Politična ekonomija davčnega izenačevanja: primer Hrvaške

Avtorji

  • Anto Bajo University of Zagreb, Faculty of Economics and Business
  • Marko Primorac University of Zagreb, Faculty of Economics and Business, Institute of Public Finance

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4335/15.2.155-173(2017)

Ključne besede:

davčno izenačevanje, medvladni transferji, delitev davčnih prihodkov, podpora centralne ravni upravljanja, politična ekonomija, Hrvaška

Povzetek

Zaradi neučinkovitosti pri zmanjševanju davčnih neenakosti je bila nedavno izvedena reforma hrvaškega sistema davčnega izenačevanja. Pred tem so kriteriji za uporabo instrumentov davčnega izenačevanja temeljili na statusu enot lokalnih ravni upravljanja na območjih posebnega državnega interesa in na hribovitih ter goratih območjih. Namen tega prispevka je proučiti razmerje med uporabo instrumentov izenačevanja in politično strukturo enot lokalnih ravni upravljanja v letu 2010. Raziskava je pokazala statistično pomemben odnos med političnim usklajevanjem lokalnih in centralne ravni upravljanja ter preferenčnim statusom na območjih posebnega državnega interesa in delitvijo podpore prek obračuna dohodnine.

Biografija avtorja

  • Anto Bajo, University of Zagreb, Faculty of Economics and Business

    Professor

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2017-05-01

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Politična ekonomija davčnega izenačevanja: primer Hrvaške. (2017). Lex Localis - Journal of Local Self-Government, 15(2), 155-173. https://doi.org/10.4335/15.2.155-173(2017)