Vpliv najvišje dovoljene ravni dolga enot lokalne uprave na njihov naložbeni potencial

Avtorji

  • Ewa Gubernat Wrocław University of Economics and Business
  • Hanna Kociemska Wrocław University of Economics and Business
  • Bernadeta Dziedziak Wrocław University of Economics and Business
  • Leszek Patrzalek Wrocław University of Economics and Business

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4335/19.3.991-1014(2021)

Ključne besede:

lokalni javni dolg, naložbeni potencial, občine, fiskalna pravila

Povzetek

Ohranjanje finančne stabilnosti enot lokalne uprave za izvajanje potrebnih projektov postaja resna težava zaradi izjemnega povečanja njihove ravni dolga. Postavlja se vprašanje, ali uporaba omejitev dolga pretirano omejuje naložbeni potencial občin. Z uporabo modela linearne regresije smo dokazali, da povečanje najvišje dovoljene ravni dolga zmanjšuje naložbeni potencial. Izpodbijali smo pomen uporabe fiskalnih pravil in predstavili liberalizacijo načel fiskalnih pravil, da bi ocenili naložbeni potencial kot kazalnik za zagotovitev optimalne izrabe gospodarskega potenciala enot lokalne uprave z različnih vidikov.

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2021-10-31

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Vpliv najvišje dovoljene ravni dolga enot lokalne uprave na njihov naložbeni potencial. (2021). Lex Localis - Journal of Local Self-Government, 19(4), 991-1014. https://doi.org/10.4335/19.3.991-1014(2021)