Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Environmental Governance Between Government and Coal Enterprises Under Environmental Audit Supervision

Abstract

In order to explore the interaction mechanism of environmental governance game between the government and the coal enterprises under the sustainable development goal, this paper constructs a evolutionary game theory model of the government and the coal enterprise environmental governance which contains the environmental protection subsidy and punishment, the government reputation loss cost and other factors. Subsequently, the relevant data were selected for simulation with MATLAB software. The investigation carried out by us has revealed that improving government supervision will promote the ideal stable state of both government and enterprises and increasing the standard of environmental subsidies can promote coal enterprises to reduce the degree of environmental damage. Surprisingly, excessive subsidies will hinder the government's active supervision. Furthermore, the implementation of higher environmental protection penalties for coal enterprises that do not actively carry out environmental governance can limit the intensity of corporate environmental damage, but it will also extend the time for the government to reach a stable state. In addition,when the perceived cost of reputational damage from negative government regulation reaches a certain level，the government will turn to an active supervision strategy. Therefore, the government should adopt a positive environmental regulation strategy, improve the standard of environmental subsidies, improve the punishment of environmental damage, and strengthen the publicity of environmental protection concepts, so as to form a good situation of environmental governance of coal enterprises and active government supervision.