

EVALUATION ON THE GOVERNMENT REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS FOR REBEL RETURNEES

Ludivina Borja-Dekit, RSW, DPA¹

Western Mindanao State University¹

ludivina.dekit@wmsu.edu.ph¹

ABSTRACT

This study evaluates how government reintegration programs affected the quality of life of rebel returnees on the Zamboanga Peninsula. It focuses on their socio-economic conditions before and after reintegration, available programs and services, social challenges, economic opportunities, and psychosocial support. It also suggested a reintegration structure. The study examined psychological, social, and financial elements of reintegration using a mixed-methods approach. Using Slovin's formula, the research surveyed 100 rebel returnees from Zamboanga Sibugay, Zamboanga del Sur, and Zamboanga del Norte, and purposefully interviewed project managers and community people. Exclusions included individuals without reintegration, those involved in criminal activity, and those with serious mental health problems. Results showed that long-term stability remained a difficulty even if reintegration initiatives provided some socioeconomic advantages. Employment was erratic; financial help uneven; and housing support insufficient. Lack of mental health treatments caused psychological stress; community stigma hampered reintegration. Vocational training's efficacy was lowered by mismatch with market needs. Although returnees knew about programs, accessibility and efficacy remained issues. Strong family and community support helped social reintegration, although local decision-making was often not sought. Low work satisfaction, unstable employment, and housing insecurity were economic challenges. The mediocre rating of mental health support highlights the need for improved services. Apart from family income, which affected social reintegration, the research found no significant correlation between major demographic variables and reintegration outcomes. For sustained reintegration, the suggested structure stresses skill development, psychological assistance, stigma reduction, and legislative changes. While government initiatives help with social reintegration, disparities in housing, mental health care, and economic stability still exist. Promoting sustainable development and financial independence for rebel returnees calls for long-term planning.

Keywords: reintegration programs; rebel returnees; socio-economic conditions; sustainable reintegration

1. INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

The endeavors of the Philippine government to reintegrate former members of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP NPA) have grown even more important in their strategy to handle insurgency and create sustainable peace. By way of financial support, livelihood training, housing, and academic support, programs like the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP) assist former rebels. These initiatives assist former rebels not just in recovering their stability and independence but also in lowering the possibility of their returning to participate in insurgency activity. Returnees should have choices and a sense of belonging so they may reintegrate into society and help their hometowns. Apart from providing financial support, ECLIP provides psychological therapy to help former rebels deal with the trauma they might have experienced during their period of armed warfare. Consequently, the government's reintegration initiatives are considered crucial for ending the cycle of insurgency as they let former rebels start over and lead peaceful life.

Part of the normalizing process, according to the Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation, and Unity (OPAPRU), is "process whereby conflict-affected communities can return to conditions where they can achieve their desired quality of life, which includes the pursuit of sustainable livelihoods and political participation inside a peaceful deliberative

society." This idea stresses financial and social assistance as well as psychological and community-based therapy to help former rebels fully enter civilian life.

Aiming to address national underlying causes of insurgency like poverty, injustice, and corruption, the Philippine government via the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC) seeks to solve these problems. Especially in rural regions, these institutional problems have often resulted in recruitment into groups like the CPP-NPA as disappointed people search for answers. On the Zamboanga Peninsula, where poverty and inequality abound, these structural problems have been evident as causes of rebel action. Local governments see the importance of supporting former rebels and addressing these basic problems via social and economic development. Emphasizing collaboration between national and local authorities, the "whole-of-nation" approach seeks to provide affected people full help. This covers initiatives aiming to offer access to education, healthcare, and livelihood opportunities—qualities seen to be basic to reduce the attraction of insurgent organizations. The government aims to lower social and economic disparities so less likely groups will turn to violent revolt.

Over the past five years, several CPP-NPA members have turned themselves in under the government's rehabilitation effort on the Zamboanga Peninsula. Estimates show that over 2,000 former rebels have freely returned under lawful rule. Various government initiatives have benefited these returning rebels. Apart from skill development, former rebels have received financial help to start small businesses or choose different financial paths. For educational activities to boost employability, guarantees of access to vocational training and literacy courses have been given. The government has worked with local authorities to create a proper environment for returnees, giving psychological and financial support to enable reintegration. Especially the Zamboanga Peninsula has seen former rebels safely reintegrate; many now help their hometowns. Testimony from returnees highlights how these programs helped them rebuild their lives and find meaning. The government hopes to reduce the current count of active insurgents and deter future recruiting by tackling the problems that typically lead individuals to insurgent organizations.

The reason for this study comes from the need to evaluate how well former rebels may effectively reintegrate into society with government programs. Given insurgency and rebellion are continuous issues in the Philippines, particularly in locations like the Zamboanga Peninsula, knowing the impact of programs like the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP) is very crucial. By assessing the outcomes of several initiatives, this study aims to provide perceptive analysis of whether these programs are addressing the basic reasons of insurgency, promoting ongoing peace, and allowing returnees to rebuild their life. The results might guide next strategies and help to plan reintegration initiatives to maximize their whole influence.

1.1. Objectives of the Problem

The purpose of this study was to assess how attempts at government reintegration influence Zamboanga Peninsula rebel returnees' quality of life. It aimed specially to address the following:

1. To determine the socio-economic conditions of rebel returnees in Zamboanga-Peninsula before and after the reintegration program.
2. To determine the programs and services provided to rebel returnees during reintegration.
3. To identify the social issues affecting rebel returnees in terms of:

- a. Family Dynamics;
 - b. Social Networks; and
 - c. Relationship with Local Authorities.
4. To explore the economic opportunities available for rebel returnees in terms of:
 - a. Employment Status;
 - b. Access to Resources;
 - c. Education and Skills;
 - d. Healthcare Access;
 - e. Livelihood Assistance;
 - f. Housing Conditions; and
 - g. Security and Safety.
5. To assess the psychosocial support needs of rebel returnees in terms of:
 - a. Mental Health Status;
 - b. Social Integration; and
 - c. Family Reunification.
6. To propose a reintegration program based on the study's findings that addresses the needs and challenges of rebel returnees.
- 7. Hypotheses**
8. The following hypotheses were tested:
H₀1: There is no significant relationship among social, economic, and psychosocial factors when grouped according to their profile.

1.2. Assumptions of the Study

Based on the study's objectives, the following assumptions were derived:

1. Rebel returnees' demographic characteristics—age, sex, educational level, location of origin, length of time spent as a rebel, and family income—affect their willingness to participate.
2. Family relationships, social networks, and interactions with local authorities significantly affect the reintegration process.
3. The capacity of rebel returnees to attain socioeconomic stability depends on availability to work, financial aid, and livelihood projects.
4. Socioeconomic conditions improved after reintegration.
5. Reintegration success is influenced by mental health state, availability to counseling, and social support.
6. The results should be used to create a program to help rebels return home and meet their needs.

1.3. Significance of the Study

This study may contribute to the following beneficiaries:

Rebel Returnees: The ones who stand to gain the most. By finding out about their psychological, social, and financial problems, the study could help make programs more specific to their needs and make the transfer to normal life easier.

Government Agencies: The outcomes could be useful for local governments and government offices working on reunification projects, such as the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP). Policymakers might be guided in assessing and enhancing current initiatives such as the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP).

Community Organizations: The results could help NGOs and community groups helping underprivileged people. Understanding the elements influencing reintegration will enable these groups to more precisely provide services to assist rebel returnees.

Local Communities: Emphasizing the need for support services for reintegrating former rebels, the findings may benefit nearby towns. Raised awareness may help lower stigma and promote inclusive policies.

Mental Health Professionals: The emphasis on psychological problems will provide mental health experts with knowledge on the problems experienced by rebel returnees. This will enable them to create more suited support systems.

Future Researchers: The work will serve as a reference for academics researching comparable themes or populations. It could motivate more research on reintegration initiatives or other underprivileged groups.

The Researcher: This study offers the researcher an opportunity to learn about conflict dynamics and community resiliency. The acquired knowledge will improve the researcher's abilities in both qualitative and quantitative approaches.

1.4. Scope and Limitation

This study looked at the many things that make it hard for rebels who have been sent back to normal life to see how they deal with reintegration. Some of the things looked at are family ties, social networks, ties to local government, and the types of people who are back. They were also asked what they do for a living, how easy it was to get finances, and what jobs they have. However, the study had drawbacks. It only looked at the Zamboanga Peninsula, so results may not apply to other parts of the Philippines.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1. Research Design

The psychosocial, social, and financial elements affecting the reintegration of rebel returnees into society were investigated using a mixed-methods approach. Combining quantitative and qualitative approaches helped provide a whole knowledge of the difficult rehabilitation process. Numerical data were gathered using structured questionnaires focusing on financial circumstances, income sources, employment possibilities, and financial resource availability. This quantitative element lets the researcher evaluate financial difficulties returnees experience and how these affect their reintegration. Along with social elements—family support, neighborhood relationships, and social activity participation—the survey also looked at psychological elements like mental health problems, coping strategies, and self-esteem to grasp how they interact and affect reintegration.

2.2. Demographic Profile of the Respondents

In determining the sample size for the quantitative survey portion of this study, random sampling technique was applied using Slovin's formula. With a 95% confidence level and 5% margin of error, the sample size for the survey questionnaire yielded approximately 100 respondents from the total population of 376 rebel returnees during the last three years and 30 of them participated in the in-depth study. The research also involved five (5) project implementers and five (5) community volunteers. This helped the researcher find a group of

former rebels who had returned and community members ready for a study of their transition to life again.

2.3. Data Collection Methods

The careful and planned way that the data for this study were gathered guaranteed accurate and useful information about the experiences of transition among rebel returnees on the Zamboanga Peninsula. The first step was for local governments and other interested parties to give permission for community study to begin. This ensures everyone works together and builds trust. After getting permission, the researcher used purposive sampling for FGD to gather in-depth insights from rebel returnees with unique experience or expertise. Participants who met certain requirements were chosen. After thanking the volunteers, the researcher informed them what the study was trying to do and why their help was important. This aided participants to see how important their contribution was and urged them to share their stories freely. Subsequently, the researcher gave the subjects the survey form. After the surveys, the researcher talked to a small group in more depth. The interview guide had open-ended questions to get people to share more about their problems and how they dealt with them. All the data gathered were finally put in order and kept safely until analyzed. This method gave the researcher useful information about how rebels who returned to the Zamboanga Peninsula adjusted to life again.

2.4. Instruments Used

With the help of questionnaire guides, the study used self-made survey questions to find out about the rehabilitation experiences of rebel returnees in the Zamboanga Peninsula. The survey was meant to look at many areas of the interviewees' lives, such as their social networks, mental health problems, finances, and how successful they were at reintegrating into society. Starting with basic facts about the respondents, like their age, gender, race, level of schooling, religion, and family income. These indicators helped make the participants' stories clear. The survey also included a discussion guide with open-ended questions aimed to discover specific challenges limiting the reintegration attempts of rebel returnees and study their coping methods in order to get in-depth knowledge.

2.5. Data Analysis Techniques

Quantitative and qualitative methods were used to analyze the data so the researcher acquire a full picture of the rehabilitation experiences of rebels who came back to the Zamboanga Peninsula. Statistical methods analyzed numeric results from the self-made survey form. The researcher encoded answers into a database. Mean, median, and standard deviation were used to find out about returnees' mental health issues, social situations, and income situations. The study looked for themes and trends. Correlation and regression analyses found the strength and relevance of these correlations, enabling the researcher to get important findings about elements influencing the reintegration process. Thematic analysis was used to look at qualitative data from the focus group discussion. Typed lines were checked to fit Colaizzi's (1978) method. After listening to recorded discussions, the researcher found themes and patterns that kept coming up in relation to problems and how former rebels were treated. Information was divided into manageable chunks using codes so the researcher could focus on a different part. The researcher got a sense of subjects' points of view by reading answers carefully. This showed what they had learned and what they thought about rehabilitation. Using both quantitative and qualitative methods, the study sought to give a full picture of factors that affect the reintegration of rebel returnees in the Zamboanga Peninsula.

2.6. Ethical Considerations

Establishing credibility in this study required analysis of ethical issues. Following WMSU Ethics and Review Committee guidelines, concerns included operation, confidentiality, and anonymity. Participants joined voluntarily without repercussions. Their rights were discussed. They could stop the research at any point. Participants' privacy was protected under the Data Privacy Act of 2012. Respondents could hide their names. Demographic details like age, gender, profession, and health status were not shared. Identities were protected; responses were confidential. Participants were informed about the research's objectives, methods, and benefits. Written consent was obtained. Names did not appear in the paper.

3. RESULTS

Although reintegration initiatives gave some socioeconomic benefits for rebel returnees on the Zamboanga Peninsula, the research revealed that long-term stability was not supported enough. Employment remained erratic; many returnees battled to find rewarding employment even after training. Unfair distribution of financial help meant many lacked the means to establish sustainable enterprises or cover basic requirements. Given limited access to housing aid services, stability of housing remained a worry. Many of the respondents reported unresolved psychological ordeal and a shortage of mental health services, therefore compromising both physical and psychological well-being from limited access to healthcare. Further hampered social reintegration and economic possibilities was community stigma. Furthermore, vocational training's efficacy was diminished as it often did not fit market needs. These results underline the necessity of a more organized and continuous reintegration strategy comprising better-targeted financial help, complete healthcare support, market-relevant occupational training, and community education to lower stigma. Research from different reintegration settings confirm the need of complete support systems in guaranteeing effective transitions for former rebels.

With respondents appreciating the accessibility of information and their knowledge of available services, the survey revealed generally good awareness of reintegration programs among returnees (Mean = 3.48, Agree). On the other hand, program efficacy (Mean = 3.20, Neutral) and service accessibility (Mean = 3.20, Neutral) were ranked lower, suggesting difficulties in obtaining from reintegration initiatives. Grand Mean = 3.29, Neutral implies that while returnees acknowledge the presence of reintegration programs, accessibility and efficacy require work.

Family dynamics (Mean = 3.94, Agree), social networks (Mean = 3.73, Agree), and relationships with local authorities (Mean = 3.69, Agree) were all positively rated, indicating strong familial and community support for returnees. The overall positive response (Grand Mean = 3.79, Agree) suggests that social reintegration has been relatively smooth, with returnees feeling accepted by their families, communities, and local authorities. However, participation in community discussions facilitated by local authorities was rated neutral, indicating room for improvement in engagement initiatives.

With work stability (Mean = 2.74, Neutral) and job contentment (Mean = 2.50, Disagree) key issues, returnees struggled greatly in employment. Ranked modestly, access to resources (Mean = 3.21, Neutral) and education and skills training (Mean = 2.82, Neutral) indicated that, while assistance programs exist, they may not be enough. Additionally given indifferent scores were healthcare access (Mean = 2.78, indifferent) and livelihood aid (Mean = 3.20, Neutral). With little access to housing programs (Mean = 2.05, Disagree), housing conditions—Mean = 2.61,

Neutral—turned up as a major concern. The highest grade went to security and safety (Mean = 3.86, Agree), suggesting that returnees typically feel secure in their hometown. Grand Mean = 3.03, Neutral indicates that economic reintegration is still difficult generally, especially in work, housing, and resource access.

Mental health support (Mean = 3.29, Neutral) showed mixed results, with many returnees aware of mental health resources but still feeling their needs were not fully met. Social integration (Mean = 3.86, Agree) was rated positively, with returnees feeling accepted by their peers and communities. Family reunification (Mean = 4.20, Agree) received the highest rating, indicating strong family support for reintegration. The overall findings (Grand Mean = 3.78, Agree) suggest that while social and family integration has been successful, there is still a need for better mental health support to address the psychological challenges faced by returnees.

The results indicate that there is no significant correlation between social, economic, and psychological factors when categorized by demographic profiles. All demographic variables—including age, sex, income, and educational attainment—showed no meaningful association with social, economic, or psychological concerns. While family income was initially considered in relation to social factors, its correlation was not statistically significant in the broader analysis. Additionally, family income did not exhibit any notable relationship with economic opportunities, support networks, or psychological support needs. Given that all variables were found to be statistically insignificant, the null hypothesis (H01) is consistently upheld.

The viewpoints of project implementers and community members expose the achievements as well as the difficulties in reintegrating former rebels. From the perspective of the community, reintegration has helped to enhance social cohesiveness, infrastructural development, and security by means of active engagement of returnees in daily life. Still unresolved, though, are issues like residual psychological anxiety, political polarization, and the need of economic empowerment. Project implementers point up legal and security issues, bureaucratic delays, coordination problems, and uneven policy execution brought on by changing leadership. Reintegration attempts are further complicated by limited finance, societal stigma, and some returnees' need on government assistance. Reintegration that is effective calls for a comprehensive strategy combining security, social acceptability, economic prospects, and ongoing government and community assistance.

The suggested reintegration program solves important issues in job development, mental health support, and community integration. This will help former rebels make a smoother return to society. Its goals are to improve job skills, provide mental health care, encourage acceptance in the community, help create jobs, and push for laws that support these goals. The framework includes targeted training, counseling, efforts to raise awareness, job placement programs, and policy projects that bring together people from different sectors to work together. The main tactics for implementation are figuring out what returnees need, building their skills, forming alliances, and keeping an eye on how well they are doing. The program's all-around method aims to promote long-term social and economic security, resilience, and self-sufficiency, which will allow former rebels to return to their communities.

Other Key Findings:

- Vocational Training: Efficacy was diminished because training often did not fit market needs.

- Financial/Housing: Financial help was unevenly distributed, and limited access to housing aid was a worry.
- Returnee Economic Initiative: Returnees demonstrated proactive steps toward financial independence, emphasizing the importance of securing a sustainable income: *"I started farming and selling small goods to sustain my daily needs and prevent dependence on aid."* and *"Finding stable work allowed me to focus on rebuilding my life instead of worrying about survival."*
- Stigma: Community stigma further hampered social reintegration and economic opportunities.
- Hypothesis Testing (H01): The null hypothesis was consistently upheld, meaning there was no significant correlation found between major demographic variables (age, sex, income, educational attainment) and social, economic, or psychological concerns. This suggests that systemic factors (legal frameworks, institutional support) are more influential than individual profiles.
- Project Implementers/Community Views: Implementers cited bureaucratic delays, coordination problems, uneven policy execution, limited finance, and societal stigma. Specifically, implementers highlighted the major difficulties in managing the process:
 - On Collaboration: *"Reintegration programs for former rebels are challenging, especially when implemented without collaboration with partner agencies, security sectors, and local government units."*
 - On Bureaucracy: *"Government programs are designed to meet the needs of Friends Rescued (FRs); however, bureaucratic processes pose a significant challenge to effective implementation."*

4. DISCUSSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the study's findings, the following conclusions were drawn:

1. Especially in job, housing, mental health support, and financial stability, the results underline ongoing difficulties in the reintegration process. Returnees suffer under insufficient financial aid, restricted access to healthcare, and vocational training unrelated to market demand. The stigma in their society, which keeps reintegration impossible, aggravates these problems. These findings underscore the necessity of a more ordered long-term reintegration plan involving durable economic initiatives, better healthcare facilities, targeted financial support, and stigma-reducing community education to help former rebels gain sustainable stability.
2. Returnees have great awareness of reintegration programs, but access and benefit from these services still present challenges. Middling ratings for program efficacy and accessibility suggest even if programs are well-known, their impact and reach require more growth. Policy implementation and actual service delivery indicate gaps, emphasizing the need for better resource allocation, streamlined processes, and greater engagement to guarantee programs successfully aid returnees in their transition.
3. Positive evaluations of family dynamics, social networks, and interactions with local authorities point to how important strong family and community support are to reintegration. The impartial assessment of involvement in community dialogues points to the necessity of more inclusive participation techniques. Further improving their sense of belonging and social reintegration is strengthening communication and providing chances for returnees to engage in local decision-making.
4. Economic reintegration poses a tremendous challenge with unstable jobs, low satisfaction, inadequate housing, and limited access to resources. Safety and security

are assured, but to increase employment outcomes livelihood initiatives and skill development must align with market demands. Filling these gaps through employment assistance, housing support, and better resource access would help returnees become financially independent and stable.

5. Reintegration into family and community works; returnees say their families and communities welcome them. There is still a lack of mental health care, even though many returnees know tools are available. Reintegration programs need trauma-informed care, more mental health treatments, and better access to therapy to fully help returnees' health.
6. Age, gender, income, and education level have little to no effect on social, psychological, or financial reintegration. This means basic systemic factors like legal frameworks, institutional support, and economic opportunities are more important, even if financial problems may affect reintegration. Removing some underlying problems can help the transition go more smoothly.
7. For former rebels to be successfully reintegrated, security, law, politics, society, and economy must all be taken into account. Community participation and infrastructure changes have come a long way, but long-term success is limited by bureaucracy, unstable politics, stigma, and lack of funds. To rebuild their lives, sustainable programs must prioritize resource allocation, maintain government involvement, and encourage community participation. For lasting peace and security, it's important to improve public administration, support inclusive policies, and build trust between returnees and communities.
8. The suggested reintegration program directly addresses problems found in the study by focusing on skill development, mental health support, community engagement, job facilitation, and policy lobbying. A strict, cross-sectoral approach promotes self-sufficiency, resilience, and long-term reintegration. Returnees might reenter society and achieve social and financial security through specific treatments and ongoing observation.

Effective reintegration of former rebels depends on a multi-sectoral strategy—program growth, legislation changes, community involvement, and research. The following suggestions outline agency responsibilities for successful, sustainable reintegration:

Agency/Group	Key Recommendations	Supporting Details
OPAPRU	Establish a Reintegration Monitoring System . Support LGUs in implementing standardized reintegration programs .	Systematically track progress, identify challenges early, and ensure consistent, equitable services.
DOH	Deploy Mobile & TeleHealth Reintegration Units . Establish Trauma-Informed Community Health Hubs . Develop a DOH-led digital dashboard to track psychosocial outcomes.	Provide physical/mental health screening (PTSD, depression) and follow-up care. Hubs should integrate health screening, counselling, and peer-mentoring.

Agency/Group	Key Recommendations	Supporting Details
DSWD	Establish Digital Case Management & Monitoring . Develop Community-Based Transitional Programs/Shelters . Provide trauma-informed care and link with other livelihood initiatives.	Track returnee progress in real-time and coordinate support. Reduce reliance on centralized shelters and promote social inclusion.
DOLE	Establish a “Returnee Employment Innovation Hub” . This includes a digital job-match platform , incentive schemes for employers, and a mentoring and networking component .	Improve long-term employment outcomes by supporting returnees beyond initial placement.
DA/DENR	Jointly develop an “Agro-Forestry Enterprise & Innovation Hub” . Create an agroenterprise incubator program and allocate forest-based enterprise blocks (under SFLMA) to returnees.	Move beyond grant handouts towards sustainable enterprise, value-chain integration, and innovation in agriforestry.
DEPED/CHED	Recognize Credit for Prior Learning/Life Experience . Offer Flexible and Modular Education Tracks and Micro-Credentials . Establish Targeted Scholarships and Bridging Programs .	Accelerate entry into higher education and validate non-formal skills. Ensure education is transferable and aligned with labor demand.
LGUs	Expand stigma-reduction campaigns using community-based approaches. Upgrade livelihood support by creating micro-enterprise incubators .	Foster sustainable reintegration at the grassroots level through social inclusion and economic empowerment.
TESDA	Develop Hybrid and Modular Skills Training . Establish a dedicated TESDA Reintegration Hub . Launch a Digital Job & Enterprise Platform .	Align TVET with market needs and provide sustainable pathways for employment and entrepreneurship.
NCIP	Develop Culturally-Sensitive Reintegration Programs (respecting IP customs/governance). Integrate returnees into existing IP governance structures . Implement	Empower former combatants as contributors to indigenous community development, respecting IP rights.

Agency/Group	Key Recommendations	Supporting Details
	a digital monitoring system for ancestral domains.	

By adhering to these sector-specific guidelines, reintegration programs will become more sustainable, efficient, and better aligned with the unique needs of returnees. This comprehensive approach will not only enhance the effectiveness of reintegration efforts but also contribute to long-term peace and social cohesion within communities, ensuring that former rebels are successfully reintegrated and able to rebuild their lives.

REFERENCES

- [1.] Alcantara, A. L., & De Castro, C. A. (2023). Implementation of the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP) in the Province of Sorsogon. *United International Journal for Research & Technology*, 5(2). <https://uijrt.com/articles/v5/i2/UIJRTV5I20012.pdf>
- [2.] Arango, M. P. (2020). *The Role of Education in the Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Colombia*. The Florida State University.
- [3.] Baysal, B., & Dilek, E. (2023). Local Understandings of Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration (DDR): Former Combatants' Perspectives on DDR in Colombia. *Alternatif Politika*, 15(1), 1-21. <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/2948815>
- [4.] Bigombe, B. O. (2021). Field Reflections on Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Social Imperatives of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. *The State of Peacebuilding in Africa: Lessons Learned for Policymakers and Practitioners*, 65-79. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-46636-7_5
- [5.] Chiu, R. A. (2021, November 7). Ex-rebel to comrades: Live in peace, get E-CLIP. Philippine Information Agency. <https://mirror.pia.gov.ph/news/2021/11/07/ex-rebel-to-comrades-live-in-peace-get-e-clip>
- [6.] Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). (2024, July 19). *DSWD provides package of services to former rebels, other extremist groups*. ReliefWeb. <https://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/dswd-provides-package-services-former-rebels-other-extremist-groups>
- [7.] Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG). (2020). Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP). https://www.dilg.gov.ph/PDF_File/issuances/memo_circulars/dilg-memocircular-2020728_721dba929b.pdf
- [8.] Francisco, J. R. (2025). Lived experiences of former rebels. *Social Science*, 1124-1136. <https://doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2025.9020091>

- [9.] Galletta, E., Fagan, T. J., Shapiro, D., & Walker, L. E. (2021). Societal reentry of prison inmates with mental illness: Obstacles, programs, and best practices. *Journal of Correctional Health Care*, 27(1), 58-65.
- [10.] Hazen, J. (2005, November). Social integration of ex-combatants after civil war. In *United Nations Expert Group Meeting entitled "Dialogue in the Social Integration Process: Building Peaceful Social Relations—By, For, and With People"* (pp. 21-23).
- [11.] National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict. (2022). Zamboanga Del Sur LGU, NTF-ELCAC provide 'good life' to FRs to facilitate community reintegration. <https://www.ntfelcac.org/post/zamboanga-del-sur-lgu-ntf-elcac-provide-good-life-to-frs-to-facilitate-community-reintegration>
- [12.] Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation, and Unity. (2022, September 6). Executive Order No. 158, s. 2021: Strengthening the policy framework on peace, reconciliation, and unity, and reorganizing the government's administrative structure for the purpose. <https://peace.gov.ph/2022/09/executive-order-no-158-s-2021/>
- [13.] Reyes, M. T. (2024, May 2). Former rebels assist disaster relief in southern Philippines. Defense Forum. <https://ipdefenseforum.com/2024/05/former-rebels-assist-disaster-relief-in-southern-philippines/>
- [14.] Suarez, C., & Baines, E. (2022). 'Together at the heart': Familial relations and the social reintegration of ex-combatants. *International Peacekeeping*, 29(1), 1-23.
- [15.] Task Force Balik-Loob. (2024, August 9). Reintegration program for former rebels: 'On the right path.' Task Force Balik-Loob. <https://www.tfbalikloob.gov.ph/Articles?t=Reintegration%20Program%20for%20Former%20Rebels%3A%20%E2%80%98on%20the%20right%20path%E2%80%99>
- [16.] United Nations Peacekeeping. (2017). Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/disarmament-demobilization-and-reintegration>
- [17.] World Bank Group. (2020). Uganda Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project. <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P109216>