

THE EVOLUTION OF THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN ALGERIA AND ITS IMPACT ON ENHANCING DEMOCRATIC INTEGRITY IN LIGHT OF THE 2020 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND ORDER (21-01)

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Received: 21/05/2025 ; Accepted: 12/09/2025

ABSTRACT

The electoral system in Algeria has undergone significant transformations since independence; however, the most notable change came after the popular Hirak of 2019, followed by the 2020 constitutional amendment and the issuance of Order (21-01) dated 10 March 2021, containing the organic law related to the electoral system. This study aims to analyze the structure of the Algerian electoral system in light of these developments, with a focus on their impact on strengthening democratic transparency and integrity.

The study adopts an analytical-descriptive methodology based on examining relevant constitutional and legal texts, in addition to drawing on scientific, juridical, and judicial literature addressing the issue of elections in Algeria.

The study starts from a central question: To what extent did the 2020 constitutional amendment and Order (21-01) contribute to restructuring the Algerian electoral system in a way that achieves greater integrity and transparency? This main question branches into several sub-questions related to the evolution of electoral legislation, the independence of the Independent National Authority for Elections, the effectiveness of judicial oversight by the Constitutional Court, and the interpretation of electoral abstention and invalid ballots.

The study concludes that recent constitutional and legal reforms have paved the way for a new phase in the organization of the electoral process, through redefining the role of electoral administration, strengthening judicial oversight mechanisms, and introducing the principle of digitization in election management. However, major challenges remain, particularly regarding low voter turnout, fragmented parliamentary representation, and the limited legislative initiative of deputies, which calls for continuing the reform process with broader institutional and cultural measures.

Keywords: electoral system, Algeria, Constitution (2020), Order (21-01), Independent National Authority for Elections, Constitutional Court, electoral abstention.

INTRODUCTION

Elections are among the most important political institutions in the modern state. They are not merely a technical mechanism for selecting individuals who will exercise authority; rather, they express the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, and reflect the degree to which democratic and pluralistic values are entrenched within society. In the Algerian context, the legal organization of the electoral process has represented an ongoing arena of tension between the requirements of political legitimacy and the need for stability, and between the aspiration for democracy and the constraints imposed by political and security transformations over decades (Saeed Bouachir, 2013).

The electoral system in Algeria has passed through several stages: from the one-party phase, to the opening toward political pluralism in the late 1980s, then to the political and security crises that followed the suspension of the electoral process in 1992, and finally to the 1996 Constitution, which established a bicameral system, accompanied by a series of constitutional amendments that reshaped the political system. However, the deepest transformation came after the popular Hirak of 22 February 2019, which expressed a broad popular demand to rebuild the legitimacy of the political system on firmer democratic grounds. The 2020 constitutional amendment responded politically and legally to these demands through the consolidation of several principles, most notably: the constitutionalization of the Hirak, the strengthening of citizens' political rights, and the establishment or reorganization of several constitutional bodies, foremost among them the Constitutional Court and the Independent National Authority for Elections (Swalhah & Hafdallah, 2024).

Within this context, the Algerian legislator introduced Organic Law (21-01) on the electoral system as a mechanism to implement the provisions of the 2020 Constitution in the electoral field. This was achieved by redefining the rules governing the electoral register, candidacy conditions, voting systems, oversight of electoral campaigns and their financing, and judicial appeal procedures, while granting a central role to the Independent National Authority for Elections.

From here arises the central problem of this study, which can be formulated as follows:

To what extent did the 2020 constitutional amendment and Order (21-01) contribute to restructuring the Algerian electoral system in a manner that enhances integrity, transparency, and trust in the electoral process?

This main question leads to several sub-questions, the most important of which are:

1. How has the Algerian electoral system evolved from independence until the 2020 amendment?
2. What are the main pillars introduced by the 2020 Constitution in the electoral field?
3. What role does the Independent National Authority for Elections play in managing the electoral process, and how independent is it in practice?
4. How can the phenomenon of electoral abstention and the rise in invalid ballots in legislative elections be explained?
5. How effective is the judicial oversight exercised by the Constitutional Court over the electoral process and its results?
6. How does the adopted voting system affect political representation and parliamentary performance?

This study aims to answer these questions by dividing the work into six interrelated chapters, beginning with the theoretical foundations of the relevant concepts, then analyzing the constitutional and legal framework, and finally evaluating the effects of recent reforms on political representation and electoral integrity.

The study adopts an analytical-descriptive approach: it analyzes the relevant constitutional texts and organic laws, draws on research, articles, and judicial studies, and employs the comparative method in a partial manner when needed—particularly when referring to some comparative experiences discussed in the literature (such as the French or Tunisian cases) (Ikram Abdelhakim, 2007; Barhoumi, 2014).

The importance of this study lies in its focus on a pivotal moment in Algeria's contemporary political history, seeking to link constitutional reform and the electoral system on the one hand, and the issue of restoring citizens' trust in the electoral process on the other, within a context marked by high electoral abstention and a record increase in invalid ballots (Independent National Authority for Elections, 2021).

Section One: The Theoretical and Conceptual Framework of the Electoral System

First Requirement: The Concept of Voting and Its Legal Nature

1. Linguistic and Juridical Definition

Linguistically, the term “voting” (al-iqtira‘) appears in Arabic dictionaries with meanings related to choosing and expressing opinion. In *Lisan al-Arab* by Ibn Manzur, voting refers to drawing lots to choose among a group of persons or options, and it also denotes the act of expressing one's opinion on a specific matter (Ibn Manzur, n.d.). This linguistic meaning aligns with the essence of the electoral process as a mechanism of choice between alternatives, whether involving persons, programs, or political projects.

From a juridical perspective, scholars of public law view voting as the procedural framework that enables the citizen to exercise the right to participate in public affairs. It is the channel through which popular will is translated into tangible outcomes, such as the formation of elected assemblies or the adoption of legislative texts through referendums (Abdelrazak Abdelhamid, 2014).

2. Legal Definition in Algerian Legislation

Legally, Order (21-01) of 10 March 2021, which contains the organic law related to the electoral system, defines voting in Article (02) as “a comprehensive term used to describe an electoral or referendum process.” This legislative definition expands the concept, as it does not confine it to the moment of casting a vote but makes it inclusive of all procedures related to the electoral or referendum process—from preparing electoral lists, through the campaign and the organization of polling stations, to counting, announcing results, and judicial appeals (Order (21-01), Article (02)).

It is evident from this definition that the Algerian legislator adopts a holistic approach to the electoral process, viewing voting as an integrated system involving legal, technical, administrative, and judicial elements. This paves the way for a deeper understanding of the nature of the reforms introduced by the 2020 Constitution and this organic law.

3. Voting as a Democratic Mechanism and an Indicator of Legitimacy

Voting performs several fundamental functions in a democratic state, the most important of which are:

- Embodying popular sovereignty: enabling citizens to freely choose their representatives according to the principle that “the people are the source of all authority.”
- Democratic legitimacy of institutions: elected bodies derive their legitimacy from the electoral process, and the more transparent and fair the process is, the stronger the legitimacy of institutions becomes.
- Peaceful transfer of power: voting prevents sliding into violence or resorting to unconstitutional means to attain power, as long as it is accessible, inclusive, and trustworthy.
- Political education of citizens: participating in voting is an opportunity to deepen political awareness and reinforce a culture of dialogue and pluralism (Muneem Barhoumi, 2014).

Thus, any breach of the conditions of fairness or transparency in voting negatively affects the legitimacy of the political system as a whole. This explains the notable emphasis in the Algerian experience on introducing additional legal and institutional safeguards in areas such as judicial oversight, independent electoral administration, digitization, and others.

Second Requirement: The Historical Development of Electoral Legislation in Algeria

Since independence, Algeria has witnessed a gradual process in developing its electoral structure, which can be divided into distinct phases:

1. The Post-Independence Phase and the 1963 Constitution

After independence in 1962, Algeria moved toward drafting the 1963 Constitution, which established the principle of popular sovereignty and created the National Assembly as an elected legislative body. However, this constitution did not last long; its application was suspended in October 1963, and the country shifted to what became known as revolutionary legitimacy, where the Revolutionary Council and the Government Council exercised legislative and executive powers (Saeed Bouachir, 2013).

During this phase, no stable electoral system developed, and electoral practices remained tied more to revolutionary and historical legitimacy than to institutionalized electoral legitimacy.

2. The 1976 Constitution and the Beginning of the First Organized Parliamentary Experience

The 1976 Constitution marked a turning point, restoring the role of representative institutions through the establishment of the National People's Assembly. Legislative elections were organized in 1977 under Electoral Law 80/08 of 25 October 1980, which set conditions for candidacy, voting, and the organization of electoral districts. However, this practice took place within a one-party system, as the National Liberation Front (FLN) monopolized the political arena, limiting electoral competition to within a single party structure (Bouachir, 2013).

Nevertheless, this phase contributed to establishing organizational traditions in the electoral field, such as district division, preparation of electoral lists, and regulation of campaigns through legal texts.

3. The Phase of Political Pluralism in 1989 and Beyond

With the 1989 Constitution, Algeria transitioned to a multi-party system, giving rise to political parties of various ideological orientations, opening the way for the formation of political associations, and establishing broader electoral competition. This culminated in the first pluralistic legislative elections in 1991. However, the suspension of the electoral process and the subsequent security crisis pushed the country into a complex transitional stage, limiting the natural development of electoral experience.

Despite this crisis, the experience generated awareness of the need for stricter conditions to ensure electoral fairness, both legally and institutionally—an awareness reflected in the 1996 Constitution and subsequent reforms.

4. The 1996 Constitution, the Bicameral System, and the Mixed Voting Model

The 1996 Constitution established the Council of the Nation as a second chamber of Parliament, leading to the adoption of two different voting methods:

- Direct and secret voting to elect members of the National People's Assembly.
- Indirect voting to elect two-thirds of the Council of the Nation members, chosen by members of municipal and provincial popular assemblies, with the remaining one-third appointed by the President of the Republic (Order (21-01), Article (218)).

This change introduced a new representative dimension linked to local structures but also raised questions regarding the balance between direct popular legitimacy and indirect representative legitimacy, as well as the overlap of powers between the two chambers (Omar Thamri, 2021).

5. The Post-2019 Phase and the 2020 Constitutional Amendment

The 2020 Constitutional Amendment represents a pivotal milestone; it not only redistributed powers among state institutions but also enshrined the aspirations of the popular Hirak to renew the political class, combat corruption, and strengthen the independence of the judiciary and independent bodies—foremost among them the Independent National Authority for Elections.

The 2020 Constitution established several election-related principles, including:

- Guaranteeing the right to vote and stand as a candidate for every citizen once legal conditions are met (Article (56)).
- Consolidating the principle of direct and secret universal suffrage for electing members of the National People's Assembly and the principle of indirect voting for electing two-thirds of the Council of the Nation (Article (121)).
- Recognizing the role of the Independent National Authority for Elections as a central actor in managing, organizing, and monitoring the electoral process (Swalhah & Hafdallah, 2024).

Section Two: The 2020 Constitutional Amendment and the Restructuring of the Electoral System

First Requirement: Electoral Foundations in the 2020 Constitution

The 2020 Constitution reorganized the structures of the political system, but its most significant provisions in the electoral field are reflected in three main axes:

6. Consolidation of the Right to Vote and Stand for Election

The Constitution stipulates that every citizen has the right to vote and to stand as a candidate once the legal conditions are met (Article (56)). This provision is an extension of what previous constitutions had established, but it gained special significance after the popular Hirak, as it was intended to express an opening toward wider participation of different segments of society, alongside stricter requirements of integrity and transparency.

The principle of equality among citizens in exercising this right was also strengthened by linking it to objective criteria (such as legal capacity and non-deprivation by judicial ruling), which aligns with international standards for free and fair elections (Abdelwahab Mohamed, 2019).

7. Balance Between Direct and Indirect Voting

Article (121) of the Constitution affirms that members of the National People's Assembly are elected through direct and secret universal suffrage, while two-thirds of the members of the Council of the Nation are elected through indirect and secret suffrage, with two seats allocated for each province, from among members of municipal and provincial popular assemblies.

This arrangement reflects the legislator's philosophy of achieving a balance between:

- Representation of the direct popular will at the national level (the first chamber).
- Representation of local interests and territorial communities through their representatives in the second chamber.

However, this arrangement has raised practical issues regarding the effectiveness of the Council of the Nation and the extent of its influence on the legislative process compared to the National People's Assembly, topics examined critically by some researchers (Thamri, 2021).

8. Constitutionalization of the Independent National Authority for Elections

Incorporating the Independent National Authority for Elections into the constitutional framework is one of the most notable innovations of the 2020 Constitution. It was recognized as an independent body responsible for organizing and monitoring electoral and referendum processes, based on a clear popular demand for separating electoral administration from the executive apparatus and protecting the electoral process from administrative interference (Bouguerra, 2024; Swalhah & Hafdallah, 2024).

This step represents a shift from a model of "government electoral administration" to a model of "independent electoral administration," which has become common in several comparative democratic experiences.

Second Requirement: Organic Law (21-01) – Philosophy and Innovations

1. General Background of Order (21-01)

Order (21-01) was issued on 10 March 2021 in an exceptional political and constitutional context. It came after the adoption of the 2020 Constitution and in response to the urgent need to organize legislative and local elections according to new rules aimed at renewing elected assemblies based on a logic that transcends previous practices associated with electoral corruption and weak representation (Imad Swalhah & Hafdallah, 2024).

This organic law is characterized by its comprehensive nature, covering:

- General provisions related to voting and the electoral register.
- The organization of presidential, legislative, and local elections.
- Regulation of voting systems and seat distribution methods.
- Regulation of electoral campaigns and their financing.
- Mechanisms of appeals and judicial oversight.
- Provisions related to the Independent National Authority for Elections.

9. Major Technical and Legal Innovations

Among the most important innovations introduced by Order (21-01) are:

1. Redefining the electoral district and the method of seat distribution in line with demographic and regional data.
2. Establishing stricter conditions for candidacy, especially regarding criminal records, adherence to financial transparency, verification of funding sources, and excluding individuals involved in corruption cases.
3. Criminalizing several electoral violations such as vote-buying, use of illicit money, and manipulation of electoral lists, with the aim of enhancing integrity.
4. Affirming the principle of neutrality of polling stations and centers by placing them under the supervision of the Independent National Authority for Elections instead of the governor, as was previously the case, and defining their composition in a way that ensures balance, representation, and neutrality (Order (21-01), articles related to polling stations).

5. Regulating more precise oversight of electoral campaign accounts and subjecting them to the control of the Constitutional Court in some electoral events, representing an extension of oversight over the legality of results and electoral spending.

These amendments collectively aim to rebuild trust in the electoral process; however, their actual success remains dependent on other factors such as the performance of political parties, voter awareness, and judicial independence, which will be addressed in subsequent chapters.

Section Three: The Independent National Authority for Elections – From Administration to Governance

First Requirement: Establishment and Foundation

The Independent National Authority for Elections was initially created under regulatory texts preceding the 2020 Constitution, and was later constitutionally enshrined within this amendment. It emerged in response to a core demand of the popular Hirak, namely ending the dominance of the executive apparatus—particularly the Ministry of the Interior—over the organization of electoral processes.

This authority enjoys legal personality and administrative and financial independence. It exercises its powers throughout the national territory, in addition to organizing voting for members of the Algerian community abroad. Its organizational provisions are governed by legal and organic texts that define its membership structure, appointment procedures, duration of mandate, and guarantees of independence.

Second Requirement: Functions and Powers

The functions of the Independent National Authority for Elections include:

1. Preparing and reviewing the electoral register in cooperation with municipalities and relevant bodies, while providing mechanisms for objections and corrections.
2. Supervising all stages of the electoral process, from accrediting candidates and lists to organizing the electoral campaign, distributing voting materials, supervising polling stations, and receiving official reports.
3. Ensuring the neutrality of its agents and members, and preventing any interference from administrative or political authorities in its work.
4. Promoting electoral culture and supporting scientific research in electoral matters in cooperation with research centers and universities (Jedidi & Djeradji, 2024; Bouguerra, 2024).
5. Contributing to the digitization of the electoral process and preparing gradually for the adoption of electronic voting in the medium or long term (Jedidi & Djeradji, 2024).

It is noted that the functions of this authority go beyond the narrow technical framework of electoral administration to include dimensions related to good governance, technological foresight, and the consolidation of a democratic electoral culture.

Section Four: The Phenomenon of Electoral Abstention and the Analysis of Electoral Behavior in Algeria

First Requirement: Voter Turnout in Legislative Elections

Official data show that Algeria has witnessed a significant increase in abstention rates during various legislative elections. In some elections, voter turnout did not exceed one-third of the electorate, reaching its peak in the 2021 legislative elections, where abstention surpassed two-thirds of voters (Independent National Authority for Elections, 2021).

Some provinces that historically recorded relatively high turnout—especially those with large populations—also experienced a sharp decline, indicating a growing crisis of trust regarding the effectiveness of elections as a mechanism for change.

Second Requirement: The Phenomenon of Invalid Ballots

Alongside abstention, another growing phenomenon is the rise in the number of invalid ballots. In some elections, their totals reached record levels, with more than 2.1 million invalid ballots recorded in the 2017 elections—the highest number in the history of Algeria’s legislative elections (Ministry of the Interior, 2017).

This phenomenon can be interpreted through two main possibilities:

- A portion of voters may participate formally yet express their rejection of the political offer by deliberately invalidating their ballots.
- Weak electoral education and a lack of understanding among some voters on how to cast a valid vote, especially when the voting system is complex or when the number of lists and candidates is high.

In both cases, the rise in invalid ballots is a negative indicator of the quality of the electoral process whether in terms of the political elite's offer or the effectiveness of electoral awareness efforts.

Third Requirement: Explaining the Abstention Phenomenon – A Sociological and Political Approach

Several factors can be identified to explain abstention, based on debates in scientific and legal literature:

1. Crisis of trust in political institutions: Many citizens do not believe that elections lead to genuine changes in public policies or in the nature of ruling elites.
2. Weak performance of elected councils: Their role is often limited to endorsing government-drafted bills, with limited legislative initiative from deputies; Sayka notes that the National People's Assembly in the 2021/2022 session confined itself to approving government bills without notable legislative initiatives (Sayka, 2025).
3. The dominance of political money and previous electoral corruption: This has left a negative impression on voters, even with the introduction of new measures to criminalize such practices.
4. Weakness of political parties: In terms of their programs, renewal of elites, and connection to their social base.
5. Cultural and social factors: Related to weak civic education and the prevalence of apathy among certain groups, especially youth.

All these factors make increasing voter turnout a central challenge for any electoral reform.

Section Five: Judicial Oversight of the Electoral Process – The Constitutional Court as a Model

First Requirement: Jurisdictions of the Constitutional Court in the Electoral Field

The Constitutional Court (formerly the Constitutional Council) is a fundamental guarantor of the integrity of the electoral process through a set of jurisdictions, the most prominent of which are:

- Ruling on appeals related to the provisional results of legislative and presidential elections.
- Monitoring the legality of constitutional referendums.
- Announcing the final results of elections and referendums.
- Monitoring campaign accounts in certain electoral events (Order (21-01), Articles 282–289).

The 2020 Constitution affirmed these powers while expanding some of them in line with the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution and the necessity of protecting the electoral will from manipulation or fraud (Hawam Al-Sheikha, 2024).

Second Requirement: The Electoral Appeals System

Appeals against the provisional results of legislative elections are subject to specific legal conditions related to the status of the appellant, deadlines, and both formal and substantive procedures, as defined in the organic law on the electoral system and the organic law on the Constitutional Court. Sayka indicates that the Constitutional Court examines these appeals according to strict criteria and may, when necessary:

- Annul the results of certain polling stations or centers.
- Correct the results.
- Or, in rare cases, nullify elections in a particular district and order their reorganization.

This system of appeals contributes to strengthening the trust of political actors and voters in the idea that potential irregularities during the voting process are not final, and that there is a higher judicial authority to which recourse is possible (Sayka, 2025).

Third Requirement: Oversight of the Parliamentary Mandate and Cases of Replacement

In addition to monitoring the validity of the results, the Constitutional Court plays an important role in overseeing the continuity of the parliamentary mandate, particularly in cases of:

- Vacating a seat due to death, resignation, or appointment to governmental or other positions incompatible with the parliamentary mandate.
- Establishing a situation of incompatibility or non-cumul as defined by the organic law (such as holding both a parliamentary mandate and certain high-ranking positions).

Sayka presented examples of decisions by the Constitutional Court, including Decision No. 386/Q.M.D/21 and Decision No. 387/Q.M.D/21 dated 5 August 2021, related to the replacement of parliamentary membership upon the establishment of a situation of incompatibility, where the vacancy was declared and replacement was approved according to the legal conditions set out in the Electoral Law (Sayka, 2025).

This type of oversight contributes to ensuring the stability of parliamentary work and preventing the misuse of the parliamentary mandate for purposes inconsistent with the public interest.

Section Six: The Impact of the Electoral System on Political Representation and Parliamentary Performance

First Requirement: Parliamentary Representation Between Pluralism and Fragmentation

The voting method adopted and the mechanism for seat distribution have a direct impact on the nature of parliamentary representation. In the Algerian context, the multiplicity of lists and political formations participating in elections combined with low turnout rates has often resulted in parliaments characterized by fragmented representation and the presence of a large number of small blocs, while some traditional parties continue to maintain a strong presence (Qirae, 2021).

Although this plurality may be viewed as an indicator of political diversity, it simultaneously raises issues related to the stability of majorities and the difficulty of forming cohesive coalitions, which in turn affects the effectiveness of parliamentary work.

Second Requirement: The Oversight Performance of the National People's Assembly

Theoretically, Parliament possesses multiple tools to monitor the government, such as oral and written questions, investigation committees, interpellations, and the possibility of a vote of no confidence. However, practical implementation in Algeria has shown limitations in the effective use of these tools due to:

- The dominance of the pro-government majority within the Assembly.
- Weak parliamentary traditions in exercising genuine oversight.
- The overlap between partisan affiliations and the requirements of institutional work.

Sayka indicates that the 2021/2022 legislative session saw the National People's Assembly rely mainly on approving government-drafted bills, without strong legislative initiatives from the deputies, which reinforces the impression of a weak supervisory and innovative role of the legislative institution (Sayka, 2025).

Third Requirement: Legislative Initiative and the Limited Legislative Role of Deputies

Constitutionally, deputies have the right to propose laws alongside the government. However, Article (147) of the 2020 Constitution restricts this right, as it prohibits accepting any bill or amendment that results in a reduction of public revenues or an increase in public expenditures unless accompanied by compensatory measures (Constitution 2020, Article (147)).

This restriction, along with other requirements concerning the number of deputies needed to submit a draft law, makes legislative initiative difficult to implement especially in a Parliament suffering from partisan fragmentation. As a result, the government continues to dominate legislative initiative in most cases, limiting the role of deputies as genuine lawmakers and reducing their role largely to approval and ratification.

Conclusion

This research sought to provide an expanded analytical reading of the development of the electoral system in Algeria, with a focus on the transformations experienced by this system in light of the 2020 constitutional amendment and Order (21-01) related to the electoral system.

The study began by establishing the concept of voting and its place within democratic governance, then traced the historical path of electoral legislation since independence, highlighting the specific characteristics of each stage. The analysis showed that the most significant transformation in the history of the Algerian electoral system was represented by the 2020 Constitution, which established new principles, the most important of which are: the constitutionalization of the popular Hiraq, the strengthening of political rights, the recognition of the Independent National Authority for Elections, and the improvement of the overall framework of judicial oversight.

The study also demonstrated the pivotal role played by the Independent National Authority for Elections in restructuring electoral administration and moving it from a model subordinated to the executive apparatus to a more independent one, with the integration of digitization and a gradual shift toward electronic voting.

In contrast, official data on voter turnout rates and invalid ballots revealed a genuine crisis of trust between citizens and the electoral process; high abstention rates and large numbers of invalid ballots indicate that legal reforms are a necessary but insufficient condition on their own to restore this trust. The study also uncovered limitations in parliamentary performance in terms of legislative initiative and oversight, given the dominance of the government over the legislative process, the fragmentation of party representation in the National People's Assembly, and the constitutional restrictions imposed on the proposal of laws by deputies.

Based on this, a number of recommendations can be proposed:

1. Strengthening electoral culture and civic education by integrating topics of democracy and elections into school curricula, and organizing continuous—not merely seasonal—awareness campaigns.
2. Developing the performance of the Independent National Authority for Elections by further empowering it on human, financial, and technical levels, and consolidating its transparency through publishing detailed reports on the conduct of each electoral event.
3. Revising certain legal provisions related to legislative initiative by deputies to facilitate its use, thereby granting Parliament a greater role in shaping public policies.
4. Expanding the scope of digitization in the electoral process in a well-studied manner, drawing on comparative experiences, to ensure greater speed and transparency in announcing results.
5. Encouraging political parties to renew their elites and programs in a way that enables them to attract voters especially youth and convince them of the value of participation.

In conclusion, it can be said that the electoral system in Algeria is in a delicate transitional phase; while legal and institutional foundations for its reform have been established, the success of this reform remains dependent on its ability to produce tangible effects in the political reality and restore citizens' confidence that their vote is capable of making a difference.

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