How to Make the Low-Powered Incentives Mode of the Public Sector Play a High-Powered Incentive Effect- Evidence from China's Government Performance Management Reform
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.52152/22.3.164-187(2024)Keywords:
public sector, incentive power, performance management reform, grassroots government, transformational leadershipAbstract
Most challenging is motivating bureaucrats who perform duties during their jobs. Public organizations gain more from low-powered incentives than private sector incentives because of multitasking and lack of rivalry. Political and financial incentives dominate public sector motives, much below private sector incentives. Thus, scholars have concentrated on low-powered incentives to boost public sector incentives. This paper examines performance evaluation scheme-optimized incentive system design and operation. The case study of West Lake District, Hangzhou City, China, shows structure, process, and leadership-based organisational motivation development in performance management reform. The findings suggest that scientifically sound reward schemes necessitate effective interaction between many subjects under the current incentive structure. Transformational leadership defines incentive targets and requires high-quality incentive plans to turn reward plans into organisational incentive power. Performance review employing “classified assessment and classified incentive” can boost incentive power. How subordinate government civil servants view the performance evaluation scheme's fairness will affect their "performance recognition". and organisational incentive. This study improves China's performance-based incentive power system and low-powered incentives. The study indicated that fairness perception strengthens organisational incentives and transformative leadership. The study's district focus may restrict its value. Confirming the findings and studying transformative leadership in other public sectors requires research.
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