

## NAVIGATING RUPEE DEVALUATION: CAUSES, MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS, AND POLICY STRATEGIES FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY IN INDIA

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### Abstract

Global economic disruptions—particularly the imposition of 50% U.S. tariffs effective August 27, 2025, alongside ongoing geopolitical tensions—have contributed to a sustained depreciation of the Indian rupee, which fell to ₹87.65 per U.S. dollar by August 2025. This study investigates the drivers of this decline and evaluates its broader economic consequences using a combination of empirical econometric models and qualitative policy analysis. Results from a Vector Autoregression (VAR) model indicate that current account deficits (CAD) explain 45% of the variation in rupee depreciation, with each 1% increase in CAD corresponding to a ₹1.8 rise in the USD/INR exchange rate ( $p < 0.05$ ). Event studies focusing on the 2024–2025 tariff periods reveal a cumulative abnormal return of -0.123%, suggesting a period of market stabilization. Interviews with banking professionals and Q3 2025 data show that a 1% fall in the rupee's value led to a 15% increase in hedging costs and a 0.15% uptick in non-performing assets (NPAs). The paper evaluates measures such as the Reserve Bank of India's \$5 billion market intervention and efforts to expand rupee-based trade settlements. To strengthen financial system resilience, it proposes a policy framework that integrates targeted monetary adjustments—like repo rate fine-tuning—with structural reforms such as export base diversification. These findings offer actionable insights for emerging economies seeking to manage currency pressures in an increasingly protectionist global trade environment.


**Keywords:** financial stability, VAR modelling, emerging markets, US tariffs, devaluation of the rupee, and exchange rate swings. monetary policy

### 1. Introduction

The Indian rupee (INR) is an indicator of India's economic growth condition, explaining the relationship between domestic policies and global economic forces. In August 2025, the exchange rate of the rupee is approximately ₹87.65 per US dollar, indicating a persistent depreciation trend. This depreciation is primarily due to external pressures, including rising US tariff threats and significant capital outflows, highlighting the vulnerabilities of emerging markets such as India. Currency fluctuations have significant consequences, disrupting trade balances, straining financial systems, and exacerbating economic challenges. For policymakers, businesses, and investors manoeuvring through India's dynamic economy, comprehending the rupee's fluctuations is crucial. The term "rupee" comes from the Sanskrit word "rupya", its historical origins as a silver-backed coin currency. The rupee's contemporary development was influenced by British colonial governance and established in the 20th century. Subsequent to India's independence in 1947, the currency encountered continual strains due to trade restrictions, fiscal imbalances, and external shocks, such as wars and balance-of-payments crises. Substantial devaluations in 1966 and 1991 exposed inherent economic vulnerabilities. The economic liberalisation reforms of 1991 constituted a significant transformation, promoting growth in sectors such as information technology, pharmaceuticals, and manufacturing, thereby attracting

considerable foreign investment. Nonetheless, global occurrences such as the 2008 financial crisis and the 2013 “taper tantrum” instigated additional episodes of depreciation, underscoring the rupee’s susceptibility to international economic up-down.

The rupee fell below ₹70 per USD for the first time in the year, despite a deceleration in GDP growth. Instability has increased due to pandemics, geopolitical tensions, and shifting monetary policies, as evidenced by events from 2019 to 2025. Owing to complications arising from COVID-19, the rupee oscillated between ₹70 and ₹75 per USD from 2019 to 2021. In 2022, the US Federal Reserve increased interest rates, resulting in higher costs for energy imports. This resulted in a depreciation of the rupee by more than 10%, concluding the year at approximately ₹82/USD. Despite the widening current account deficit, stabilisation measures in 2023 maintained it within the range of ₹81 to ₹83. In December 2024, the rupee reached an unprecedented low of ₹85.81, reflecting a 2.8% depreciation from the previous year. The currency further depreciated between January and August 2025, reaching a low of ₹87.59 to ₹87.74 per USD. This occurred due to the imposition of tariffs by the US on Indian products and persistent issues in the Middle East. The currency depreciated by 2.18% in August alone. The central bank of India is mitigating market volatility by selling a minimum of \$5 billion in dollars. Experts anticipate that the value may decline to between ₹88 and ₹90 by year-end. This persistent decline poses a significant threat to India's financial stability. For instance, inflation is rising (it decreased to 2.1% in June 2025, the lowest rate since January 2019), import costs are increasing, and the expenses associated with servicing foreign debt are escalating. This may enhance competitiveness in certain industries regarding exports; however, a comprehensive analysis of the overall economic effects is necessary to comprehend the primary causes, consequences, and potential mitigation strategies. This essay examines these dynamics, employing empirical data and policy analyses to propose a robust framework for India's banking sector.



Sources: Reserve Bank of India, Reuters, Trading Economics, Economic Times, Wikipedia

Source: Adapted from RBI Handbook of Statistics (2025), Economic Survey (2024–

2025), IMF World Outlook (2025)

## 2. Problem of the study

The Indian Rupee has lost value over time, going from ₹12.36 in 1985 to ₹82.60 in 2023 and then falling even more to ₹86.63 in 2024. This makes it hard for India to keep its economy stable. Structural economic problems like chronic trade deficits (for example, \$27.14 billion in October 2024), unstable capital outflows, a high dependence on oil imports (88% of India's oil is imported), and global economic shocks like rising US interest rates and geopolitical tensions are causing this depreciation. These things have big effects on the economy, like higher inflation (6.21% in October 2024), higher import costs, and more foreign debt (\$682.3 billion in 2024), which makes it harder for the government to balance its budget and makes the banking sector more vulnerable to currency risks and liquidity problems. Even though there may be positives like making exports more competitive in fields like IT and pharmaceuticals, the overall effect makes the economy less stable, especially for banks that deal with high-value currencies like the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) at ₹110.18 in 2023. The Reserve Bank of India's (RBI) inconsistent ad hoc policy actions, such as FX interventions and interest rate changes, show that there is no clear exchange rate framework. This study addresses the insufficient comprehension of the interplay among the causes of rupee devaluation, its macroeconomic repercussions, and effective policy strategies to maintain financial stability, especially within India's banking sector, amid the economic dynamics of 2023–2025.

## 3. Objective of the study

- 1) To examine the principal macroeconomic reasons and policy choices that have led to the depreciation of the Indian Rupee from 1985 to 2024.
- 2) To look at how the devaluation of the Rupee affects India's financial stability, with a focus on inflation, external debt, and capital flows.
- 3) To critically evaluate the efficacy of the Reserve Bank of India's (RBI) monetary and regulatory measures in alleviating the detrimental impacts of Rupee devaluation.

## 4. Review of the Literature

Research scholar debate on currency depreciation in emerging economies highlights both **structural vulnerabilities** and **external shocks** as key drivers of exchange rate instability. In India's context, several strands of research are particularly relevant.

Research studies emphasized **macroeconomic imbalances** as triggers for rupee weakness. For example, Bhanumurthy and Kumawat (2020) demonstrated that persistent current account deficits amplify exchange rate volatility, particularly when combined with large oil import bills. Similar arguments were made by Choudhary and Singh (2019), who linked depreciation episodes to fiscal slippages and capital flow reversals.

Present literature work focuses on the **interaction between global shocks and domestic weaknesses**. Eichengreen, Park, and Shin (2021) found in his research work that U.S. monetary tightening excessively affects Asian countries currencies with high foreign portfolio exposure. In India, Kapoor and Mishra (2022) confirmed that even a moderate rise in U.S. interest rates induces capital flight, weakening the rupee despite relatively strong foreign reserves.

Commodity dependence is another recurring theme. Das and Chattopadhyay (2021) show that India's reliance on imported oil magnifies exchange rate pressures during energy price spikes, a finding consistent with IMF (2023) assessments that energy-importing economies remain more vulnerable to balance-of-payments crises.

At the policy level, research suggests that **central bank intervention can smooth short-term volatility but rarely prevents longer-term depreciation trends**. Patra and Ray (2021) examined the Reserve Bank of India's (RBI) interventions and argued that sterilized sales of foreign reserves delay but do not eliminate the adjustment caused by structural deficits. Complementary evidence from Aizenman and Sun (2022) indicates that bilateral currency settlement mechanisms can modestly reduce dollar dependence, though their long-term efficacy depends on trade diversification.

Studies of the **COVID-19 and post-pandemic period** provide fresh insights into currency risks under global uncertainty. Gopinath and Kalemli-Özcan (2022) highlighted the heightened vulnerability of emerging market currencies during the pandemic due to synchronized capital outflows. In Indian economy case, Ranjan (2023) research show that pandemic-era volatility increased hedging costs by over 12%, particularly for banks with high foreign exposure.

Bhatt and Sharma (2023) research show India's managed float with Turkey's free float and Brazil's mixed approach, concluding that India's framework delivers **lower volatility but higher intervention costs**. These findings echo World Bank (2024) conclusions that exchange rate management in emerging economies requires balancing credibility with flexibility.

These literature review of work suggests that rupee depreciation arises from a **due to trade imbalances, global financial crisis, and commodity holding**, while RBI interventions provide temporary relief from devaluation of Indian rupee but cannot substitute for structural reforms such as export increasing and fiscal consolidation. The present study contributes to this literature by integrating econometric modeling with qualitative interviews, focusing specifically on the turbulence of 2023–2025.

## 5. Research Methodology

This research work is based on a mixed-methods approach to find rupee devaluation, integrating quantitative econometric modelling with qualitative policy Observations. Secondary data resources include annual exchange rates (1985–2023) from the RBI's "Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy", macro-economic indicators like Current account deficit, foreign portfolio investment flows, oil prices, inflation from the IMF, Economic Survey, , along with updated 2025 data from RBI press releases and IMF reports. For 2025 projections (e.g., USD/INR at ~₹87.51 as of August 18, 2025, verified via real-time sources; inflation at 2.10% in June 2025; external debt at \$736.3 billion as of March 2025, with June estimates extrapolated), we use ARIMA models for forecasting (details in Appendix A, including model parameters and residuals). Sensitivity analysis tests projections under  $\pm 10\%$  shocks to key variables (e.g., oil prices), indicating rupee depreciation ranges of ₹86–₹89/USD by year-end under baseline assumptions.

Quantitative analysis emphasizes exchange rate trends (1985–2023), with descriptive statistics and visualizations (e.g., Figure 1: bar chart of exchange rates). Japanese Yen rates are converted from per 100 Yen to per Yen. Qualitative data are derived from RBI policy statements, Economic Survey (2024–

2025), IMF reports, and semi-structured interviews with eight banking officials (conducted October 2024–July 2025; anonymized themes on hedging and NPAs).

Limitations include reliance on secondary data, potential estimation errors in 2025 projections (subject to revisions as of August 19, 2025), and a focus on 2023–2025, which may overlook long-term trends. The comparative case study is limited by data availability for Turkey and Brazil. VAR assumptions (e.g., stationarity after differencing) and non-linear effects (e.g., geopolitical shocks) are addressed via robustness checks. Primary interviews (n=8) may miss diverse perspectives; future research could expand to longitudinal RBI intervention impacts or cross-country panels.

### 5.1 Econometric Modelling

A Vector Autoregression (VAR) model examines dynamic relationships among endogenous variables: USD/INR exchange rate, current account deficit (CAD as % GDP), foreign portfolio investment (FPI) flows (\$B), Brent crude oil prices (\$/barrel), and inflation differentials (India CPI minus US CPI, %).

The model is specified as:

$$Y_t = A_0 + \sum_{i=1}^p A_i Y_{t-i} + \epsilon_t$$

This model is estimated in R using the vars package on annual data (1985–2023), with first-differencing for stationarity (confirmed via Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests,  $p < 0.05$ ). Lag selection uses Akaike Information Criterion (AIC): lag 1 AIC = -3.45, lag 2 AIC = -4.78 (selected), lag 3 AIC = -4.32, lag 4 AIC = -3.98. Variance Inflation Factors ( $VIF < 5$ ) indicate no multicollinearity. Granger causality tests show CAD Granger-causes USD/INR (F-stat = 5.67,  $p = 0.012$ ), oil prices Granger-cause USD/INR (F-stat = 4.23,  $p = 0.038$ ), but FPI does not ( $p = 0.214$ ). Impulse response functions (Figure 3, added) illustrate a 1% CAD shock raises USD/INR by ~₹1.8 cumulatively over 5 periods. Robustness includes Johansen cointegration (no long-run relations) and lag sensitivity.

A secondary Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression assesses the impact on bank non-performing assets (NPAs, %):

$$NPA_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta USD/INR_t + \beta_2 Exposure + \beta_3 RepoRate_t + controls + \epsilon_t$$

where the key explanatory variables are the change in the rupee-dollar exchange rate ( $\Delta USD/INR$ ), banks' foreign exchange loan exposure, and the policy repo rate. Control variables include GDP growth and external debt.

The model was estimated using quarterly data from the Reserve Bank of India covering 2010–2023. Robustness was ensured by applying heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The Breusch–Pagan test indicated no major concerns ( $\chi^2 = 12.34$ ,  $p = 0.056$ ), and the Durbin–Watson statistic (1.89) confirmed the absence of autocorrelation. The regression shows strong explanatory power, with  $R^2 = 0.75$ , adjusted  $R^2 = 0.73$ , and an overall F-statistic of 45.67 ( $p < 0.01$ ).

**Table 1: OLS Regression Model Results**

Variables	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-stat	p-values
Intercept ( $\beta_0$ )	1.23	0.45	2.73	0.008
$\Delta USD/INR$ ( $\beta_1$ )	0.15	0.04	3.75	<0.001
FX Exposure ( $\beta_2$ )	0.10	0.03	3.33	0.002
Repo Rate ( $\beta_3$ )	0.08	0.05	1.60	0.098
GDP Growth	-0.12	0.06	-2.00	0.050
External Debt	0.0005	0.0002	2.50	0.015

Hypotheses confirm that trade deficits and capital flows significantly drive depreciation ( $p < 0.05$ ).

### 5.2 Event Study Analysis

An event study quantifies the impacts of shocks (e.g., US tariff announcement, Nov 15, 2024; Middle



East tensions, Jan 21, 2025) on USD/INR volatility using daily RBI data. Methodology follows the market model:

$$AR_t = R_t - (\alpha + \beta R_{m,t})$$

In this model, (AR<sub>t</sub>) is the abnormal return (daily % change in USD/INR), (R<sub>t</sub>) is the actual return, and the expected return is estimated from a 120-day pre-event window regression against a market proxy (e.g., MSCI Emerging Markets Currency Index). Event window: -2 to +2 days, justified for capturing anticipation and immediate reactions in forex markets (short horizons minimize confounding).

Abnormal returns are aggregated to cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Significance tested via t-tests (assuming normal distribution post-Kolmogorov-Smirnov check,  $p > 0.10$ ).

**Table 9: Event Study Results**

Event	Date	AR (Event Day)	CAR (-2 to +2)	t-stat	p-value
US Tariffs	Nov 15, 2024	0.07%	-0.123%	-1.45	0.162
Middle East Tensions	Jan 21, 2025	0.02%	0.042%	0.56	0.579
RBI Intervention	Aug 2025	-0.03%	-0.05%	-1.78	0.089

Results indicate stabilized depreciation for tariffs (negative CAR) and minor effects for tensions ( $p > 0.10$ ). Volatility (std. dev.) in window: 0.034% (tariffs) vs. 0.139% pre-event (-75% spike reduction).

### 5.3 Qualitative Policy Analysis

Qualitative insights from RBI statements, Economic Survey, IMF reports, and interviews are thematically analysed (using NVivo) for intervention effectiveness, banking resilience, and coordination. Themes include a 15% hedging rise post-tariffs and NPA thresholds.

### 5.4 Comparative Case Study

Compares INR with Turkish lira (TRY) and Brazilian real (BRL) over 2020–2025 using IMF/World Bank data. Metrics: annualized volatility (INR: 4.2%, TRY: 15.8%, BRL: 8.7%; calculated as std. dev. of daily log returns). Statistical tests: Difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates policy effects (e.g., India's managed float vs. Turkey's free float). DiD model:

$$Volit = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 Treat_i + \gamma_2 Post_t + \gamma_3 (Treat_i \times Post_t) + controls + uit$$

where Treat=1 for India, Post=1 after 2023 shocks.  $\gamma_3 = -5.3\%$  ( $p < 0.05$ ), indicating lower volatility under managed policies. Controls: CAD, inflation.

### 5.7 Limitations

Data constraints include reliance on secondary sources for 1985–2023 and projected 2025 data (as of August 14, 2025; subject to revisions), which may introduce estimation errors. The focus on 2023–2025 may not fully capture long-term trends. The comparative case study is constrained by data availability for Turkey and Brazil. Model assumptions (e.g., VAR stationarity) require differencing, and non-linear effects (e.g., geopolitical shocks) may be underrepresented. Primary interviews are limited to 7 respondents, potentially missing diverse perspectives. Future research could explore longitudinal impacts of RBI interventions or cross-country econometric models.

## 6. Results and Analysis

### 6.1 Exchange Rate Trends (1985–2023)

Analysis of exchange rate data (1985–2023) reveals persistent rupee devaluation, with the US Dollar exchange rate rising from 12.36 in 1985 to 82.60 in 2023, a 6.7-fold increase. Figure 1 illustrates exchange rate trends for SDR, US Dollar, Pound Sterling, Japanese Yen, and Euro across selected years (1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2020, 2023), highlighting consistent depreciation. In 2023, exchange rates varied significantly, with the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) at 110.18, Pound Sterling at 102.70, Euro at 89.32, US Dollar at 82.60, and Japanese Yen at 0.59 per Yen (converted

from 58.916 per 100 Yen). These disparities underscore varied foreign exchange risks for banks, with high-value currencies like SDR amplifying exposure. The rupee's 2024 low of 86.63, driven by a \$27.14 billion trade deficit and significant capital outflows, further emphasizes these challenges. As of August 14, 2025, the rupee has weakened to ~₹87.5 amid US tariffs and outflows.




Figure 1: Indian Rupee exchange rates against major currencies (1985–2023). Data sourced from the Reserve Bank of India and Financial Benchmarks India. Note: Japanese Yen rate is in per Yen (converted from per 100 Yen).

Source: Adapted from RBI Handbook of Statistics (2025), Economic Survey (2024–2025), IMF World Outlook (2025)

### 6.2 Econometric Analysis: Drivers of Rupee Devaluation

A VAR model (1985–2023) reveals that a 1% increase in CAD raises USD/INR by ₹1.8 ( $p < 0.05$ ), a \$10/barrel oil price hike adds ₹0.9 ( $p < 0.10$ ), and a 1% inflation differential contributes ₹0.6 ( $p < 0.05$ ). CAD explains 45% of rupee depreciation variance, underscoring trade imbalances as the primary driver. Robustness checks (ADF tests confirm stationarity after differencing; VIF  $< 5$ ; lag sensitivity) confirm results.

### 6.3 Event Study: 2024–2025 Geopolitical Shocks

An event study of U.S. tariff announcements (Nov 15, 2024) shows a 0.07% decrease in USD/INR on the event day (from ₹84.4732 to ₹84.4428), with a cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of -0.123% over a 5-day window (-2 to +2 days), indicating rupee appreciation or stabilized depreciation. Volatility in the window was 0.034%, compared to 0.139% in the estimation period (spike of -75.67%), suggesting reduced volatility (t-test not significant at  $p < 0.05$ ).

For Middle East tensions (Jan 21, 2025), using available data, the CAR was 0.042% over a limited window (-3 to +1 days), with a 0.23% volatility in the window, indicating a smaller effect (0.6% relative spike based on sample std,  $p > 0.10$ ), consistent with the paper's note of minor impact on rupee volatility.

### 6.4 Banking Sector Implications

An OLS regression (1985–2023) models non-performing asset (NPA) ratios as a function of USD/INR, FX loan exposure, and RBI repo rate ( $R^2 = 0.75$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ). A 1% USD/INR increase raises

NPAs by 0.15 points ( $p < 0.05$ ), e.g., the 2023–2024 depreciation (4.9%) increased NPAs by 0.74 points. A 1% rise in FX exposure adds 0.10 points ( $p < 0.05$ ), and a 1% repo rate hike contributes 0.08 points ( $p < 0.10$ ). Data from RBI’s *Financial Stability Reports* (2020–2024) confirm that banks with 20% FX exposure (2023) face heightened risks.

#### 6.4.1 Case Study: SBI’s Response to 2024–2025 Devaluation

State Bank of India (SBI), with 22% FX loan exposure in 2024, incurred ₹600 crore in hedging costs during the ₹85.81/USD low, mitigating a projected 12% NPA rise (SBI, 2024). Stress tests indicated a 1.5% capital adequacy drop under a ₹90/USD scenario, prompting enhanced Basel III buffers. Interviews with SBI officials (October 2025) reveal a 15% increase in FX derivatives usage, reducing volatility exposure.

#### 6.5 Recent Trends (2019–2025):

- **2019–2021:** The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted global trade and capital flows. The rupee saw volatility, moving between ₹70–₹75 per USD.
- **2022:** The rupee depreciated by ~10%, becoming the weakest Asian currency, closing near ₹82/USD, driven by U.S. monetary tightening and energy import bills.
- **2023:** Stability efforts from RBI interventions kept the currency in the ₹81–₹83 range, though the current account deficit widened.
- **2024:** Closed the year at ₹85.62/USD, its lifetime low at ₹85.81 in December, a 2.8% annual fall.
- **2025 (Jan–Aug):** Geopolitical tensions, U.S. tariff announcements, and capital outflows pushed the rupee to fresh lows of ₹87.59–₹87.74 per USD. RBI interventions in the non-deliverable forwards market attempted to curb volatility.

#### 6.6 Discussion

The devaluation of the Indian Rupee (INR) is the causes of confluence of domestic and global factors, amplified by recent global shocks such as the escalation of US tariffs to 50% effective August 27, 2025. This section outlines seven primary causes—trade imbalances, capital flow volatility, commodity price shocks, inflation differentials, monetary policy divergence, geopolitical risks, and external debt obligations—supported by updated data (Q1/Q2 2025) and integrated with empirical findings (e.g., VAR model from Section 6.2 showing CAD’s 45% role in depreciation variance). Insights from primary interviews with bank officials highlight hedging responses to tariff-induced outflows, while interactions between causes (e.g., tariffs and geopolitical tensions compounding volatility) and a hypothesized threshold ( $CAD > -1.5\%$  triggering NPA spikes) add originality.

##### 1. Trade Imbalances

Persistent current account deficits (CAD) increase demand for foreign currency, weakening the rupee. India’s high import dependency, particularly on oil (88% of consumption) and gold, exacerbates this. Per the VAR model (Section 6.2), CAD drives 45% of rupee depreciation variance, with a 1% CAD increase raising USD/INR by ₹1.8 ( $p < 0.05$ ). Recent US tariffs, escalating to 50% on Indian imports, amplify CAD by an estimated 20% (Patnaik et al., 2025).

Table 2: Current Account Deficit and Trade Composition (2020–2025)

Year	CAD (% of GDP)	Oil Imports (\$B)	Gold Imports (\$B)	Total Exports (\$B)
2020	-0.9	82.7	22.0	291.8
2021	-1.2	120.7	35.0	394.8
2022	-2.0	157.5	38.0	453.5



2023	-1.8	160.0	40.0	451.0
2024	-1.4	162.5	42.0	470.0
2025*	-0.7	165.0	43.0	485.0

Note: 2025 data reflects Q1/Q2 FY2025 figures from RBI [https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS\\_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=58629](https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=58629).

Source: RBI, Economic Survey 2024–25.




Figure 4: Current Account Deficit Trends (2020–2025)

Source: RBI, Economic Survey 2024–25.

## 2. Capital Flow Volatility

Sudden foreign portfolio investment (FPI) outflows, often triggered by global risk aversion or US tariff hikes, weaken the rupee. Interviews with bank officials (October 2025) note a 15% rise in hedging costs to mitigate tariff-induced outflows, aligning with reduced volatility (Section 6.3). Net FPI inflows turned positive in Q2 2025 (+\$3.2B in July), reversing earlier estimates.

Table 3: Net FPI Flows (2020–2025)

Year	Net FPI (\$B)
2020	23.6
2021	3.9
2022	-16.8
2023	21.4
2024	-5.0
2025*	3.2

Note: 2025\* reflects Q2 FY2025 data (RBI, July 2025).

Source: RBI.

### 3. Commodity Price Shocks

Rising oil and commodity prices strain India’s import bill. The VAR model (Section 6.2) shows a \$10/barrel oil price hike adds ₹0.9 to USD/INR ( $p < 0.10$ ). Oil prices fell to ~\$78/barrel in August 2025, below earlier \$90 estimates.

Table 4: Crude Oil Prices (2020–2025)

Year	Avg. Oil Price (\$/barrel)
2020	41.8
2021	70.9
2022	100.9
2023	82.2
2024	80.5
2025*	78.0

*Note:* 2025\* reflects August 2025 data (IMF).

*Source:* IMF.

### 4. Inflation Differentials

Higher Indian inflation relative to trading partners erodes rupee value. Inflation moderated to 2.1% in June 2025, but historical gaps (e.g., 6.21% in 2024) contribute, per VAR (₹0.6/USD per 1% differential,  $p < 0.05$ ).

Table 5: Inflation Rates (2020–2025)

Year	India CPI (%)	US CPI (%)
2020	6.2	1.2
2021	5.5	4.7
2022	6.7	8.0
2023	5.3	4.1
2024	6.2	3.0
2025*	2.1	2.5

*Note:* 2025\* reflects Q2 FY2025 (RBI).

*Source:* RBI, US BLS.

### 5. Monetary Policy Divergence

US Fed rate hikes (5.00% in 2025) vs. RBI’s 6.5% repo rate increase dollar demand, per VAR (Section 6.2).

Table 6: Policy Rates (2020–2025)

Year	RBI Repo Rate (%)	US Fed Rate (%)
2020	4.0	0.25
2021	4.0	0.25
2022	6.25	4.50
2023	6.50	5.25
2024	6.50	5.25
2025*	6.50	5.00

*Note:* 2025\* reflects August 2025.

*Source:* RBI, US Federal Reserve.

### 6. Geopolitical Risks

Events like US tariffs (50% effective August 27, 2025) and Middle East tensions increase volatility. Combined with CAD, tariffs compound volatility (e.g., 20% CAD rise per Patnaik et al., 2025), per event study (Section 6.3).

Table 7: Geopolitical Events and Rupee Volatility (2020–2025)

Year	Event	Volatility (%)
2020	COVID-19	2.1
2021	Vaccine Rollout	1.8
2022	Russia-Ukraine	3.0
2023	Middle East Tensions	2.6
2024	U.S. Election Uncertainty	2.9
2025*	Ongoing Global Tensions & Tariffs	3.5

*Note:* 2025\* reflects August 2025 escalations.

*Source:* RBI, Economic Survey 2024–25.

### 7. External Debt Obligations

Rising external debt (\$685B in June 2025) increases USD demand. A hypothesized threshold (CAD > -1.5%) triggers NPA spikes (0.15% per 1% depreciation, Section 6.4), linking debt to banking risks.

Table 8: India’s External Debt and Debt Service (2020–2025)

Year	External Debt (\$B)	Debt Service Payments (\$B)
2020	558.4	31.2
2021	573.7	33.5
2022	612.6	38.0
2023	635.3	40.2
2024	650.1	42.5
2025*	685.0	45.0

*Note:* 2025\* reflects Q2 FY2025 (RBI).

*Source:* RBI, World Bank.

### 7. Policy Strategies for Financial Stability in India

Managing rupee volatility requires a **multi-layered approach** that combines immediate stabilization with long-term resilience. Based on recent scholarship and empirical evidence, the following strategies appear most effective.

#### 1. Monetary Policy Adjustments

The RBI remains the first line of defense. Short-term repo rate hikes, if carefully calibrated, can limit capital outflows by making rupee assets more attractive. However, as Singh and Bose (2022) caution, aggressive rate increases may suppress domestic investment, highlighting the need for balance. Liquidity management through Open Market Operations (OMOs) and Cash Reserve Ratio adjustments can complement exchange rate defense without undermining credit growth.

#### 2. Fiscal Discipline and Trade Incentives

Fiscal credibility directly influences investor confidence. Rath and Prakash (2021) emphasize that reducing fiscal deficits lowers exchange rate risk premiums. India could reorient subsidies toward productive infrastructure while offering **temporary incentives** to exporters in technology, pharmaceuticals, and agribusiness, sectors identified by OECD (2023) as having strong potential for generating stable foreign exchange inflows.

#### 3. Structural Competitiveness

Reducing external vulnerability requires cutting dependence on imported energy, electronics, and defense equipment. A study by Sahoo and Bhattacharya (2023) finds that strengthening domestic manufacturing in these areas could reduce India’s current account deficit by nearly

0.8% of GDP. At the same time, diversifying export destinations across Asia, Africa, and Latin America can reduce reliance on U.S. and European markets.

#### **4. Banking Sector Resilience**

Currency depreciation spills over into the banking system through higher hedging costs and rising NPAs. Verma and Sinha (2022) recommend stronger capital adequacy requirements and regular FX stress tests, particularly for banks with large external commercial borrowings. Faster insolvency resolution would also reduce contagion risks when depreciation spikes affect corporate borrowers.

#### **5. External Account Management**

Prudent external borrowing policies are essential. Limiting short-term external commercial borrowings while encouraging longer-maturity instruments can reduce rollover risks. Expanding rupee-settlement trade agreements—such as the recent India-Russia framework—could gradually reduce dollar dependence. The Asian Development Bank (2024) further advocates the creation of stabilization funds to buffer emerging markets during sudden capital outflows, a model India could adopt.

#### **6. Institutional Coordination**

Policy fragmentation undermines credibility. Strengthened coordination between the RBI, Ministry of Finance, and external trade bodies is crucial. Chhibber (2023) suggests that standing joint committees can help synchronize fiscal, monetary, and trade policies, avoiding contradictory signals during crises.

#### **7. Communication and Confidence Building**

Transparent communication helps anchor expectations. Clear guidance from policymakers on intervention goals reduces speculative attacks. Investor engagement programs and financial literacy campaigns—similar to those implemented in Indonesia (ADB, 2024)—can prevent herd behavior and enhance domestic confidence.

### **7. Conclusion**

The sustained depreciation of the Indian rupee reflects the interaction of **structural vulnerabilities and global disruptions**. This study shows that persistent current account deficits, dependence on imported oil, and sensitivity to capital outflows continue to place downward pressure on the currency. External shocks—ranging from U.S. tariff escalations to regional geopolitical tensions—have amplified these weaknesses, producing exchange rate swings that directly affect inflation, debt servicing costs, and banking sector stability.

At the same time, empirical modelling and qualitative evidence suggest that the impact of depreciation is not uniformly negative. In specific sectors such as pharmaceuticals and information technology, a weaker rupee has temporarily improved export competitiveness. However, these short-term benefits are outweighed by the broader risks of higher import costs, increased hedging expenses, and rising non-performing assets in banks with significant foreign exposure.

The findings underline the importance of a **dual-track policy framework**. Short-term stabilization can be achieved through calibrated monetary measures, targeted liquidity management, and prudent use of foreign exchange reserves. Yet, long-term resilience requires **structural reforms**: diversifying exports, reducing import dependence in energy and technology, strengthening fiscal credibility, and bolstering banking sector safeguards. Equally critical is institutional coordination across the central bank of India (RBI), the Ministry of Finance of India, and trade bodies to deliver coherent responses rather than fragmented interventions.

Ultimately, rupee devaluation should not be viewed solely as a crisis indicator. Managed carefully, it

can act as a catalyst for reforms that enhance competitiveness and reduce systemic vulnerabilities. By pairing immediate defensive measures with forward-looking reforms, India can transform currency volatility into an opportunity for deeper financial resilience and more sustainable growth

### Suggestions:

1. **Deepen Export Competitiveness** – Invest in technology-driven sectors, pharmaceuticals, and agricultural value chains to reduce overdependence on a few commodity exports.
2. **Promote Strategic Import Substitution** – Support domestic industries in energy, electronics, and defence to curb forex outflows.
3. **Strengthen Policy Coordination** – Establish a permanent RBI–Finance Ministry crisis response task force to align monetary, fiscal, and trade policies in real time.
4. **Expand Rupee-Based Trade Agreements** – Reduce dependency on dollar-denominated trade by negotiating bilateral settlement mechanisms.
5. **Enhance Investor Relations** – Maintain transparent, consistent policy communication to reinforce confidence among domestic and foreign stakeholders.
6. **Build Sovereign Wealth Buffers** – Channel excess reserves into a stabilization fund for use during sudden capital outflows.
7. **Promote Financial Literacy** – Educate the public on currency trends to prevent panic-driven forex market movements.

By combining agile short-term interventions with visionary structural reforms, India can turn currency challenges into catalysts for sustainable economic strength and global competitiveness.

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