

## **CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: A CROSS-SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS**

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### **Abstract**

Corporate governance and public policy have become increasingly intertwined in the development of accountability strategies that impact on organisational integrity, transparency and trust. Reprinted in Key Debates in New Political Economy (Taylor and Francis, 2018) This paper examines the role of accountability mechanisms horizontally applied across sectors, informed by both corporate governance and public governance. The research problem focuses on the continued disconnect between formal accountability regulations and their enforcement in practice that negatively impacts stakeholder confidence.

To do this, a cross-sector review of the literature is used to explore how governance structures in business corporations and public sector organizations facilitate or hinder accountability. The approach integrates conceptual analysis with a comparative perspective informed by extant governance frameworks, policy documents and academic debates.

Main results show that, although targeted at shareholder protection and regulatory compliance, inspired governance arrangements differ from public policy frameworks that seek to better serve people's welfare and democratic accountability. But both are even more compromised dynamics today: regulatory capture, lax enforcement and poor stakeholder involvement. The analysis discusses mechanisms for narrowing these gaps, such as independent oversight bodies, transparency legislation, and participatory governance.

This study suggests that enhanced accountability can emerge from a synthesis of corporate governance mechanisms with principles of public policy. The paper concludes with suggestions for improving commitments to a cross-sectoral approach, institutional changes and innovative accountability mechanisms to foster sustainable governance results.

### **Introduction**

Accountability has become a core issue in corporate governance and public policy, influencing how institutions earn credibility, take risks and protect the interests of stakeholders. Company scandals, regulatory mishaps and public trust crises over the past few decades have demonstrated an urgent requirement for more robust accountability systems. Corporate governance has historically focused on the management, board, and shareholder relationship; public policy-based frameworks take accountability to a more diverse base encompassing not only citizens, civil society groups but also regulators. It is these domains where learning from each other can provide some of the most valuable both in how governance structures can be strengthened across different spheres.

The issue this research deals with has been persistent over time: the fact that while accountability frameworks are plentiful both privately and publicly, there are always enforcement gaps and weak institutions that prevent even the most robust frameworks from achieving their goals. This focusing issue begs the question – what can different governance sectors learn from one another and what hybrid models can be devised to strengthen transparency, integrity, and legitimacy?

The goals of the paper are threefold (1) to examine the theory and practice of underpinning accountability in corporate governance and in public policy (2) to catalogue the similarities and differences in accountability systems across these sectors and (3) to bring forward integrative models that improve the governance outcomes. Accordingly, the paper is guided by the following research questions:

- How do accountability mechanisms function differently in corporate governance and public policy?
- What challenges limit the effectiveness of these mechanisms in practice?
- What cross-sectoral strategies can enhance accountability and foster sustainable governance?

The very cross sectoral nature of accountability in this particular study contributes to the ongoing debates in governance reform, while enabling some actionable recommendations to be made for policymakers, governance and business practitioners. This is fundamentally a conceptual and comparative study that seeks to learn from the literature, case studies and policy debates about cross sectoral lessons.

### **Literature Review**

The inter-relationship between corporate governance and public policy has been the subject of extensive research, often, though not exclusively in disciplinary silos. The corporate governance literature is dominated by ways of disciplinary mechanisms that align management's interests with those of shareholders and other stakeholders. Grounded theories, such as agency theory (Jensen & Meckling 1976) emphasize the role of monitoring mechanisms—represented by boards and audit committees—in controlling conflicts between managers and owners. Complimentary viewpoints, such as stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) and stewardship theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991), broaden the focus of accountability to include a wider variety of stakeholder groups and focus on trust, morality and long-term value.

Let me put it this way, accountability is a fundamental aspect of democratic rule and governance. Bovens (2007) tells us about vertical accountability (citizen control through voting) and horizontal accountability (within institutional tiers). In public administration, there is a focus on policy accountability to show public governance and to ensure that policy outputs render public value. Yet, Dubnick (2014) highlights that there is a lack of cohesion in public accountability, resulting in overlapping functions and reduced efficacy.

Research that crosses borders identifies important connections. For instance, in governance, corporate reform seems to apply public sector control and supervision models, while in public sector organisations there is an increasing adoption of performance measurement and auditing systems from the private sector (Rhodes, 2017). In spite of this, tensions persist: corporate systems place emphasis on profit maximization while public policy is concerned with equity, plurality and legitimacy.

Although there are ample theoretical and empirical findings, large gaps still exist. First, a significant volume of the writing analyses corporate and public accountability as separate topics without exploring how one may inform another across sectors. Second, there is scarce research on hybrid accountability arrangements which combine market-based governance instruments and democratic control mechanisms. Third, to what extent should accountability be focused on compliance versus values – the latter indicating the persistent tension between following process and achieving governments' desired goals (Mulgan, 2017).

By focusing on the gaps, we push forward the cross-sectional angle considering accountability mechanisms not simply within their own domains but also potential ones of concurrence. This method is an attempt to transcend disciplinary boundaries and broaden the lens for a more comprehensive view of governance reform.

### **Methodology**

This study employs a qualitative, comparative research strategy to examine mechanisms of accountability at the intersection of corporate governance and public policy. The design is fit for visiting governance as a multi-dimensional phenomenon where institutions and theory play crucial roles in determining outcomes. It does not create original empirical observations but instead uses secondary sources, such as articles in peer reviewed journals, policy reports, governance codes and case studies to allow for an overarching cross-sectoral analysis.

Hence, the study combines thematic content analysis to establish patterns and contrast within the chosen secondary sources. Using a cross-sectoral comparative frame, the study provides a critical analysis of how these accountability mechanisms operate across different institutional contexts and as such offers nuanced understanding of both shared elements and sector specific issues. The approach enables the logic and findings of a diverse array of empirical studies and theoretical arguments to be integrated, thereby contributing to an in-depth understanding of governance dynamics which respects the complexity of the underlying phenomena as well as the utility for policy and corporate governance reform. Comparative examination of cases and documents strengthens the generalizability of findings across settings.

### **Data Sources**

The theoretical of this study is based on scholarly texts concerning academic governance, political science, and the administration of the governance and public sector journals. To obtain institutional practices, policy papers and the institutional governance documents have been analysed, including codes of corporate governance, transparency interventions, and anti-corruption laws. Furthermore, illustrative case studies of corporate scandals and policy failures have been analysed to demonstrate the real practical issues that the mechanisms of accountability face.

Alongside scholarly literature and policy documents, this work incorporates more than one jurisdictional legal and corporate governance documents, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the UK Combined Code, and the King IV Code, to demonstrate the changing thresholds of corporate accountability. International approaches of the OECD are helpful to this study in providing cross-national exemplary practices and regulatory gaps concerning stakeholder engagement and transparency to inform governance anal practices. Collectively, these mosaic pieces contribute to the study's appreciation of governance practices on their articulation, enforcement and actual effects, moving corporate and public governance practices toward theory and cross governance.

### **Data Collection Methods**

A literature systematic review method was employed to choose relevant articles over the last twenty years to allow for theoretical coverage alongside relevance to current practice. Policy documents and governance codes were sampled by their impact either informally or nationally/internationally (e.g., OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, UN Global Compact). Case applications were chosen purposively to include a selection of sectors and contexts to allow for accountability.

As part of systematic literature review, data collection involved screening through different scholarly databases and governance repositories with explicitly defined search terms related to accountability, governance framework, and company policy. For relevance, rigor, and contribution to research queries, studies were screened to include peer-reviewed articles, policy briefs, and conclusive institutional reports. Grey literature including reports from governmental institutions such as the OECD and UN were also included to account for coverage of most recent developments and complete regulatory perspectives. Inclusion-exclusion criteria were explicitly implemented throughout review with duplicate screening and data extraction to attenuate biasing and ensure maximum reliability of findings.

### **Analysis Procedures**

The analysis centered around thematic content analysis focusing on patterns of accountability mechanisms, enforcement practices, and the relations of stakeholders. A comparative framework was constructed to discern the similarities in and differences between corporate accountability and public accountability systems. Enforcement shortcomings, institutional deficits, and the emergence of cross-sectorial hybrid mechanisms were the primary focus of the analysis.

An instance of analysis on the other hand required iteration of the coding and refinement of the themes until the representative essence of the data was captured correctly. Each thematic representation was constructed to explain the most prominent phenomena of the power structures and the primary mechanisms beyond enforcement paralysis. The comparative framework offered a robust basis to analyse the roll of corporate governance in juxtaposition to public governance and provided the insights into converging as well as diverging and sectoral hybrid innovations. The coding processes included attempts to enhance the final analysis the validity of the analysis in terms of the data which included the peer review of the coding framework and triangulation across multiple data sources, thus, supporting the validity and relevance of the findings.

### **Justification of Approach**

Given that the research questions aim at explaining the complex dynamics of governance and not detecting single variables, we believe a qualitative methodology appropriate, as well as cross-sectoral. By integrating theory, policy and case material, the analysis seeks to bring a nuanced understanding on accountability mechanisms and their transferability between contexts. This methodology allows for the uncovering of sector-focused lessons as well as cross-cutting lessons that may be used to inform governance reform.

Cross-sector and qualitative methodology is also justified by its capability to investigate "whys" and "how's" of accountability mechanisms something which is not possible for most statistical measures. It is most productive where multi-dimensional complex concepts such as governance come into play where discerning finer subtleties behind practices, beliefs, and behaviours of institutions is imperative. In prioritizing depth over statistical universality, the ongoing work attempts to establish a good theoretical framework amenable to providing information to policy decision-makers as well as to company strategy where non-tangibles such as moral concerns, beliefs of stakeholders, and socio-cultural norms acting to inform accountability in both corporate as well as public domains can be comprehended.

### **Results/Findings**

Comparing public policy to corporate governance pinpointed convergence as well as divergence in structures of accountability. Three prevailing themes were present: structural mechanisms of accountability, oversight and enforcement, and stakeholder involvement.

### 1. Structural Mechanisms of

Systems of corporate governance rely heavily on internal controls including board compositions, audit committees, and shareholder reports. Systems of public policy, by contrast, emphasize institutional checks and balances, election-based accountability, and administrative review. Both areas, however, increasingly rely on programs of transparency—like disclosure requirements and public reporting—as central instruments of accountability.

### 2. Rectification and

Findings indicate that enforcement is also a vulnerable area within both domains. In corporate governance, such breakdowns as the Enron scandal or Germany's Volkswagen emission scandal indicate regulatory capture and absence of monitoring. Similarly, in public policy, such breakdowns as the United States's Flint water crisis indicate how decentralized monitoring can be averse to accountability. Even where structures are robust, disconnection between rule and enforceable practice undermines effectiveness within both domains.

### 3. set

Corporate governance concerns primarily responsibility to shareholders, but recent developments have widened scope for consideration of stakeholders (e.g., employees, customers, and society). Public policy is essentially citizen-based but often does not allow fruitful participation except around election time. Both sectors show a trend to shift to a participative mode—e.g., stakeholder forums for corporate sustainability and citizen involvement in governance budgets—but practices are haphazard.


### Cross-Sectoral Convergences and Divergences

- **Convergences:** Both sectors increasingly rely upon transparency, independent auditing, and participation practices.
- **Divergences:** Corporate governance is efficient and value-based for shareholders, but public policy is about equity, inclusiveness, and legitimacy.

**Table 1: Comparison of Accountability Mechanisms in Corporate Governance and Public Policy**

Dimension	Corporate Governance	Public Policy	Cross-Sectoral Insight
Accountability Focus	Shareholders, investors	Citizens, civil society	Expanding toward multi-stakeholder inclusion
Structural Mechanisms	Boards, audits, disclosure rules	Oversight agencies, elections, judiciary	Shared reliance on transparency tools
Enforcement Challenges	Regulatory capture, weak compliance culture	Fragmented oversight, political influence	Enforcement gaps limit effectiveness
Stakeholder Engagement	Limited but expanding (CSR, ESG initiatives)	Citizen participation, advocacy groups	Need for stronger participatory frameworks

**Figure 1: Cross-Sectoral Convergences and Divergences in Accountability**



This also represented in the theoretical framework as a diagram which visualizes the (in)/convergences between accountability mechanisms in corporate governance and public policy. Related tools become common to both sectors at their point of convergence; transparency initiatives, independent audits and participatory practices reflect commitments among the two sectors to oversight and stakeholder confidence. Nonetheless, there are significant differences: corporate governance focuses on efficient management, shareholder value and performance measures whereas public policy emphasises equity, citizen wellbeing, and democratic legitimacy. This overlap underscores the possibility of hybrid accountability systems that reconcile efficiency with inclusion, providing avenues towards more balanced and enduring governance.

## Quantitative Illustration and Empirical Evidence


**Table: Corporate Governance Compliance and Audit Trends (2023–2024)**

Metric	2023	2024
Code Compliance (All Companies)	39%	65%
Industrial Sector Compliance	32%	83%
Non-Big Four Audited FTSE Firms	11	17
Non-compliance Pension Contributions	34%	10%
Boards: Accounting/Finance Background	43%	48%
Boards: Risk Mgmt. Background	20%	27%

**Table: Board Diversity and Accountability Statistics (2024)**

Metric	Value
Women on Boards (Global)	29.3%
Companies w/ $\geq 1$ Woman Director (Global)	96%
Female Director Appointments (2024)	14.2%
S&P 500 PoC Board Appointments (2024)	24.2%
OSC Accountability Cases Received (2024)	6,251
OSC PPP Favourable Actions (2024)	450
OSC Hatch Act Cases Resolved (2024)	391
Top Quartile Gender-Diverse Boards Performance	+27%

**Chart: Gender Representation on Boards (2012–2024)**



Recent statistics and examples illustrate significant progress in compliance with the principles of management, diversity and accountability where between 2023 -24 there was a dramatic increase from 39% to 65% for the Code as a whole among companies with compliance rate among sectors leaping to 83%; significant decrease in refusal on executive pension contribution to 10%. \* Board composition also became more specialist, including a noticeable increase among board members with finance and risk management backgrounds while global board diversity making steady progress as well: Women now account for 29.3% of board seats worldwide, while nearly all companies (96%) at least one fetched women director (despite a slight recent drop out of the new female appointments). These enhancements are matched by increased enforcement, including more than 6,200 accountability cases received and 450+ beneficial regulatory actions in 2024 alone - a growing dedication to transparent, impactful and effective.

## Discussion

These findings reveal strengths and weaknesses of accountability structures in corporate governance and public policy, affirming conclusions of prior scholarship as well as offering novel cross-sector observations.

At first, results affirm agency theory's hypothesis (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) that developed governance structures for companies chiefly serve to reduce managerial opportunism with monitoring and disclosure. However, consistent with stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), rising emphasis upon environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practices indicates a gradual shift towards broad stakeholder responsibility. Such a shift is emblematic of public

governance where standard vote-based accountability is increasingly being supplemented with participation and transparency tools (Bovens, 2007).

Second, deficits in enforcement still prevail. It has been demonstrated with case examples such as Enron and Volkswagen that weak regulatory enforcement undermines corporate accountability. Similarly, it is illustrative to look to the Flint water scandal to detail how diffuse oversight can numb public accountability. These findings support Dubnick's (2014) remark that systems of accountability, even theoretically valid, often are subverted in practice by institutional capability, political influences, or regulatory capture.

Thirdly, the comparative analysis identifies both converging and diverging trends between both sectors. Transparency initiatives, external audit, and participation-based strategies appear throughout both sectors, pointing to a trend towards hybrid forms of accountability structures. But such a divergence between public equity-based accountability and corporate efficiency-based accountability is not overcome but instead displays a critique of accountability as a "contested concept" (Mulgan 2017) that is incapable of being applied uniformly.

### **Implications**

Cross-sector learning suggests that learning across lines has benefits for both public and corporate governance. For businesses, adopting public-sector practices such as deliberative forums with a citizenry style could boost their legitimacy. Public institutions could also adopt private-sector performance metrics to be more efficient than they would be with democratic accountability. For policymakers, it signals a value that designs for regulation should seek to balance compliance with substantive outcomes.

### **Limitations**

It is delineated by applying only secondary data and conceptual analysis which is unable to present entire complexity of accountability practices amidst different cultural, legal, and organizational contexts. Additionally, example case illustrations are non-exhaustive but indicative. Future research is free to employ empirical designs such as interviews or surveys to represent stakeholder perceptions regarding accountability mechanisms.

### **Possible Explanations**

Endurance of responsibility voids across both sectors could be attributed to institutional inertia, unfavourable stakeholder interests, and a lack of resources. Moreover, responsibility involves a latent dependence between controls as well as autonomy: excessive regulation will kill innovation but an absence of controls will occasion malpractice. Such a tension could be one explanation for why reform is often incrementally effective but never systemic.

### **Conclusion**

This research analysed accountability in corporate governance and public policy through a cross-sectoral comparative lens, uncovering similarities / differences in how these systems are conceived and implemented. The results showed that corporate governance focuses more on shareholder protection, internal control and efficiency, while public policy emphasizes citizen welfare, equity and legitimacy. Despite such contrasting approaches, transparency, oversight and engagement are becoming common tools for accountability in both.

The results highlight continued difficulties with an Achilles heel: accountability often fails in the implementation phase, as regulatory capture, institutional balkanization and political capture constrain its bite. Case studies from the private sector and public sector further indicate that accountability could not be institutionalised in a formalistic way, rather strong institutional structures are needed besides actual stakeholder involvement.

Taking a cross-sectoral approach, the paper extends governance research by illuminating opportunities for hybrid accountability that synthesizes measures of corporate performance

with public sector values of inclusivity and legitimacy. The key revelation is that accountability cannot be narrowed down to compliance-oriented modes of process and instead will have to develop towards a value-driven system orientated towards the fostering of trust and sustainable results.

In conclusion, accountability still remains an ambivalent but indispensable concept for contemporary governance. The contribution of this paper is in linking corporate and public biosecurity rationalities and as a basis for preparing more trustful Governance Systems.

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