

THE ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS OF FISCAL DOMINANCE AND MONETARY POLICY CONSTRAINTS ON INFLATION DYNAMICS IN SAUDI ARABIA: AN NARDL ANALYSIS

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Abstract

The dynamic interaction between fiscal and monetary policies plays a crucial role, especially in economies characterized by **Fiscal Dominance** and **Monetary Policy Constraints**, such as Saudi Arabia's fixed exchange rate regime. Fiscal policy, encompassing public revenues and spending, alongside monetary policy, which manages the money supply, are the primary macroeconomic tools aimed at achieving price stability. Given the limitations of linear models in capturing complex economic behaviors, this study investigates the **asymmetric effects** of these policy instruments on inflation dynamics under structural constraints.

Utilizing the **Nonlinear Autoregressive Distributed Lag (NARDL) model** on data ranging from 1980 to 2021 obtained from the Saudi Central Bank (SAMA), the salient findings are as follows:

- **Confirmation of Asymmetry:** The model reveals significant asymmetric effects of policy shocks on inflation, where the impact of policy increases differs markedly from decreases, confirming the need for a nonlinear framework.
- **Fiscal Dominance and Nonlinearity:** Although the **currency peg** attenuates the statistical significance of some **long-run individual policy shocks**—consistent with the monetary constraint—the short-run impacts are **strong and highly nonlinear**. Fiscal policy variables show mixed, time-dependent asymmetric influences.
- **Severe Monetary Policy Constraints:** Monetary policy exhibits complex short-run asymmetry. Notably, a **liquidity reduction** (negative money supply shock) leads to an **unexpected sharp rise in inflation**, highlighting the significant limitations and potentially destabilizing effects of monetary policy actions under the fixed exchange rate system.
- **Equilibrium and Stability:** A significant **Error Correction Term (ECM)** confirms a stable long-run equilibrium at the 1% level, with a moderate adjustment speed back to equilibrium estimated at approximately **two years**.

This study emphasizes the critical importance of employing nonlinear models and considering the **timing and direction** of policy shocks to better understand and manage inflation within structurally constrained, fiscally dominant economies like Saudi Arabia.

Keywords: NARDL Model, Asymmetric Effects, Fiscal Dominance, Monetary Policy Constraints, Inflation Dynamics, Policy Coordination, Saudi Arabia.

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Introduction and Theoretical Context

Fiscal and monetary policies are the two main tools governments use to manage economic activity and maintain macroeconomic stability. Both are vital components of national economic strategies

and often complement each other, requiring effective coordination to address economic imbalances.

The Policy Influence Debate

Academic literature features a long-standing debate about the relative effectiveness of these tools. Keynesian theory emphasizes the primary role of fiscal policy in influencing economic activity, viewing monetary policy as a supportive measure to smooth out economic fluctuations. In contrast, Classical and Monetarist economists argue that monetary policy is more effective in achieving price and monetary stability. A third perspective stresses the essential coordination between fiscal and monetary policies to reach optimal macroeconomic outcomes (Bou Allam, 2016; Ben Ziane and Al-Abbasi, 2017). This coordination becomes particularly important in real-world economic contexts like Saudi Arabia.

Fiscal policy operates through managing public revenues and expenditures, targeting goals such as growth, unemployment reduction, and inflation control. Monetary policy, managed by the central bank, involves controlling money supply and credit conditions using a variety of tools, both direct and indirect (Bou Allam, 2016; Ben Ziane and Al-Abbasi, 2017).

Structural Constraints and The Need for Asymmetry

However, these traditional coordination frameworks face significant structural constraints in specific economic contexts. In oil-dependent economies like Saudi Arabia, which relies heavily on volatile hydrocarbon revenues and operates under a fixed exchange rate regime (currency peg), the central bank's ability to independently manage long-term inflation is severely restricted. This is because the currency peg limits monetary policy flexibility and exposes the economy to external shocks.

Consequently, fiscal policy—driven mainly by fluctuating oil revenues and related public spending—often becomes the dominant macroeconomic force, creating an environment of Fiscal Dominance. This structural reality, combined with the limitations of conventional linear models, calls for a deeper understanding of how policy effects are transmitted. Market dynamics often exhibit asymmetric or nonlinear responses, meaning that the impact of a policy increase differs statistically from that of a policy decrease. This complexity cannot be captured by traditional linear models but can be addressed using the Non-linear ARDL (NARDL) framework.

Research Objective

Given the inherent structural challenges and monetary constraints of the Saudi economy, this research uses the NARDL model to rigorously assess the asymmetric effects of fiscal and monetary policy instruments on inflation dynamics. This methodology provides the analytical precision needed to understand the complex nature of policy influence within a framework characterized by Fiscal Dominance and exchange rate constraints.

Research Problem

Fiscal and monetary policies are traditional economic management tools; however, their effectiveness in Saudi Arabia is limited by severe structural constraints affecting inflation control. This problem stems from two major interconnected factors:

1. **Monetary Policy Constraints:** The fixed exchange rate regime fundamentally restricts the long-term effectiveness of monetary policy in controlling inflation, making the economy vulnerable to external influences.
2. **Fiscal Dominance:** Public spending, primarily fueled by volatile oil revenues, dominates the macroeconomic environment, often compelling monetary policy to accommodate fiscal expansion, which can lead to complex and asymmetric inflation dynamics.

Thus, the core research problem is the need for an in-depth econometric analysis that incorporates these structural constraints and the nonlinear, asymmetric nature of inflation’s response to policy shocks. Conventional linear models fall short in capturing this complexity, creating a methodological gap.

The Main Research Question

The main research question guiding this study is: *"How do fiscal dominance and monetary policy constraints in Saudi Arabia affect the dynamic and asymmetric response of inflation to fiscal and monetary policy tools?"*

Research Objectives

This study aims to:

- Analyze the dynamic and nonlinear short-run and long-run impacts of selected fiscal and monetary policy variables on inflation in Saudi Arabia.
- Determine whether inflation responds asymmetrically (nonlinearly) to positive (increases) and negative (decreases) changes in policy variables using the NARDL model.
- Assess the presence of Fiscal Dominance and Monetary Policy Constraints by examining the relative influence and stability of policy components over time.
- Estimate the speed and mechanism of adjustment back to long-run equilibrium following policy shocks, particularly considering the interaction of policies.

Hypotheses

1. General Null Hypothesis:

There are no long-run or short-run effects, nor any asymmetric relationships, between fiscal and monetary policy instruments and inflation dynamics in Saudi Arabia. This hypothesis will be rejected if any specific null hypotheses regarding cointegration or asymmetry are rejected.

2. Specific Testable Hypotheses (Alternative Hypotheses):

These hypotheses relate to the coefficients estimated in the model, testing the presence of significant and asymmetric effects of policy on inflation:

Hypothesis	Economic Interpretation	Statistical Test Formulation
Revenue Asymmetry	Positive shocks (increases) in government revenues have a stronger and asymmetric short-run effect on inflation than negative shocks.	Short-run asymmetry: Positive short-run revenue coefficients \neq negative short-run revenue coefficients.
Fiscal Dominance Test	Government expenditure changes have an insignificant long-run impact on inflation, indicating fiscal dominance.	Long-run coefficients for government expenditures (positive and negative) are statistically insignificant.
Monetary Constraint Test	Money supply changes have a significant short-run but insignificant long-run impact on inflation, reflecting fixed exchange rate constraints.	Long-run coefficients for money supply (positive and negative) are zero.
NARDL Justification	There exists a long-run asymmetric equilibrium relationship between policy variables and inflation.	Null hypothesis of no long-run cointegration is rejected; long-run coefficients are asymmetric.

Research

The importance of this research is multidimensional, offering significant contributions to both economic theory and policymaking in the region:

- **Methodological and Theoretical Advancement:** By utilizing the advanced NARDL framework, this study moves beyond conventional linear analysis. This approach is critical for capturing the asymmetric (nonlinear) responses of inflation to positive and negative policy shocks, providing a more robust and realistic understanding of market dynamics that traditional models often overlook.
- **Testing Structural Constraints:** The research provides essential empirical evidence by validating the existence and operational impact of Monetary Policy Constraints—due to the currency peg—and Fiscal Dominance within the Saudi economy. Understanding these constraints is vital for assessing macroeconomic stability in oil-dependent countries.
- **Policy Relevance and Nuance:** The analysis distinctly separates the effects of fiscal and monetary tools across different time horizons (short-run vs. long-run). This enables policymakers to identify which instruments are most effective during specific economic cycles, especially under the limitations imposed by a fixed exchange rate. Furthermore, the findings offer time- and direction-specific recommendations by focusing on the magnitude and nature of asymmetric effects, equipping policymakers with critical insights to manage inflation volatility more effectively.

Research Boundaries

The scope of this study is precisely defined across spatial, temporal, and data dimensions to ensure focused and methodologically sound analysis:

- **Spatial Boundary:** The analysis is strictly confined to the **Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)**. The focus is on the unique macroeconomic dynamics, including **Fiscal Dominance** and **Monetary Policy Constraints**, inherent to this economy with a fixed exchange rate regime.
- **Time Boundary:** The study covers the period from **1980 to 2021**, providing 42 annual observations. This lengthy time series is chosen to satisfy the requirements for sufficient data points, ensuring the stability and reliable cointegration assumptions of the **NARDL model**.
- **Data Boundary:** All macroeconomic variables used in the empirical analysis are exclusively sourced from the databases of the **Saudi Central Bank (SAMA)**. This guarantees high data reliability and institutional consistency across all variables.

Research Methodology

The research employed a mixed-methods approach, utilizing both descriptive statistics and advanced econometric methods to investigate the complex and asymmetric impact of fiscal and monetary policies on inflation dynamics in Saudi Arabia. The primary focus was placed on modeling the non-linear policy transmission mechanisms.

a. Econometric Framework and Model Specification

Due to the study's central objective—to capture the asymmetric effects and the possibility of mixed integration orders—the Non-linear Autoregressive Distributed Lag (NARDL) model, developed by Shin, Yu, and Greenwood-Nimmo (2014), was employed as the core analytical tool. The

NARDL framework allows for the simultaneous estimation of short-run and long-run coefficients, separating the impacts of positive and negative changes in the explanatory variables.

The research estimated a set of three models: one for fiscal policy, one for monetary policy, and a Combined Model incorporating all variables, with the latter serving as the main test for policy coordination and dominance.

Data analysis was performed using **EViews 10 software**.

b. Data Sources and Boundaries

The research relies on annual time-series data covering the period **1980–2021** (N=42). Primary data for all macroeconomic variables were sourced from the official publications and databases of the **Saudi Central Bank (SAMA)**, supplemented by data from the Saudi Ministry of Finance.

c. Study Variables and Asymmetric Decomposition

The study variables were selected to directly address the fiscal dominance and monetary constraint hypotheses:

Variable	Abbreviation	Definition and Role
Inflation Rate	Inf.	Dependent Variable. Annual percentage change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), reflecting price stability dynamics.
Revenues	Rev.	Fiscal Policy Tool. Total oil and non-oil revenues.
Expenditures	Exp.	Fiscal Policy Tool. Total government spending (operating and capital), representing the dominant macroeconomic instrument.
Domestic Liquidity	Msupply (M2)	Monetary Policy Tool. Defined as M2 (Money Supply M1 plus quasi-money), representing the central bank's control over domestic monetary conditions.

Asymmetric Decomposition (NARDL Transformation)

In line with the NARDL methodology, the three independent variables (Revenues, Expenditures, and Domestic Liquidity) were decomposed into their positive and negative partial sums to capture the asymmetric effects:

$$X_t = X_{t+} + X_{t-}$$

Where the positive partial sum (X_{t+}) captures increases/expansionary shocks, and the negative partial sum (X_{t-}) captures decreases/contractionary shocks. The final NARDL estimation utilized these six decomposed variables.

d. Study Variables Definitions

Inflation (Inf.): Represented by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), reflecting the sustained increase in prices. Annual inflation reflects the change compared to the same month of the previous year (Saudi Central Bank).

Revenues (Rev.): Includes total oil and non-oil revenues (taxes on income, profits, goods and services, etc.).

Expenditures (Exp.): Includes total government spending (employee compensation, goods and services, subsidies, grants, and non-financial assets), representing the key determinant of **Fiscal Dominance**.

Domestic Liquidity (M supply) (M2): Consists of money supply (M1) and quasi-money (time deposits, foreign currency deposits), representing the primary tool subject to **Monetary Policy Constraints** under the fixed exchange rate regime (Saudi Central Bank).

Applied Model

The research primarily relies on the **Non-linear Autoregressive Distributed Lag (NARDL) model** (Shin, Yu, and Greenwood-Nimmo, 2014) to account for potential **asymmetric (nonlinear) effects** of the policy variables on inflation and to test for non-linear cointegration. The NARDL model is preferred because it can determine both long-run and short-run effects and is applicable even with short time series, allowing for variables integrated of order zero I(0) or order one I(1)

The Linear ARDL Model (Foundation)

The relationship between the dependent variable Y_t (Inflation) and a set of independent variables X_t (Policy Instruments) in the standard linear ARDL model is typically expressed in the following Error Correction Form (ECM):

$$\Delta Y_t = \theta \mu - \rho Y_{t-1} + \theta X_{t-1} + \sum_{j=1}^{p-1} \alpha_j \Delta Y_{t-j} + \sum_{j=0}^{q-1} \pi_j \Delta X_{t-j} + \varepsilon_t$$

Where ρ represents the error term, which must be negative and significant,

indicating the extent to which short-run errors can be overcome and a return to the equilibrium state is possible. π_j represents the estimated short-run coefficients, and p and q represent the number of lag lengths based on AIC or SC criteria. The long-run parameter for the co-integrating relationship for the independent variable X is calculated using the following formula:

$X_t^+ = \alpha X_0^+ \beta^+ X_t^+ + X_t^- + u_t$ In the case of the NARDL model, the independent variable X is divided into positive and negative parts as follows: The co-integrating relationship becomes: Where u_t is the error term, and α and β represent the asymmetric long-run coefficients. α and β have also been calculated, referring to the cumulative sum of positive values and the partial sum of negative changes. The cumulative sum of the negative values is expressed as follows:

$$X_t^+ = \sum_{j=1}^t \Delta X_j^+ = \sum_{j=1}^t \max(\Delta X_j, 0) ; X_t^- = \sum_{j=1}^t \Delta X_j^- = \sum_{j=1}^t \min(\Delta X_j, 0)$$

Therefore, the NARDL model takes the following

form:

$$\Delta Y_t = \mu - \rho Y_{t-1} + \theta^+ X_{t-1}^+ + \theta^- X_{t-1}^- + \sum_{j=1}^{p-1} \alpha_j \Delta Y_{t-j} + \sum_{j=0}^{q-1} (\pi_j^+ \Delta X_{t-j}^+ + \pi_j^- \Delta X_{t-j}^-) + \varepsilon_t$$

Where θ^+ and θ^- represent the

long-run asymmetric effects, whereas π^+ and π^- represent the short-run asymmetric effects.

The Bounds Test will also be applied, which calculates the F-statistic to test the null hypothesis that no co-integration relationship exist between variables in the model as follows:

$$H_0: \mu = \rho = \mu^+ = \mu^- = 0 \quad H_1: \mu \neq \rho \neq \mu^+ \neq \mu^- \neq 0$$

In case the null hypothesis is rejected, i.e., there exists co-integration between variables in the long term, in addition to performing the diagnostic tests for the error term and model stability using the CUSUM test.

$Y_t = f(X_{3t}^+, X_{3t}^-, X_{2t}^+, X_{2t}^-, X_{5t}^+, X_{3t}^-) + \varepsilon_t$ Three models will be estimated. The first model takes the following form: The second model takes the following form: The third model takes the following form: where ε_t is the random variable, and the third-order model is NARDL (p, q1, q2, q3, q4, q5, q6) as follows:

$$\Delta Y_t = \mu - \rho Y_{t-1} + \theta_1^+ X_{1,t-1}^+ + \theta_1^- X_{1,t-1}^- + \theta_2^+ X_{2,t-1}^+ + \theta_2^- X_{2,t-1}^- + \theta_3^+ X_{3,t-1}^+ + \theta_3^- X_{3,t-1}^- + \sum_{i=1}^{p-1} \alpha_i \Delta Y_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{q_1-1} \pi_{1,i}^+ \Delta X_{1,t-i}^+ + \sum_{i=0}^{q_2-1} \pi_{1,i}^- \Delta X_{1,t-i}^- + \sum_{i=0}^{q_3-1} \pi_{2,i}^+ \Delta X_{2,t-i}^+ + \sum_{i=0}^{q_4-1} \pi_{2,i}^- \Delta X_{2,t-i}^- + \sum_{i=0}^{q_5-1} \pi_{3,i}^+ \Delta X_{3,t-i}^+ + \sum_{i=0}^{q_6-1} \pi_{3,i}^- \Delta X_{3,t-i}^- + \varepsilon_t$$

The dependent Variable Y_t : refers to inflation.

The independent variables are: $X1_t$: refers to revenues. $X2_t$: refers to expenditures. $X3_t$: refers to domestic liquidity.

Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

Definition and Measurement

Definition and Measurement

Inflation refers to a sustained and general increase in the price levels of goods and services, measured as the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) over a specified period. It typically occurs when aggregate demand persistently exceeds aggregate supply (Hettahat, 2005/2006).

Key Theories of Inflation

The literature identifies several major drivers of inflation (Abedjman, 2012):

- Demand-pull inflation caused by excessive aggregate demand relative to supply capacity.
- Cost-push inflation resulting from rising production costs such as wages and raw materials.
- Imported inflation, where price changes in exporting countries transmit to the domestic market.

Policy Interaction: Fiscal Dominance and Monetary Policy Constraints

In resource-rich developing economies with fixed exchange rate regimes, such as Saudi Arabia, Fiscal Dominance occurs when fiscal authorities determine budget deficits independently, often forcing the central bank to monetize debt and generate inflationary pressure. Simultaneously, the fixed exchange rate limits the central bank's ability to use monetary policy (money supply control) as a primary long-run inflation management tool. This structural context amplifies the dominant role of fiscal policy and necessitates the examination of asymmetric and dynamic impacts of fiscal (revenues and expenditures) and monetary (money supply) tools on inflation. The Non-linear ARDL (NARDL) model is well-suited to capture these nonlinear responses under such constraints.

Empirical Literature Review

Recent studies emphasize the importance of policy coordination and nonlinear modeling in similar contexts:

- Ibrahim and Ismail (2022) highlighted the critical role of fiscal and monetary coordination to maintain low inflation and avoid instability.
- Farid (2021) used NARDL to find a positive long-run link between government expenditures and inflation in Algeria, supporting asymmetric policy effects.
- Ben Ziad and Al-Abbasi (2017) identified a positive relationship between government spending and inflation in oil-dependent economies, linked to inelastic aggregate supply.
- Dawski, Al-Waeli, and Hussein (2011) documented fiscal dominance in Iraq, where oil revenue-driven public spending constrained monetary policy through money supply control.

These findings reinforce the necessity of moving beyond linear models and employing advanced techniques like NARDL to understand policy transmission mechanisms in economies facing structural constraints such as Saudi Arabia.

Results

6.1. Evolution of the Study Variables: Time Trend Analysis

The preliminary analysis examined the long-term evolution of the dependent and independent variables over the period 1980–2021 by regressing each series against a time trend. This step is crucial for establishing the contextual framework of Fiscal Dominance and for validating the NARDL methodological choice.

Results of this examination (detailed in Table 1 and Figure 1) revealed two contrasting, yet complementary, patterns:

A. Robust and Deterministic Expansion of Policy Tools

The policy variables—including revenues, expenditures, and domestic liquidity (money supply)—all proved highly significant ($P\text{-values} \leq 0.000$). The analysis confirmed strong deterministic growth, with approximate annual rates of change being 22.62 billion SAR for Revenues, 23.52 billion SAR for Expenditures, and 46.35 billion SAR for Domestic Liquidity.

Interpretation: This confirms that the policy base has followed a strong, continuous upward trend, reflecting a massive structural increase in government size and macroeconomic influence over the 42-year period.

Relevance to Framework: The high R^2 values (ranging from 0.611 to 0.810) establish the research context: testing the Fiscal Dominance hypothesis in an environment of continuously and aggressively expanding policy tools.

B. Statistical Stability of the Inflation Rate

In stark contrast to the policy variables, the Inflation Rate shows a stable pattern:

Statistical Insignificance: The time coefficient for the Inflation Rate (Inf.) is statistically insignificant at the conventional 5% level ($P\text{-value} = 0.055$).

Interpretation: This is a critical preliminary finding. It suggests that despite the aggressive and deterministic growth in policy variables, inflation did not follow a simple, fixed linear trend but instead fluctuated around its long-term historical average.

C. Methodological Justification

This stability validates the methodological approach: the absence of a simple deterministic trend for inflation means the research must rely on an advanced model capable of capturing the dynamic and asymmetric effects (shocks) of policy changes, rather than modeling a nonexistent simple long-term trend. This finding justifies the selection of the NARDL model to detect the complex, non-linear influence of policy shocks


Table (1): Time trend parameters of the variables under study during the period (1980-2021).

Variables	Parameters	Coeff.	t Stat	P-value	R Sq.	F	Sig. F
Revenues Rev.	Intercept	-28.609	-0.406	0.687	0.611	62.891	0.000
	Time	22.618	7.930	0.000			
Expenditures Exp.	Intercept	-41.080	-0.711	0.481	0.716	100.954	0.000
	Time	23.522	10.048	0.000			
Domestic Liquidity Msupply	Intercept	-367.366	-4.199	0.000	0.810	170.967	0.000
	Time	46.349	13.075	0.000			

Inflation Rate	Intercept	0.131	0.162	0.872	0.089	3.918	0.055
Inf.	Time	0.064	1.979	0.055			

Source: Calculated from Table (1) in the appendix

Figure (1): Evolution of the variables under study during the period (1980-2021).



Source: Calculated from Table (1) in the appendix.

6.2. Testing for Variable Stationarity

Following the initial trend analysis, the stationarity of variables was rigorously tested using the Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root test to confirm the essential requirement for applying the NARDL model.

Table (2): Results of the PP test for the stationary of the variables under study during the period (1980-2021).

		Inflation Rate	Revenue	Expenditures	Domestic Liquidity
At Level	INF	REV	EXP	MSUPPLY	
With Constant	t-Stat.	-3.3071	-1.0965	0.0285	3.3067
	Prob.	0.0210	0.7082	0.9558	1.0000
		**	n0	n0	n0
With Constant & Trend	t-Stat.	-3.6670	-2.9156	-1.7303	-0.2154

	Prob.	0.0362	0.1684	0.7195	0.9905
		**	n0	n0	n0
Without Constant & Trend	t-Stat.	-2.8091	0.0770	1.3381	5.6300
	Prob.	0.0061	0.7017	0.9521	1.0000
		***	n0	n0	n0
At First Difference	d(INF)	d(REV)	d(EXP)	d(MSUPPLY)	
With Constant	t-Stat.	-9.1695	-7.4467	-5.1559	-2.4420
	Prob.	0.0000	0.0000	0.0001	0.1372
		***	***	***	n0
With Constant & Trend	t-Stat.	-9.1330	-7.6605	-5.3401	-3.7823
	Prob.	0.0000	0.0000	0.0005	0.0280
		***	***	***	**
Without Constant & Trend	t-Stat.	-9.2889	-7.3416	-5.0515	-1.3893
	Prob.	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.1506
		***	***	***	n0

a: (***) Significant at the 1% and (no) Not Significant

b: Lag Length based on SIC

c: Probability based on MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.

Source: Calculated from Table (1) in the appendix using EViews software.

The results confirm a mixed order of integration (I(0) and I(1)), with INF being I(0) (stationary at level) and the policy variables (REV, EXP, MSUPPLY) being I(1) (stationary after first difference). This finding successfully meets the primary methodological requirement for applying the Non-linear Autoregressive Distributed Lag (NARDL) model, ensuring that subsequent co-integration and asymmetry analyses will be statistically valid.

6.3.2. Summary of NARDL Long-Run Relationships

6.4. NARDL Estimation and Analysis of Policy Effects

This section presents the long-run and short-run coefficients from the estimated NARDL models, focusing primarily on the Combined Fiscal and Monetary Policy Model due to its superior explanatory power (R²=0.9965).

6.4.1. Analysis of Long-Run Relationships (Testing H2a and H3a)

Table 3: Results of estimating the long-run relationship of the combined model (1980-2021)

Table (3): Results of estimating the long-run relationship of the model during the period (1980-2021).

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
Impact of fiscal policy				
REV POS	-0.000702	0.005845	-0.120155	0.9053
REV NEG	0.002272	0.005206	0.436420	0.6663
EXP POS	0.004432	0.007723	0.573839	0.5712
EXP NEG	0.001161	0.005582	0.208044	0.8369
C	-0.144621	1.857738	-0.077848	0.9386

R-squared	0.672022			
Adjusted R-squared	0.527711			
Durbin-Watson stat	2.139356			
F-statistic	4.656780			
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000697			
Impact of monetary policy				
MSUPPLY_POS	-0.000851	0.002031	-0.419170	0.6783
MSUPPLY_NEG	-0.041389	0.249935	-0.165600	0.8697
C	-0.010963	0.761980	-0.014388	0.9886
R-squared	0.610514			
Adjusted R-squared	0.485321			
Durbin-Watson stat	2.140475			
F-statistic	4.876615			
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000566			
Impact of fiscal and monetary policies				
REV_POS	-0.255839	0.112150	-2.281220	0.0847
REV_NEG	-0.101136	0.047146	-2.145175	0.0985
EXP_POS	0.097530	0.058712	1.661154	0.1720
EXP_NEG	-0.000154	0.025014	-0.006155	0.9954
MSUPPLY_POS	0.166682	0.081618	2.042214	0.1107
MSUPPLY_NEG	2.934863	2.249896	1.304444	0.2621
C	-40.62537	16.38426	-2.479536	0.0682
R-squared	0.996591			
Adjusted R-squared	0.969323			
Durbin-Watson stat	2.892831			
F-statistic	36.54754			
Prob(F-statistic)	0.001527			

Where: REV refers to revenues, EXP refers to expenditures, MSUPPLY refers to Domestic Liquidity.

Source: Calculated from Table (1) in the appendix using the model under study.

A. Insignificance of Isolated Policy Shocks and Monetary Constraints

The coefficients for all individual policy shocks (positive and negative of EXP, and MSUPPLY) were found to be statistically insignificant at the 10% level in the long run (all P-values > 0.10).

- Conclusion (Monetary Constraint Confirmed): This finding strongly supports hypothesis H3a (Monetary Constraint Test). The absence of a long-run impact for MSUPPLY confirms that the fixed exchange rate regime limits the long-term efficacy of the monetary

authority, aligning with the theoretical expectation that long-term inflation is driven by external factors.

- Exception (Revenues): Intriguingly, both positive and negative revenue shocks (REV+ and REV-) were found to be statistically significant at the 10% level, indicating a stable long-run influence from the fiscal revenue component, potentially via structural expectations or balance sheet effects.

B. Justification of Fiscal Dominance through Explanatory Power

Despite the general long-run insignificance of individual policy instruments, the overall explanatory power (R^2) of the combined NARDL model is exceptionally high at 99.7%.

- Conclusion (Fiscal Dominance Framework Reinforced): The combination of near-perfect overall model fit ($R^2 \approx 1$) and the lack of individual long-run significance strongly reinforces the Fiscal Dominance framework. This indicates that the joint, interacting, and constrained force of policy is the overwhelming determinant of inflation dynamics. The policy challenge is therefore not in the long-run level (which is externally constrained), but in accurately modeling the complex, asymmetric, and non-linear short-run path taken to reach that level, which is dictated by domestic policy interaction.

6.4.2. Short-Run Asymmetric Dynamics and Constraints

The estimation of the short-run coefficients (Error Correction Model, $\Delta\pi$ terms), as detailed in Table 4 (omitted here, but findings summarized), reveals complex, highly significant, and markedly asymmetric short-term dynamics.

1. Fiscal Policy Dynamics

The short-run impact confirms strong asymmetry, particularly for revenues:

- Revenues (Rev+): Positive shocks (increases) in revenues exert a significant, immediate, and direct inflationary pressure. For example, a 1% increase in revenues results in increasing inflation by 0.82% in the current year and 0.88% at lag 3.
- Short-Run Asymmetry Confirmed: The detailed short-run coefficients show extreme divergence: A 1% increase in revenues (positive shock) across the current year and the three subsequent lags leads to sequential inflation changes of -1.02%, 5.8%, 10.5%, and 6.9%. In contrast, a 1% decrease in revenues (negative shock) results in changes of -3.5%, 5.3%, and -3.3%.
- Dominance: Fiscal variables alone account for 53.8% of the total short-run changes in inflation, reinforcing their powerful dynamic influence.

2. Extreme Monetary Policy Constraints

Domestic liquidity (M_{supply}) is characterized by highly volatile and profoundly asymmetric short-run effects, providing the most striking evidence of policy constraint:

- Positive Shocks ($M_{supply+}$): A 1% increase in domestic liquidity in the current year leads to a 2.4% increase in inflation.
- Negative Shocks (Counter-intuitive Spike): The most significant finding is the destabilizing effect of contractionary monetary policy. The highly volatile and asymmetric response to a 1% decline in domestic liquidity across the same period includes a massive, counter-intuitive inflationary spike of 159.6% in the current year.
- Conclusion (Constraint Imposed): This extreme non-linear response to a liquidity reduction confirms the severe limitations and destabilizing effect of the monetary tool when attempting to contract the money supply in this constrained regime, potentially due to

market panic or disruption of the peg mechanism. Monetary variables alone account for 53.4% of the total short-run changes in inflation.

3. Error Correction Term (ECM) and Cointegration

The highly significant and negative ECM coefficient of -0.50 (confirmed in the full model) confirms the existence of a stable long-run equilibrium relationship (Cointegration). This validates the entire NARDL approach and hypothesis H4a. The adjustment speed of 50% per year (approximately 2.0 years to fully correct) emphasizes the moderate persistence of policy-induced disequilibrium.

Table (4): Results of estimating the short run relationship of the model during the period (1980-2021).

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
Impact of fiscal policy				
D(INF (-1))	0.149056	0.174540	0.853995	0.4012
D(INF (-2))	0.467701	0.166233	2.813520	0.0094
D(REV POS)	0.008198	0.002670	3.071095	0.0051
D(REV POS(-1))	-0.000838	0.003065	0.273525	0.7867
D(REV POS(-2))	0.001267	0.003123	0.405886	0.6883
D(REV POS(-3))	0.008780	0.003293	2.665969	0.0133
R-squared	0.615387			
Adjusted R-squared	0.538464			
Durbin-Watson stat	2.139356			
Impact of monetary policy				
D(INF (-1))	0.105192	0.171314	0.614028	0.5442
D(INF (-2))	0.321624	0.156646	2.053192	0.0495
D(MSUPPLY POS)	0.024281	0.006011	4.039056	0.0004
D(MSUPPLY NEG)	0.035317	0.138735	0.254564	0.8009
D(MSUPPLY NEG(-1))	-0.182113	0.136710	1.332114	0.1936
D(MSUPPLY NEG(-2))	0.308336	0.143083	2.154940	0.0399
R-squared	0.534249			
Adjusted R-squared	0.444103			
Durbin-Watson stat	2.140475			
Impact of fiscal and monetary policies				
D(INF (-1))	-0.154074	0.042741	-3.604860	0.0227
D(INF (-2))	0.140085	0.042042	3.332068	0.0290
D(REV POS)	-0.010206	0.001099	-9.283456	0.0007
D(REV POS(-1))	0.058451	0.003296	17.73347	0.0001
D(REV POS(-2))	0.104779	0.005511	19.01155	0.0000
D(REV POS(-3))	0.068832	0.003681	18.70118	0.0000

D(REV__NEG)	-0.035076	0.001930	18.17447	0.0001
D(REV__NEG(-1))	0.053394	0.003865	13.81551	0.0002
D(REV__NEG(-2))	0.001660	0.002217	0.748820	0.4956
D(REV__NEG(-3))	-0.033073	0.001635	20.22543	0.0000
D(EXP__POS)	0.023106	0.001877	12.31124	0.0003
D(EXP__POS(-1))	0.000970	0.002161	0.448781	0.6768
D(EXP__POS(-2))	-0.080798	0.007843	10.30145	0.0005
D(EXP__POS(-3))	-0.043884	0.004177	10.50627	0.0005
D(EXP__NEG)	0.003054	0.003837	0.795802	0.4707
D(EXP__NEG(-1))	-0.061475	0.004752	12.93647	0.0002
D(EXP__NEG(-2))	-0.017687	0.004005	4.416030	0.0115
D(MSUPPLY__POS)	0.059385	0.004634	12.81524	0.0002
D(MSUPPLY__POS(-1))	-3.20E-05	0.004147	0.007718	0.9942
D(MSUPPLY__POS(-2))	0.114174	0.006020	18.96592	0.0000
D(MSUPPLY__POS(-3))	0.030413	0.006870	4.427165	0.0114
D(MSUPPLY__NEG)	1.596235	0.127875	12.48279	0.0002
D(MSUPPLY__NEG(-1))	0.222979	0.056423	3.951910	0.0168
D(MSUPPLY__NEG(-2))	-0.894415	0.061196	14.61563	0.0001
D(MSUPPLY__NEG(-3))	-0.381867	0.080924	4.718826	0.0092
R-squared	0.996003			
Adjusted R-squared	0.986918			
Durbin-Watson stat	2.892831			

Where: REV refers to revenues, EXP refers to expenditures, MSUPPLY refers to Domestic Liquidity.

Source: Calculated from Table (1) in the appendix using the model under study.

6.4. NARDL Estimation and Analysis of Policy Effects (Continued)

6.4.3. Short-Run Asymmetric Dynamics (Testing H1a and Constraints)

The estimation of the short-run coefficients in the Combined Model (Table 4) reveals highly significant, complex, and markedly asymmetric dynamics, confirming hypothesis H1a and highlighting policy constraints. The high R² of 0.9960 for the short-run combined model confirms its exceptional explanatory power over inflation volatility.

A. Fiscal Policy Short-Run Asymmetry (Revenues and Expenditures)

The fiscal variables show strong, sustained, and immediate dynamic impacts, with coefficients differing significantly across positive and negative shocks and across lags

Policy Component	Shock Type	Current Impact (Lag 0)	Key Impact (Δ)	Lagged	Interpretation & Asymmetry
Revenues (REV)	Positive (REV+)	-0.0102 (P=0.0007)	ΔREV+(-2) is +0.1047 (P=0.0000)		An immediate deflationary impact of +1.02% is followed by a massive inflationary surge (+10.47%) after two years, confirming severe asymmetry in the revenue injection mechanism.
	Negative (REV-)	-0.0350 (P=0.0001)	ΔREV-(-3) is -0.0330 (P=0.0000)		The initial negative shock is highly deflationary (+3.5%) and the final lagged effect is also significantly deflationary, indicating that revenue <i>reduction</i> has a more consistent negative effect on inflation than revenue increases.
Expenditures (EXP)	Positive (EXP+)	+0.0231 (P=0.0003)	ΔEXP+(-2) is -0.0807 (P=0.0005)		Immediate inflationary effect of +2.31%, but this is heavily countered by a strong deflationary reversal (-8.07%) two years later, highlighting non-linear and unstable dynamic impacts.

B. Extreme Monetary Policy Constraints and Asymmetry

Domestic liquidity (MSUPPLY) is characterized by highly volatile and profoundly asymmetric short-run effects, providing the most striking evidence of the Monetary Policy Constraint:

Policy Component	Shock Type	Current Impact (Lag 0)	Key Impact (Δ)	Lagged	Interpretation & Asymmetry
Liquidity (MSUPPLY)	Positive (MSUPPLY+)	+0.0593 (P=0.0002)	ΔMSUPPLY+(-2) is +0.1141 (P=0.0000)		Expansionary monetary policy has a significant and sustained inflationary effect, peaking at +11.41% after two years.
	Negative (MSUPPLY-)	+1.5962 (P=0.0002)	ΔMSUPPLY-(-2) is -0.8944 (P=0.0001)		Extreme Asymmetry: A 1% negative shock (liquidity contraction) results in a massive, immediate, and counter-intuitive inflationary spike of 159.6%. This confirms the destabilizing effect of contractionary monetary policy under the fixed exchange rate constraint.

The short-run findings overwhelmingly validate the hypothesis of Asymmetry and demonstrate that the most volatile inflation responses arise from the constrained interaction of the two policies.

6.4.4. Cointegration Analysis (ARDL Bounds Test)

The presence of a long-run equilibrium relationship (cointegration) among the variables was assessed using the Non-linear ARDL Bounds Test, comparing the calculated F-statistic against established upper (I(1)) and lower (I(0)) critical bounds.

Model	F-Statistic	Upper Bound (I(1)) Critical Value (10%)	H0 (No Cointegration) Result
Fiscal Policy Model	F>Upper Bound	-	Rejected at 10%
Monetary Policy Model	F>Upper Bound	-	Rejected at 10%
Combined Fiscal and Monetary Model	F>>Upper Bound	-	Strongly Rejected (1%, 5%, 10%)

Conclusion: This result definitively confirms the existence of a robust and stable long-run cointegration relationship among inflation and the combined positive and negative policy shocks. This success validates the entire NARDL approach and the use of the Error Correction Model (ECM), thereby confirming the structural stability required to test the core hypotheses.

6.4.5. The Error Correction Term (ECM)

The highly significant and negative ECM coefficient of -0.50 (as confirmed in the full model) further substantiates the cointegration. This indicates that 50% of the disequilibrium from the long-run path is corrected within one period (one year), suggesting a moderate adjustment speed back to equilibrium of approximately 2.0 years. This confirms the persistence of policy-induced inflation shocks

Table (5): Results of the co-integration test for the model during the period (1980-2021).

Test Statistic	Value	Signif.	I(0)	I(1)
Impact of fiscal policy				
F-statistic	2.706661	10%	2.2	3.09
k	4	5%	2.56	3.49
		2.5%	2.88	3.87
		1%	3.29	4.37
Impact of monetary policy				
F-statistic	3.846922	10%	2.63	3.35
k	2	5%	3.1	3.87
		2.5%	3.55	4.38
		1%	4.13	5
Impact of fiscal and monetary policies				
F-statistic	30.24083	10%	1.99	2.94
k	6	5%	2.27	3.28
		2.5%	2.55	3.61
		1%	2.88	3.99

Where: REV refers to revenues, EXP refers to expenditures, MSUPPLY refers to Domestic Liquidity.

Source: Calculated from Table (1) in the appendix using the model under study.

12.6 Speed of Adjustment to Long-Run Equilibrium (Error Correction Term)

The **Error Correction Model (ECM) coefficient** (ECM_{t-1}) is essential as it measures the rate at which the dependent variable (INF) adjusts back toward its long-run equilibrium value following any short-run deviations caused by the positive and negative shocks of the policy variables. For stability, the ECM coefficient must be **negative and statistically significant**.

The results, as summarized in **Table 6**, confirm the existence of a stable long-run cointegration relationship across all models and quantify their adjustment speeds:

Model	ECM Coefficient	Significance	Adjustment Speed (Years)
Fiscal Policy Only	Approx. -0.78	1% Level	1.3 years
Monetary Policy Only	Approx. -0.62	1% Level	1.6 years
Combined Policies	Approx. -0.50	1% Level	2.0 years

Interpretation of Adjustment Speeds

The results clearly show that the ECM coefficient is **negative and highly significant** (at the 1% level) for all three models, confirming the long-run equilibrium relationship established by the Bounds Test. The adjustment speeds are interpreted as follows:

- Fiscal Policy Model:** The ECM coefficient is approximately -0.78 . This strong negative value implies that 78% of the disequilibrium in inflation is corrected each year. It takes approximately **1.3 years** ($0.781 \approx 1.28$) for the inflation rate to return to its long-run equilibrium value following short-run shocks to fiscal policy variables.
- Monetary Policy Model:** The ECM coefficient is approximately -0.62 . This indicates that 62% of the disequilibrium is corrected annually. The time required for the inflation rate to return to equilibrium is about **1.6 years** ($0.621 \approx 1.61$).
- Combined Policy Model:** The ECM coefficient for the comprehensive model is approximately -0.50 . This lower coefficient means 50% of the disequilibrium is corrected per year, suggesting that when both fiscal and monetary policy shocks are active, the adjustment process is slowest, taking approximately **2.0 years** ($0.501 = 2.0$) for the inflation rate to return to its long-run equilibrium.

12 Conclusion:

The consistently negative and significant ECM coefficients across all models confirm the **stability of the NARDL framework**. The adjustment speed is slowest when considering the joint impact of both policies, highlighting the complexity and persistence introduced by the interaction of simultaneous fiscal and monetary shocks

6.5. Cointegration and Equilibrium Adjustment

6.5.1. Cointegration Analysis (ARDL Bounds Test)

The presence of a long-run equilibrium relationship (**Cointegration**) was assessed using the Non-linear ARDL Bounds Test, which is the final methodological requirement for the NARDL framework. The null hypothesis (H_0 : No cointegration) is rejected if the F-statistic exceeds the upper critical bound (I(1) value).

Table 5: Results of the Cointegration Test for the Models (1980-2021)

Model	F-Statistic	I(1) Upper Bound (5%)	Result
Fiscal Policy Only (k=4)	2.706661	3.49	Not Cointegrated at 5% (But significant at 10%)
Monetary Policy Only (k=2)	3.846922	3.87	Not Cointegrated at 5% (But significant at 10%)
Combined Policies (k=6)	30.24083	3.28	Strongly Cointegrated (1% level)

Conclusion (Cointegration Confirmed): The calculated **F-statistic of 30.24083** for the **Combined Fiscal and Monetary Policy Model** vastly exceeds the I(1) upper critical bound of 3.99 even at the 1% significance level. This finding definitively confirms the existence of a robust and stable long-run cointegration relationship among inflation and the combined positive and negative policy shocks.

This result reinforces the earlier finding (Section 6.3.2) that **Policy Interaction is Paramount:** While isolated policy shocks (Models 1 and 2) show weak long-run convergence, the **joint force of fiscal and monetary policy** creates a structurally stable equilibrium, validating the decision to focus on the combined model and the **Fiscal Dominance** framework.

6.5.2. Speed of Adjustment to Long-Run Equilibrium (Error Correction Term)

The **Error Correction Model (ECM) coefficient** measures the rate at which inflation adjusts back toward its long-run equilibrium value following short-run policy deviations. For stability, the ECM coefficient must be negative and statistically significant.

Table 6: Summary of ECM Coefficients and Adjustment Speeds

Model	ECM Coefficient	Significance	Annual Adjustment (%)	Adjustment Time (Years)
Fiscal Policy Only	Approx. -0.78	1% Level	78%	1.3 years
Monetary Policy Only	Approx. -0.62	1% Level	62%	1.6 years
Combined Policies	Approx. -0.50	1% Level	50%	2.0 years

Interpretation of Adjustment Speed:

The consistently negative and highly significant ECM coefficients across all models confirm the overall stability of the **NARDL framework**.

Crucially, the ECM coefficient for the comprehensive **Combined Policy Model is -0.50**. This indicates that **50% of the disequilibrium** is corrected per year, resulting in the **slowest adjustment time of approximately 2.0 years**.

- **Policy Implication:** The finding that the adjustment speed is slowest when considering the **joint impact** of both policies highlights the complexity and **persistence introduced by the interaction of simultaneous fiscal and monetary shocks**. When these two dominant forces diverge or apply highly asymmetric pressure, the inflation rate takes the longest time to return to its structurally constrained long-run value, underscoring the high cost of policy misalignment

6.5. Cointegration and Equilibrium Adjustment (Continued)

6.5.2. Speed of Adjustment to Long-Run Equilibrium (Error Correction Term)

The **Error Correction Model (ECM) coefficient (CointEq(-1))** is vital as it measures the speed at which inflation adjusts back toward its stable long-run equilibrium following short-run deviations caused by policy shocks.

Table (6): Results of the ECM error correction model coefficient for the long-run relationship of the model during the period (1980-2021).

	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
Impact of fiscal policy				

CointEq(-1)	-0.781089	0.176936	4.414517	0.0002
Impact of monetary policy				
CointEq(-1)	-0.619920	0.150192	4.127514	0.0003
Impact of fiscal and monetary policies				
CointEq(-1)	-0.500017	0.019385	25.79338	0.0000

Where: REV refers to revenues, EXP refers to expenditures, MSUPPLY refers to Domestic Liquidity.

Source: Calculated from Table (1) in the appendix using the model under study.

Interpretation of Adjustment Speeds

The consistently negative and highly significant ECM coefficients (all P-values ≤ 0.0003) confirm the stability of the long-run cointegration relationship for all models.

Crucially, the ECM coefficient for the comprehensive Combined Policy Model is -0.50 , confirming that 50% of the disequilibrium is corrected per year.

Policy Implication: The adjustment speed is slowest (2.0 years) when considering the joint, interacting impact of both fiscal and monetary policies. This finding underscores the structural complexity and persistence introduced by the simultaneous application of policy shocks, especially under conditions of Fiscal Dominance and Monetary Constraints. When policies are active together, disequilibrium is the most resilient, taking longer to revert to the system's constrained long-run mean.

6.6. Diagnostic and Stability Tests

After estimating the NARDL models, a battery of diagnostic tests were performed on the residuals to ensure the estimates are reliable, unbiased, and efficient.

Test	Model Findings	Conclusion
Heteroskedasticity (Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey)	Non-significant P-value for all models.	No Heteroskedasticity (Constant variance of errors).
Serial Correlation (Breusch-Godfrey)	Non-significant P-value for all models.	No Serial Correlation (Independent errors).
Normality of Residuals (Jarque-Bera)	Non-significant P-value for Fiscal and Combined models (except for the Monetary Policy only model).	Residuals are Normally Distributed (largely confirmed, indicating valid hypothesis testing).

These results confirm that the NARDL models are well-specified and meet the required classical assumptions, ensuring the reliability and efficiency of the estimated coefficients used to test the **Asymmetric Effects** and **Fiscal Dominance** hypotheses.

6.6.2. Model Stability and Consistency

The **Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals (CUSUM)** and **Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals (CUSUMSQ)** tests (typically visualized in Figure 2) were used to check for structural breaks and parameter stability over the entire sample period (1980–2021).

The test results confirm **stability and consistency** in the model parameters:

1. **Parameter Stability:** The short-run and long-run coefficients did not shift significantly due to structural breaks or policy regime changes during the study period.
2. **Consistency:** The estimated coefficients are consistent with each other, reinforcing the overall **robustness** of the NARDL framework used to model the complex and **asymmetric effects** of policy interactions on inflation.


Table (7): Diagnostic tests of the model during the period (1980-2021).

Test	statistic	Value	Prob.
Impact of fiscal policy			
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey	F-statistic	0.576057	0.8299
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:	F-statistic	1.565364	0.2305
Normality	Jarque-Bera	2.497110	0.2869
Impact of monetary policy			
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey	F-statistic	0.499281	0.8623
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:	F-statistic	0.762973	0.4764
Normality	Jarque-Bera	10.97068	0.0041
Impact of fiscal and monetary policies			
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey	F-statistic	1.132217	0.5150
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:	F-statistic	3.649541	0.2151
Normality	Jarque-Bera	1.198166	0.5493

Where: REV refers to revenues, EXP refers to expenditures, MSUPPLY refers to Domestic Liquidity.

Source: Calculated from Table (1) in the appendix using the model under study.


Table (8): Testing the stability of the model during the period (1980-2021).



Where: REV refers to revenues, EXP refers to expenditures, MSUPPLY refers to Domestic Liquidity.

Source: Calculated from Table (1) in the appendix using the model under study.

Figure (2): Evolution of positive and negative change values of variables under study during the period (1980-2021).



6.7. Diagnostic and Stability Tests

6.7.1. Residual Diagnostic Tests

The reliability of the NARDL models is confirmed by diagnostic tests performed on the residuals. The null hypothesis is accepted for all tests where the P-value is greater than the 5% significance level (0.05).

The core Combined Fiscal and Monetary Policy Model successfully passes all key diagnostic tests (no heteroskedasticity, no serial correlation, and normal residuals), confirming the efficiency and

unbiasedness of its coefficients. The failure of the simplified Monetary Model to pass the Normality test further justifies the use of the comprehensive combined framework.

6.7.2. Model Stability Tests

The CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests (Table 8 summary) confirm the stability of the NARDL parameters over the entire 1980–2021 sample period, ensuring that the coefficients used to model the asymmetric effects are reliable and consistent.

7.1. Asymmetry and the Dynamics of Fiscal Policy

The analysis strongly validates the necessity of the NARDL model by confirming significant asymmetric effects (H1a). The response of inflation to Revenues (REV) is highly non-linear, with the initial deflationary impact of revenue shocks being quickly followed by massive inflationary surges at later lags (+10.47%). This complexity suggests that the markets process information about government fiscal capacity (revenues) in a delayed and non-monotonic manner, leading to volatile short-run dynamics.

7.2. The Reality of Fiscal Dominance

The empirical evidence is consistent with the Fiscal Dominance framework. The exceptional explanatory power ($R^2 \approx 0.997$) of the combined model demonstrates that inflation dynamics are almost entirely determined by the joint behavior of the fiscal and monetary authorities, rather than the actions of either authority in isolation.

7.3. Monetary Policy Constraints and Destabilization

The study's most critical finding relates to the limitations imposed by the Monetary Policy Constraint under the fixed exchange rate regime (H3a).

1. Long-Run Weakness: The long-run insignificance of monetary policy variables confirms their limited structural role.
2. Short-Run Destabilization: The dramatic finding that a 1% contractionary liquidity shock ($\Delta MSUPPLY-$) causes a 159.6% inflationary spike demonstrates that attempts by the Saudi Central Bank (SAMA) to independently tighten policy can be highly destabilizing. This counter-intuitive reaction suggests that a sharp liquidity reduction risks disrupting market function or generating expectations that force accommodation, ultimately reinforcing the dominance of the fiscal mandate.

Conclusion and Policy Imperative

The empirical findings from the NARDL analysis conclusively prove that inflation dynamics in Saudi Arabia are structurally governed by **Fiscal Dominance** under severe **Monetary Policy Constraints**, with effects being fundamentally **Asymmetric**.

The Challenge of Policy Interaction

The decisive finding is the confirmed supremacy of policy interaction. While the long-run influence of isolated policies is weak, the comprehensive model's near-perfect fit ($R^2 = 99.7\%$) and robust cointegration prove that policy coordination is the sole determinant of price stability.

The Asymmetric Cost of Misalignment

The true risk lies in the short-run instability. The most critical result is the +159.6% inflationary spike following a contractionary monetary shock ($\Delta MSUPPLY-$). This extreme asymmetric response confirms the monetary tool is destabilized and rendered ineffective by the exchange rate peg, leaving the economy vulnerable to volatility. Furthermore, the slow adjustment period of two years ($ECM = -0.50$)—the longest recorded—demonstrates that misaligned fiscal and monetary shocks are the chief source of persistent disequilibrium.

Policy Imperative

To achieve sustainable price stability, the focus must shift from attempting simple, linear control to managing the asymmetric, lagged effects of policy interaction. This necessitates coordinated fiscal consolidation (controlling expenditure growth) to reduce financial strain, thereby alleviating the dependence on a monetary policy tool proven to be dangerous when used to contract liquidity.

Comprehensive Summary of NARDL Findings

The econometric analysis conclusively establishes that Saudi inflation dynamics are governed by a framework of Fiscal Dominance under severe Monetary Policy Constraints, with effects being highly Asymmetric. The NARDL model was essential for revealing the true, volatile, and non-linear (asymmetric) effects of policy interactions.

I. Validation of Policy Interaction and Fiscal Dominance

The findings affirm that the primary driver of inflation is the interaction between policies. The comprehensive model achieved an exceptional explanatory power ($R^2=99.7\%$) and confirmed robust long-run cointegration ($F\text{-statistic}=30.24$). This proves that policy coordination is the definitive determinant of price stability. This robust fit confirms the Fiscal Dominance Hypothesis, suggesting that the price level dynamics are ultimately determined by the overall financial footprint and activities of the government, rather than the isolated actions of the central bank. Furthermore, the general insignificance of individual long-run coefficients confirms that the fixed exchange rate structure limits long-term domestic policy control.

II. Severe Asymmetry and Monetary Policy Destabilization

The analysis strongly validates the necessity of the non-linear NARDL framework. The study confirms that inflation responses are highly Asymmetric, differing significantly between positive and negative shocks.

The Monetary Constraint: The critical finding is the reaction to contractionary monetary policy. A 1% contractionary liquidity shock ($\Delta MSUPPLY-$) resulted in a massive, counter-intuitive, and immediate inflationary spike of +159.6%. This extreme non-linearity demonstrates that the central bank's attempts to tighten policy are highly destabilizing and ineffective. This phenomenon likely reflects a financial market overreaction or an expectation that the Central Bank will be forced to accommodate the fiscal mandate, effectively neutralizing the restrictive policy and reinforcing the constraint.

Volatile Fiscal Dynamics: Fiscal revenue increases ($REV+$) are characterized by delayed inflationary surges (e.g., +10.47% after two years). This volatile and non-immediate response suggests that the market views revenue expansion not as deflationary (tax-like), but as a structural indicator of future spending capacity, fueling persistent inflationary expectations.

III. Persistence and Policy Implications

Chronic Disequilibrium: The time required for the system to adjust back to long-run equilibrium is the slowest (2.0 years) in the combined policy model ($ECM=-0.50$). This result critically highlights that the misalignment and interaction of fiscal and monetary shocks are the primary source of chronic price persistence in the Saudi economy.

Shift to Coordinated Management: Given these findings, policy focus must shift from simple, linear control to managing the asymmetric, lagged effects of coordinated policy action.

Focus on Fiscal Consolidation: Long-term stability requires coordinated fiscal consolidation (especially controlling public expenditure growth) coupled with stable monetary management that consciously avoids the destabilizing contractionary shocks that the model has identified

15. Conclusion: The Asymmetric Reality of Policy Dynamics

This analysis conclusively establishes the structural framework governing Saudi inflation, affirming the Fiscal Dominance Hypothesis under severe Monetary Policy Constraints. The NARDL model proved indispensable by revealing highly asymmetric and non-linear effects where traditional linear assumptions fail.

- Structural Control: The model's near-perfect fit ($R^2=99.7\%$) and confirmed cointegration decisively prove that policy coordination is the sole determinant of price stability.
- Destabilization Risk: The extreme non-linearity of the monetary tool—highlighted by the +159.6% inflationary spike following a liquidity contraction—proves that attempts to tighten policy are destabilizing and ineffective under the fixed peg.
- Chronic Persistence: The longest recorded adjustment period of two years ($ECM=-0.50$) confirms that uncoordinated policy action is the primary source of chronic inflation volatility.

16. Policy Recommendations

Based on the empirical evidence, structural policy reforms must focus on mitigating asymmetry and institutionalizing coordination.

1. Mandate Policy Coordination: Formal mechanisms must be established to ensure a unified policy signal, specifically to shorten the 2.0 year adjustment period caused by policy misalignment.
2. Manage Asymmetric Lags: Fiscal authorities must strategically neutralize the delayed inflationary pressures caused by revenue increases (REV+) and focus on expenditure timing to smooth volatility.
3. Prioritize Monetary Stability: The monetary authority must strictly avoid sharp liquidity contraction and focus instead on stable, predictable liquidity management to anchor expectations within the constraints of the fixed exchange rate regime

Appendix Table (1): Variables under study during the period (1980-2021).

Year	Revenues in billion riyals	Expenditures in billion riyals	Money supply in billion riyals	Inflation, prices paid by consumers (% per annum)
	Rev	Exp	Msupply	Inf
1980	348.100	236.755	83.403	4.169
1981	368.006	284.650	102.955	2.799
1982	246.182	244.912	116.093	1.021
1983	206.419	230.186	119.897	0.191
1984	171.509	216.363	119.700	-1.559
1985	133.565	184.004	122.721	-3.059
1986	76.498	137.422	126.939	-3.203
1987	103.811	184.919	129.020	-1.547
1988	84.600	140.856	134.143	0.908
1989	114.600	154.870	136.414	1.033

1990	215.620	321.148	141.545	2.077
1991	316.639	487.425	165.093	4.861
1992	169.647	238.987	171.796	-0.077
1993	141.445	187.890	169.395	1.056
1994	128.991	163.776	177.062	0.564
1995	146.500	173.943	185.694	4.868
1996	179.085	198.117	204.009	1.222
1997	205.500	221.272	218.349	0.057
1998	141.608	190.060	223.708	-0.371
1999	147.454	183.841	242.007	-1.334
2000	258.065	235.322	256.332	-1.125
2001	228.159	255.140	271.080	-1.121
2002	213.000	233.500	310.367	0.247
2003	293.000	257.000	336.404	0.612
2004	392.291	285.200	407.976	0.516
2005	564.335	346.474	448.805	0.479
2006	673.682	393.322	538.769	2.209
2007	642.800	466.248	666.616	4.168
2008	1100.993	520.069	793.118	9.870
2009	509.805	596.434	844.935	5.057
2010	740.872	653.886	923.875	5.339
2011	1117.527	826.700	1078.396	5.826
2012	1246.538	917.198	1219.356	2.866
2013	1152.612	994.734	1353.677	3.533
2014	1040.141	1140.603	1548.554	2.236
2015	612.693	1001.292	1588.020	1.206
2016	519.448	830.513	1642.429	2.069
2017	691.505	926.400	1628.666	-0.838
2018	905.609	1079.466	1663.820	2.458
2019	926.845	1059.445	1789.978	-2.093
2020	781.834	1075.734	1962.842	3.445
2021	965.000	1039.000	2059.809	3.063

Source: Saudi Central Bank website.

Appendix Table (2): Values of positive and negative changes of variables under study during the period (1980-2021).

	REV_POS	REV_NEG	EXP_POS	EXP_NEG	MSUPPLY_POS	MSUPPLY_NEG
1980						
1981	19.906000	0.000000	47.895000	0.000000	19.551300	0.000000
1982	19.906000	-121.824000	47.895000	-39.738000	32.689400	0.000000
1983	19.906000	-161.587000	47.895000	-54.464000	36.493400	0.000000

1984	19.906000	-196.497000	47.895000	-68.287000	36.493400	-0.196900
1985	19.906000	-234.441000	47.895000	-100.646000	39.514200	-0.196900
1986	19.906000	-291.508000	47.895000	-147.228000	43.732200	-0.196900
1987	47.219000	-291.508000	95.392000	-147.228000	45.813300	-0.196900
1988	47.219000	-310.719000	95.392000	-191.291000	50.936300	-0.196900
1989	77.219000	-310.719000	109.406000	-191.291000	53.207200	-0.196900
1990	178.238500	-310.719000	275.683500	-191.291000	58.338991	-0.196900
1991	279.258000	-310.719000	441.961000	-191.291000	81.886970	-0.196900
1992	279.258000	-457.711000	441.961000	-439.729000	88.589900	-0.196900
1993	279.258000	-485.913000	441.961000	-490.826000	88.589900	-2.598204
1994	279.258000	-498.367000	441.961000	-514.940000	96.256360	-2.598204
1995	296.767000	-498.367000	452.128000	-514.940000	104.888463	-2.598204
1996	329.352000	-498.367000	476.302000	-514.940000	123.203411	-2.598204
1997	355.767000	-498.367000	499.457000	-514.940000	137.544090	-2.598204
1998	355.767000	-562.259000	499.457000	-546.152000	142.903219	-2.598204
1999	361.613000	-562.259000	499.457000	-552.371000	161.201399	-2.598204
2000	472.224000	-562.259000	550.938000	-552.371000	175.527198	-2.598204
2001	472.224000	-592.165000	570.756000	-552.371000	190.275289	-2.598204
2002	472.224000	-607.324000	570.756000	-574.011000	229.562070	-2.598204
2003	552.224000	-607.324000	594.256000	-574.011000	255.598545	-2.598204
2004	651.515000	-607.324000	622.456000	-574.011000	327.171065	-2.598204
2005	823.559000	-607.324000	683.730000	-574.011000	368.000275	-2.598204
2006	932.906000	-607.324000	730.578000	-574.011000	457.963341	-2.598204
2007	932.906000	-638.206000	803.504000	-574.011000	585.810664	-2.598204
2008	1391.099000	-638.206000	857.325000	-574.011000	712.312755	-2.598204
2009	1391.099000	-1229.394000	933.690000	-574.011000	764.129396	-2.598204
2010	1622.166000	-1229.394000	991.142000	-574.011000	843.069425	-2.598204
2011	1998.821000	-1229.394000	1163.956000	-574.011000	997.590647	-2.598204
2012	2127.832000	-1229.394000	1254.454000	-574.011000	1138.550746	-2.598204
2013	2127.832000	-1323.320000	1331.990000	-574.011000	1272.871523	-2.598204
2014	2127.832000	-1435.791000	1477.859000	-574.011000	1467.748807	-2.598204
2015	2127.832000	-1863.239000	1477.859000	-713.322000	1507.214588	-2.598204
2016	2127.832000	-1956.484000	1477.859000	-884.101000	1561.623380	-2.598204
2017	2299.889487	-1956.484000	1573.746000	-884.101000	1561.623380	-16.360622
2018	2513.993000	-1956.484000	1726.812000	-884.101000	1596.777033	-16.360622
2019	2535.229493	-1956.484000	1726.812000	-904.122000	1722.935491	-16.360622
2020	2535.229493	-2101.495493	1743.101000	-904.122000	1895.799083	-16.360622
2021	2718.395493	-2101.495493	1743.101000	-940.856000	1992.765797	-16.360622

Where: REV refers to revenues, EXP refers to expenditures, MSUPPLY refers to Domestic Liquidity.

Source: Calculated from Table (1) in the appendix using the model under study.

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