FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE: A RESEARCH STUDY ON DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS, AUTONOMY, AND COOPERATIVE MECHANISMS

Abstract

Federalism remains one of the key models of dealing with diversity, advancing democracy, and distributing power between the central and sub-national state. However, federal systems do not rely on single characteristics but rather on the combinations of constitutional design, judicial interpretation, and collaborative practices to achieve resilience. This paper explores the concept of federalism in three interdependent aspects that include the allocation of powers, the independence of sub-national units, and the mechanisms of cooperation that connect various levels of governance. Based on the qualitative research design, which is based on the doctrinal and comparative analysis, the study explores five federations such as India, the United States, Germany, Canada, and South Africa, each of which represents different traditions and institutional innovations. The results show that federations that have a loose allocation of powers, substantial fiscal and administrative freedom, and established cooperative frameworks are stronger and more resilient to the modern challenges. The United States emphasizes on the role of judicial interpretation whereas Canada shows the value of fiscal independence. Germany demonstrates what can be done by cooperative institutions, India demonstrates what excessive centralization can accomplish, and South Africa demonstrates how cooperative governance can be constitutionalized. The contribution of the work to the formation of the federal theory is the definition of resilience as the product of power distribution, autonomy, and cooperation interactions. The study to the policymakers emphasizes the need to have fiscal reforms, judicial balance and good intergovernmental mechanism to enable federal stability in the rapidly changing governance environment.