

## **PUBLIC POLICY EVALUATION ON MODERN RETAIL STRUCTURING: REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MINIMARKET REGULATIONS IN BANDUNG REGENCY**

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**Abstract** The rapid expansion of modern convenience stores in Indonesia has heightened competition with traditional markets, raising concerns over retail governance. This study examines minimarket regulation in Bandung Regency using a mixed-methods approach, combining surveys of 400 respondents with interviews of 17 key informants. Findings reveal that despite spatial regulations and inter-agency coordination frameworks, weak enforcement, poor communication, limited resources, and low public outreach hinder effective implementation. Inconsistent permit issuance and unlicensed operations further undermine policy goals. Strengthened institutional integration, monitoring, and stakeholder participation are essential to balance modern retail growth with traditional market sustainability.

**Keywords:** Public Policy Implementation, Modern Retail, Minimarket Regulation, Mixed Method, Regional Policy Governance.

### **1 Introduction**

In recent years, Indonesia has witnessed a dramatic transformation in its retail landscape. The proliferation of modern convenience stores—convenience stores of small businesses operated by large retail chains—has reshaped urban and rural communities. These outlets, often open 24/7 and strategically located, offer convenience, standard prices and guaranteed supply that appeal to consumers. However, the surge in the number of modern retail (Minimarkets) has sparked growing concern among policymakers, scholars, traditional market business actors, and local communities. In Bandung Regency, West Java, the expansion of convenience stores has sparked debates about economic equity, zoning justice, and the preservation of trade in traditional markets.

The introduction of formal policy instruments by local governments, such as zoning regulations, licensing rules, and inter-agency coordination mandates, reflects official efforts to regulate development. However, the question remains: Is this

policy effectively implemented? Do they balance the growth of modern retail with the resilience of small-scale merchants in traditional markets? What is the experience of living in an environment where minimarkets grow like mushrooms?

This research explores these questions within the scope of the Bandung Regency area—an area that symbolizes a small miniature of Indonesia's development. With a population approaching 4 million and a rapid shift in land use, Bandung district reflects a broader national trend. The underlying diversity—from urban centres to the countryside—makes it an ideal laboratory for studying the application of modern market retail zoning policies in real-world conditions on the ground.

Our investigation adopts a mixed-methods research approach, combining statistical analysis with in-depth qualitative narratives. On the one hand, a survey of 400 residents in various sub-districts measured awareness, satisfaction, and the perceived impact of regulations on minimarkets. The in-depth study was carried out through 17 interviews with the main informants, they provided comprehensive insights, the informants consisted of local government officials, traditional shop owners, community leaders, and the minimarket manager himself. This methodological combination allows us to triangulate findings and generate richer, more grounded insights into policy performance in local government.

The core research questions of this study are:

1. How is the implementation of policies related to zoning and licensing of minimarkets in Bandung Regency?
2. How does public perception align with official goals, and what gaps exist?
3. What are the institutional, structural, and socio-cultural obstacles that arise in implementing retail policies in local government institutions?
4. How do stakeholders (modern retailers, traditional vendors, government actors, and community members) interact in this policy realm?

The answers to these questions are built through two important academic streams: the implementation of public policy and the

geographical location of retail. Since the work of Pressman and Wildavsky in 1973, scholars have acknowledged that there has been an "implementation gap"—the difference between policy design and outcomes on the ground (Derthick, 1974; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). These gaps often arise from fragmented bureaucracy, unclear regulations, or a lack of community participation. In the context of modern retail (convenience stores), recent research has emphasized that spatial justice—ensuring equitable access and equitable opportunities—offers a valuable lens for understanding the social impact of retail expansion. However, empirical studies on the topic remain rare, especially in Indonesia.

Therefore, our study contributes to the literature by providing context-based evidence on how decentralized government structures in Indonesia are navigating the rapid modernization of retail. It evaluates not only the existence of policies but also the integrity of enforcement, the dynamics of coordination between departments, and the resonance of policy messages among the community.

The unique regulatory architecture in Bandung Regency combines many layers: the Detailed Spatial Plan (RDTR) regulations, the licensing protocol issued by the Investment and One-Stop Integrated Services Office (DPMPTSP), and support from the Trade and Cooperatives Office of DISPERKOP). Each institution brings different tasks but must operate cohesively so that policies can succeed well. Our fieldwork reveals the extent to which that coherence exists—and where the damage is happening.

Ultimately, the goal of this research is to offer actionable insights for policymakers and practitioners. By identifying driving points—such as strengthening monitoring systems, clarifying regulatory mandates, and encouraging inclusive stakeholder engagement—researchers hope to help design a more responsive governance framework. It can maintain the benefits of modernization while maintaining a dynamic and equitable local economy so that it is fair.

In the following sections, we first synthesize relevant literature on

the implementation of retail spatial justice and policy, then outline our concurrent mixed-methods research design. We proceed to present quantitative and qualitative findings in the Results and Discussion, and conclude with key policy implications and suggestions for further research.

## **2 Literaturereview**

### **2.1 Public Policy Implementation: From Design to Practice**

The implementation of public policy has long been recognized as one of the most complex stages in the policy cycle. While policy formulation tends to be guided by political ideals and strategic goals, implementation involves the interaction of bureaucratic institutions, stakeholders, and local contexts. Pressman and Wildavsky (Derthick, 1974; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984) first shed light on the problem of "implementation gaps", arguing that well-intentioned policies often fail to achieve the desired results due to the challenges encountered during execution. Since then, scholars have broadened the discourse to consider how bureaucratic behavior, institutional fragmentation, and stakeholder resistance shape implementation success.

According to Edwards III (Mubarak et al., 2020; Pülzl & Treib, 2017; Rokhadiyati, 2020), four variables significantly affect the effectiveness of policy implementation: communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure. These variables are interdependent and often interact in unpredictable ways. Clear communication ensures that implementers understand policy objectives and operational guidelines. Adequate resources—including human resources, funding, and infrastructure—provide the operational backbone. The disposition of the implementers, including their commitment and attitude towards the policy, plays an important motivational role. Finally, the bureaucratic structure, including hierarchies, standard operating procedures, and inter-agency coordination, forms the overall coherence of the implementation environment.

Mazmanian and Sabatier (1980) further emphasize that successful implementation requires clear goals, a sound causal theory that

links policy tools to outcomes, and the presence of implementing agencies with adequate authority and commitment. Their "top-down" model has been influential but has also been criticized for underestimating the role of local agencies and contextual diversity.

This criticism paves the way for a "bottom-up" perspective, which argues that street-level bureaucrats and local implementers exercise considerable discretion in interpreting and implementing policies (Yanow, 1993). This wisdom is not just the product of negligence or resistance but often reflects the complexity of translating abstract directions into real-world action in a dynamic environment.

Grindle (2017) proposed a more integrated model, recognizing the dimensions of administrative and political implementation. The framework considers policy content (e.g., clarity, incentives, perceived fairness), implementation context (e.g., stakeholder strengths, institutional arrangements, and socio-political conditions), and actors' strategies, as central variables. In a fragmented governance setting like Indonesia's, this model offers a useful insight into examining how inter-agency coordination—or lack thereof—can affect the implementation of retail regulation.

## **2.2 Availability of resources and support services, Integration of autistic children and Law Model and Legal Systems**

Retail transformation in developing countries is not only a function of market dynamics but also of state intervention and governance. The Global Phenomenon shows that modern retail formats—supermarkets, hypermarkets, and convenience stores—are evolving rapidly, often at the expense of traditional market systems. Reardon et al. (2003) described this as a "supermarket revolution", which involves the restructuring of supply chains, changes in consumer behavior, and the spatial reconfiguration of cities. Minimarkets, with low investment thresholds and franchise-based expansion, have become the fastest-growing segment of this revolution, especially in Indonesia.

However, such a rapid retail expansion is not without

controversy. Several studies have noted adverse socio-economic effects on small traders, informal traders, and traditional markets (Ilhami et al., 2022; Natawidjaja, 2005; Nurlinda et al., 2022). The competitive asymmetry between capital-intensive modern retail chains and traditional market players with limited resources creates structural inequalities. In many urban centres in Indonesia, the proximity of convenience stores to traditional markets—often in violation of zoning guidelines—has led to the cannibalization of traditional markets, a decline in foot traffic in traditional markets, and the erosion of community-based economic activities.

The government has issued various rules in the form of regulations. In Indonesia, Ministerial Regulation No. 53/M-DAG/PER/12/2008 provides guidelines for the development and arrangement of traditional markets, shopping centres, and modern shops. This regulation requires modern outlets to maintain a distance of at least 1000meters from traditional markets and involve local suppliers in their operations. At the regional level, Bandung Regency introduced Regional Regulation No. 20/2009 and Regent Regulation No. 60/2014 to further operationalize the directive.

However, its enforcement is still weak. Reports show that many minimarkets operate without permits or violate spatial plans Kompas, (2017) and Tempo, (2020) (Indrajaya & Tanzili, 2023). These violations often stem from bureaucratic overlap, a lack of law enforcement capacity, or political-economic interests between local governments and large retailers. Therefore, the challenge is not the absence of policies, but the failure of implementation—a point that this study wants to investigate further.

### **2.3 Spatial Justice and Urban Retail Distribution**

A growing explanation in the literature relates to spatial justice and the distribution of urban retail, especially from urban studies and geography. That spatial justice refers to the equitable allocation of urban resources, services, and economic opportunities in various socio-economic groups (Soja, 2010). In

the context of retail, this means ensuring that access to affordable food, goods, and trade opportunities is not monopolized by corporate chains, while traditional retailers remain marginalized. Research by Gonzalez and Waley (2013) in Latin America and Asia found that urban retail policies often favour formal retail and franchise systems over informal vendors, leading to displacement and spatial exclusion. In Indonesia, spatial planning tools such as RTRW (Regional Spatial Plan) and RDTR (Detailed Spatial Plan) are intended to serve as safeguards to prevent excessive retail concentration. However, gaps in implementation and political negotiations over land use rights often undermine these mechanisms (Forester, 1987; Munira et al., 2021).

The discourse on spatial justice is closely related to participatory planning. Arnstein's (1969) participation ladder reminds us that policy implementation is not only about enforcing the rules, but also about instilling democratic accountability. In Bandung Regency, evidence shows that traditional market vendors and community groups are rarely consulted in decisions related to zoning and licensing of convenience stores, thus strengthening the top-down policy model.

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## **2.4 Governance in a Decentralized Context**

Indonesia's post-1998 decentralization reforms gave significant autonomy to local governments. While decentralization is expected to increase responsiveness and innovation in the delivery of public services (Dick-Sagoe, 2020; Ibrahim, 2024; Schulze et al., 2014), decentralization has also produced challenges. These include inconsistencies in district-wide regulations, overlapping mandates, and arrests of local elites. According to Buehler (2010), local autonomy has created opportunities for participatory governance and patronage politics, depending on how local actors mobilize institutional power (Levine, 2017).

In the case of convenience store regulation, the decentralized framework places the burden of implementation on local governments, which must interpret and operationalize national

laws. This requires technical capacity, inter-agency coordination, and strong political will. The Office of Investment and Licensing (DPMPTSP), the Office of Trade and Cooperatives (Disperindag), and local spatial planning authorities must collaborate seamlessly—tasks that are often hampered by closed governance, unclear standard operating procedures, and fragmented databases.

There is also the problem of law enforcement asymmetry. Large retail chains, often backed by powerful legal teams and political influence, are in a better position to navigate licensing procedures or avoid them altogether. Traditional traders, on the other hand, may not have the legal literacy and organizational influence to voice their concerns effectively. Therefore, policy implementation in retail is about power relations and also about administrative efficiency.

## **2.5 Mixed Methods in Policy Evaluation**

A growing number of researchers are advocating a mixed-methods approach to evaluating the implementation of public policies. The blended method allows researchers to combine the breadth of quantitative analysis with the depth of qualitative insight (Creswell & Clark, 2017; Marvasti, 2018) studies, quantitative surveys can measure public perception, awareness, and policy satisfaction, while qualitative interviews can uncover the logics, values, and informal practices that shape implementation in the field.

In the context of this study, mixed methods provide a way to understand structural gaps in policy implementation (e.g., data on license violations or lack of resources) and subjective experiences of different actors (e.g., how store owners perceive fairness, or how officials interpret zoning mandates). This dual approach responds to a recent call for pragmatic policy science—which recognizes the contextual complexity of local governance in developing countries (Peters & Pierre, 2006; Pierre & Peters, 2020).



## **2.6 Research Synthesis and Gaps**

A review of the existing literature highlights three critical gaps. First, although much has been written about policy design and retail transformation in Indonesia, few studies provide detailed empirical explanations of local policy implementation using mixed methods. Second, research on convenience market regulation tends to focus on economic or legal framework impacts but rarely links them to the lived experiences of local implementers and affected communities. Third, spatial justice as an analytical lens remains underutilized in the context of Indonesian policy, despite its relevance for understanding the conflicts of retail geography and zoning.

This research contributes to closing the gap by: 1) Applying a concurrent mixed method framework to evaluate the implementation of minimarket regulations in Bandung Regency; 2) Triangulation of perspectives from citizens, bureaucrats, and business actors to map the dynamics of implementation; and 3) Anchor the analysis in the theoretical synthesis of Edwards III's policy implementation model, Grindle's administrative-political framework, and spatial justice theory. Thus, this research not only deepens the empirical understanding of policy implementation in decentralized Indonesia but also offers a conceptual contribution to the study of urban retail governance in the Global South (Faria & Whitesell, 2021).

## **3 Methodology**

In the The study used a concurrent mixed method design (Creswell & Creswell, 2017; Marvasti, 2018), specifically a concurrent triangulation strategy, which integrates quantitative and qualitative data collected over the same time period. This approach allows researchers to triangulate findings, compare and validate results, and produce a comprehensive understanding of the implementation of minimarket restructuring policies in Bandung Regency.

The reason for using a mixed-methods approach lies in the complexity of public policy implementation, which involves measurable public perception and nuanced administrative

processes. Quantitative data captures the extent of public knowledge, awareness, and satisfaction with minimarket regulation, while qualitative data explores institutional dynamics, actors' motivations, and governance challenges in more depth.

The quantitative research population consists of residents in Bandung Regency who are directly or indirectly affected by the existence and operation of minimarkets in their neighbourhoods.

Using simple random sampling, a total of 400 respondents were selected in urban, peri-urban, and rural sub-districts to ensure demographic and spatial representation. The sample size meets the minimum requirements for inferential statistical analysis at a 95% confidence level and a 5% margin of error.

Data were collected using a structured questionnaire, which was designed to measure three main dimensions: 1) Public awareness of minimarket zoning and licensing policies; 2) The impact felt from the growth of minimarkets on local livelihoods and spatial justice; and 3) The level of satisfaction with the implementation of policies and government responsiveness. Items were measured using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5). The questionnaire was tested for validity and reliability through a pilot test involving 30 respondents, and showed acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach alpha = 0.812).

Quantitative data were analyzed using descriptive statistics (frequency, mean, standard deviation) and inferential statistics, in particular cross-tabulation, correlation, and multiple regression analysis to identify significant relationships between demographic factors and perceptions of policy effectiveness.

The qualitative component was carried out through in-depth interviews with 17 key informants, who were selected through purposive sampling. The informants include: 1) Local government officials (DPMPTSP, DISPERINDAG, and the Spatial Planning Office); 2) Representatives of traditional market associations; 3) Community leaders in the affected neighbourhoods; 4) Franchise minimarket outlet manager; and 5) Urban planning experts and local academics.

This purposive approach ensures that data is collected from

individuals directly involved or affected by policies, allowing for a holistic understanding of implementation dynamics. Interviews are conducted using semi-structured interview guides, allowing for the flexibility to delve deeper into key issues. Interview questions focused on: 1) The role of respondents in the implementation of retail policies or governance; 2) Perceived challenges in inter-agency coordination and communication; 3) Observation on zoning violations and permit enforcement; and 4) Suggestions to improve the effectiveness and equivalence of regulations. Each interview lasts approximately 45 to 90 minutes and is recorded (with consent), transcribed verbatim, and encoded for thematic analysis.

Qualitative data were analyzed using thematic coding (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The analysis follows six steps: 1) Introduction with the data; 2) Initial coding; 3) Search for themes; 4) Review themes; 5) Define and name themes; and 6) Generate reports. Themes are organized around Edward III's framework: communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure, with additional themes emerging about policy coordination and community inclusion.

The mixed-method design integrates both data strands at the interpretation stage. After separate analysis, the convergence and divergence between quantitative and qualitative results are examined. For example: 1) Survey responses about satisfaction with enforcement compared to officials' views on resource constraints; and 2) Residents' perceptions of spatial justice are contrasted with planning officials' interpretations of zoning regulations. This integration process provides a richer and triangulation understanding of implementation effectiveness and governance gaps.

To ensure validity and reliability, the following steps are taken: 1) Quantitative validity is ensured through instrument testing, expert reviews, and pilot studies; 2) Qualitative trust is handled using member auditing, triangulation, and audit trails; and 3) Credibility and reliability are enhanced by engaging diverse stakeholder perspectives and maintaining transparency in coding and theme development.

Ethical clearance was obtained from the Institutional Research Ethics Agency of Nurtanio University. All participants provided informed consent, and the study adhered to ethical standards regarding anonymity, confidentiality, and voluntary participation. While the mixed-method approach offers depth and breadth, some limitations remain. Self-reported data in surveys can be influenced by response bias. Interview data can reflect an institutional perspective more than a grassroots experience. Nevertheless, triangulation and deliberate sampling help alleviate these concerns.

## **4 Results**

This section presents research findings based on quantitative survey data (QUAN) and qualitative interview data (QUAL). The results were thematically structured based on the Edwards III framework—which included communication, resources, disposition (executive attitudes), and bureaucratic structures—as well as additional themes that emerged during the analysis.

### **4.1 Communication**

The survey results showed that only 38.5% of the 400 respondents were aware of the zoning regulations that require minimarkets to be at least 1000 meters away from traditional markets. In addition, only 25.2% of respondents stated that they had received socialization or communication from government agencies regarding the minimarket policy.

The Likert scale item that measures satisfaction with government transparency scored an average of 2.84/5, indicating neutral to low public satisfaction. Respondents living in sub-districts with high density of minimarkets (e.g., Cileunyi, Margahayu) were significantly less likely to feel adequately informed ( $p < 0.05$ ) than those in low-density areas.

Interviews with key informants revealed a lack of structured and sustainable communication between the Trade and Industry Office (Disperindag), the Investment and Licensing Office (DPMPTSP), and the general public. Some officials acknowledged that communication about convenience store

regulations is reactive rather than proactive, often occurring only after public complaints have arisen. "We don't have a dedicated communication unit for policy outreach. Usually, people only learn about the rules when there is a conflict." (*Informant 3, DPMPSTSP official*). Traditional traders emphasize that they are rarely consulted or informed about the establishment of new convenience stores near their stalls.

## 4.2 Resources

When asked if the government has enough capacity to enforce minimarket regulations, only 29.1% of respondents agreed. In addition, the majority of respondents (61.3%) consider that illegal convenience stores continue to operate with no visible sanctions, especially in suburban or semi-rural areas. Cross-tabulation showed that younger respondents (ages 18-35) were more critical of perceived enforcement weaknesses compared to older respondents ( $\chi^2 = 8.32, p < 0.01$ ).

Some government officials point to limited human and financial resources as the main obstacles in implementation. Field officers reported difficulties in verifying zoning compliance and conducting routine monitoring, due to insufficient staffing and outdated spatial databases. "We were supposed to check every application against the RDTR [Detailed Spatial Plan], but we didn't have the hands-on system or GIS tools to do it efficiently." (*Informant 6, Office of Spatial Planning*). In addition, internal coordination remains paper-based in some institutions, slowing down the validation process between departments.

## 4.3 Disposition (Attitude of the Executive)

Respondents were asked to assess their trust in government officials to act fairly in issuing minimarket permits. The average score was 2.93/5, with 45% expressing doubts about impartiality. In addition, 58% believe that certain businesses receive preferential treatment, a perception that is more prominent in districts with visible minimarket clusters.

Interviews with civil servants revealed that there was a variation in commitment and wisdom among the implementers. Some

officials showed strong procedural compliance, while others expressed frustration over political interference and ambiguous leadership directions. "Sometimes we know permission shouldn't be granted because of spatial breaches, but pressure from certain actors makes things complicated." (Informant 11, Trade and Industry Officer). Traditional vendors echo this sentiment, alleging that franchise networks often go through procedures through informal channels. This not only undermines public trust but also morality among conscientious implementers.

#### **4.4 Bureaucratic Structure**

Regarding the perception of bureaucratic efficiency, only 32.8% of respondents felt that the minimarket permit process was carried out in a transparent and accountable manner. A large number (43.7%) expressed confusion about which agencies are responsible for law enforcement, indicating fragmentation in the delivery of public services. In districts with overlapping authorities (e.g., a shared market between the village and the municipal administration), satisfaction is much lower.

Qualitative data corroborate these findings. The interviews revealed functional overlap and unclear role definitions between the DPMPTSP, the Disperindag, and the Spatial Planning Office. Each institution handles different policy segments—licensing, monitoring, and spatial validation—but lacks a unified dashboard or coordination platform. "Every office works in isolation. We do not have an integrated information system. So minimarkets can escape the loophole." (Informant 13, DISPERINDAG official). The lack of inter-agency MoUs and the absence of a joint monitoring team contribute to inconsistent law enforcement and weak internal accountability.

#### **4.5 Emerging Themes**

Outside of the Edwards III framework, two additional themes emerged: 1) Community Inclusion and 2) Equity and Spatial Justice. Many informants highlighted the absence of a participatory mechanism in the licensing process. Traditional traders and neighborhood leaders are not involved in decision-

making or consulted during zoning decisions. "Minimarkets appeared overnight. We never know who approved it or why they were allowed near our stalls." (Informant 15, community leader). Spatial analysis revealed that convenience stores are highly concentrated in areas with low-income populations, suggesting predatory location strategies. This raises concerns about retail equity, as traditional vendors in these zones struggle to retain their customer base.

**Table1:Key Results Summary**

Theme	Key Findings	QUAN	Key QUAL Insights
Communication	Low awareness (38.5%) of policies and procedures		Communication is sporadic and unstructured
Resources	61.3% consider law enforcement weak and unlicensed stores		Staff lacks tools, funding, and database support
Disposition	58% suspect unfair treatment in the issuance of permits		Offices face pressure; Some actors skip the rules
Bureaucratic Structure	Confusion about the responsible institution (43.7%)		There is no unified system or coordination framework
Community Inclusion	—		Local communities excluded from licensing discussions
Spatial Justice	—		Poor people are more exposed to the saturation of minimarkets

The findings of this study reveal a complex and diverse landscape of public policy implementation, where formal frameworks coexist with informal practices, institutional fragmentation, and uneven power dynamics. Using the Edwards III implementation model as an analytical lens—complemented by themes that

emerge from qualitative insights—this section discusses how each factor plays a role in the context of minimarket regulation in Bandung Regency, and what these dynamics mean for the broader discourse on local governance and retail spatial justice in a decentralized system.

## **5 Discussion**

### **5.1 Communication: The Missing Chain in Local Policy Socialization**

Effective communication is essential for successful policy implementation. In the context of this study, the low level of public awareness (38.5%) regarding minimarket zoning regulations indicates a significant failure in the dissemination of policies. This is in line with Edward III's statement that unclear or inconsistent communication undermines implementation by creating confusion between the implementer and the public.

Interviews support these findings, revealing that inter-agency communication (especially DPMPTSP and DISPERINDAG) is episodic, uninstitutionalized, and highly dependent on personal initiative. This weak inter-organizational coordination mirrors the findings of Lipsky (1980), who noted that street-level bureaucrats often operate in a communication vacuum that limits their effectiveness.

In addition, a lack of proactive engagement with the community fosters a perception of exclusion, weakening trust and support. Arnstein's (1969) citizen participation model reminds us that without meaningful interactions, governance becomes technocratic and distant—exactly as traditional traders report in this study.

### **5.2 Resources: Capacity Constraints in Practice**

Resources—financial, human, technological—are the operational backbone of any implementation effort. The findings that 61.3% of respondents believe that minimarket rules are not well enforced, and the acceptance by public officials of outdated staffing limitations and spatial tools, highlight the severe capacity gap in Bandung Regency's retail governance.



These findings support Grindle's 1980 (Grindle, 2017) proposition that resource sufficiency is a core obstacle to effective policy realization, especially in development contexts where implementation capacity is often assumed but not provided. The case of Bandung is symbolic of a broader pattern in Indonesian local government, where the decentralization of authority is not always accompanied by adequate resources (Derthick, 1974; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984) .

In addition, the lack of digital integrations—such as GIS-based zoning validation—points to a persistent reliance on manual and fragmented systems, further slowing down law enforcement and allowing convenience stores to operate in spatial gray areas. This is consistent with the findings of Hudalah et al. (2014), which emphasize that weak technical enforcement mechanisms undermine spatial planning in Indonesian cities(Grindle, 2017).

### **5.3 Disposition: Implementation Politics**

While laws may exist, the attitudes, motivations, and wisdom of the implementers shape what actually happens on the ground. The survey findings reveal low public trust in bureaucratic impartiality, and qualitative data confirm that officials often face political pressure from investors and interest groups when evaluating applications for convenience store licenses.

This reflects Edwards III's third variable—disposition—as a critical determinant of policy outcomes. When the implementer lacks autonomy or feels powerless, their willingness to enforce the rules is reduced. This is especially evident in cases where zoning violations are known but not acted upon due to the "invisible hand" that affects the permitting process.

In addition, some officials acknowledged ambiguity in interpreting spatial planning guidelines, so law enforcement was inconsistent across sub-districts. This administrative ambivalence erodes the credibility of the regulatory system and creates fertile ground for informal negotiation and favoritism—what Buehler (2010) calls the "patronage trap" in decentralized government.

## **5.4 Bureaucratic Structure: Fragmentation and Functional Overlap**

The bureaucratic structure in retail governance in Bandung Regency is highly segmented, with overlapping responsibilities between licensing authorities, trade offices, and spatial planning bodies. Survey responses show confusion among citizens about which agency handles which part of the process. Interviews with officials confirmed the lack of a shared information system, joint operating procedures, or inter-agency task force.

These findings confirm Edward III's fourth dimension—bureaucratic structure—as a key variable in implementation failure. According to Peters and Pierre (Peters & Pierre, 2006; Pierre & Peters, 2020), fragmented governance in a multi-agency environment can lead to a "silo effect", where each institution protects its own territory without a systemic view of the issue.

In this regard, the absence of integrated monitoring has allowed convenience stores to exploit procedural blind spots, especially in suburban and rural environments where supervision is weaker. Without a clear line of accountability or collaborative mechanisms, bureaucratic fragmentation remains one of the most persistent obstacles to policy coherence.

## **5.5 Equity, Participation, and Spatial Justice**

Beyond the Edwards III model, the study uncovers broader normative issues—particularly regarding spatial equity and participatory governance. The fact that convenience stores are disproportionately clustered in low-income areas, where traditional merchants lack resilience, suggests a predatory location strategy by corporate retailers. This has implications for retail spatial justice, a concept articulated by Soja (2013), which emphasizes equitable access to economic opportunities and urban services.

In addition, the exclusion of traditional traders from licensing dialogues reflects a deeper problem of procedural injustice. The absence of participatory forums, grievance mechanisms, or consultative processes indicates a top-down governance model that risks further alienating marginal actors. As Gonzalez and

Waley (2013)) say, urban retail restructuring in the Global South often reproduces inequality unless equity is embedded into the governance architecture.

These concerns resonate with local voices on the ground demanding a more transparent, accountable, and inclusive regulatory system, not only to protect livelihoods but also to build social legitimacy in public institutions.

#### Triangulation Interpretation: Mixed Method Values

The simultaneous use of quantitative and qualitative methods in this study enriches the analytical depth and increases the credibility of the findings. While quantitative data offers breadth—revealing trends in public perception and satisfaction—qualitative interviews provide contextual insights into why those trends exist.

For example, low awareness scores in surveys were explained through interviews as a product of institutional neglect in policy outreach. Similarly, public doubts about fairness are evidenced by officials' recognition of external pressure and lack of procedural protections. This triangulation adds resilience to the conclusions and underscores the value of a mixed-methods approach in public policy research, especially when dealing with complex governance issues.

### **5.6 Implications for Policy and Practice**

The findings of this study show several critical areas for policy improvement in the implementation of minimarket regulations in Bandung Regency. First, there is an urgent need for institutional integration through the establishment of a joint task force that includes licensing authorities, trade departments, and spatial planning offices. These inter-agency units should operate under a shared database and standard operating procedures (SOPs) to ensure consistency and reduce bureaucratic fragmentation. Second, strengthening digital enforcement mechanisms is very important. Investments in spatial data tools—such as GIS systems—and online permit tracking platforms will enable real-time monitoring, improve regulatory transparency, and improve detection of zoning violations.

Third, increasing community participation is essential to build legitimacy and inclusivity. Participatory forums should be created to allow traditional market vendors, local leaders, and residents to voice concerns, contribute to policy design, and participate in retail zoning decisions. Fourth, local governments should invest in capacity building by training field officers in spatial analysis, conflict resolution, and community engagement. Such training will improve the professional implementation of policies and reduce discretionary inconsistencies. Finally, transparency and accountability should be institutionalized by issuing approved permits and licensing information through publicly accessible platforms. A transparent process, combined with grievance redress mechanisms, can reduce perceptions of favoritism and promote public trust in the regulatory system. Together, these recommendations aim to encourage a more coordinated, inclusive and equitable governance framework for retail development in the region.

In short, the challenge of implementing the minimarket policy in Bandung Regency is not rooted in the absence of formal rules but in how they are understood, communicated, enforced, and negotiated among actors with unequal power and capacity. Bridging the gap between regulation and reality requires not only technical improvements but also a governance paradigm that is inclusive, fair, and adaptive to local socio-political dynamics.

## **6 Conclusion**

Based on This study aims to evaluate the implementation of minimarket structuring policies in Bandung Regency, Indonesia, using a mixed research method approach and based on the Edwards III policy implementation framework. Drawing from survey responses of 400 residents and in-depth interviews with 17 key stakeholders, the study uncovered a substantial gap between regulatory design and implementation realities.

These findings suggest that despite formal policies and spatial planning regulations to govern convenience store operations—especially regarding zoning, licensing, and fair competition with traditional markets—implementation is far from optimal. In the

four core dimensions of the Edwards III model—communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure—deficiencies are constantly observed.

Communication between agencies and with the public remains ad hoc, non-institutional, and reactive. Public awareness of the policy framework is very low, undermining citizen participation and trust. Limited resources, both human and technological, have hampered law enforcement capacity, leaving many convenience stores operating without permits or violating spatial planning rules. Implementing attitudes, shaped by bureaucratic ambiguity and political interference, further contribute to the inconsistent application of the rules. Finally, the bureaucratic structure—fragmented across multiple agencies with overlapping mandates and poor coordination—prevents coherent and timely policy implementation.

Beyond these structural factors, the study also identifies critical normative issues around spatial justice and societal exclusion. Convenience stores tend to be overly concentrated in low-income areas, threatening the survival of traditional retailers and raising questions about fairness in retail geography. At the same time, traditional traders and local communities remain sidelined from policy dialogues and decision-making processes, reflecting a top-down approach to governance that is increasingly at odds with the principles of decentralization and participatory planning.

Theoretically, the study contributes to the literature by operationalizing the Edwards III model in the context of a decentralized Global South, while also integrating insights from spatial justice theory and local governance studies. Methodologically, this study describes the strength of mixed method research in capturing systemic patterns and life experiences of policy implementation.

In practical terms, these findings point to the urgent need for institutional reform—especially in terms of digital integration, inter-agency coordination, capacity building, and participatory mechanisms—to ensure that the regulation of convenience stores becomes a tool for inclusive urban development rather than a source of economic dislocation.

In conclusion, the success of minimarket regulation is not only a technical issue but a matter of governance quality, equity, and accountability. Local governments must move beyond rule-making to foster a coherent, responsive, and inclusive policy ecosystem that balances modernization with the protection of traditional economies and vulnerable communities. Without these reforms, the promise of spatially fair and economically equitable retail development will remain unfulfilled.

formulation of such policies, should the resources not be accompanied by other structural or institutional complementarities. The second hypothesis hinged on a relationship between resource availability and support services in developing law models and legal systems was supported comprehensively. This knowledge showed that there is a fair and positive correlation between resource and legal aspects especially on how the available resources contribute to the improvement of the legal systems in supporting inclusive education policies. This goes a long way in advocating for the need to search for the item that would have aided in strengthening the legal frameworks supporting the policies for autistic children. The third hypothesis under consideration was also confirmed by the results of the study: The subject under consideration: Integration of autistic children into educational environments is also the source of positive influences on the governmental initiatives of innovations. From the research evidence it is apparent that integrating autistic students has a positive impact on the development of new government policies. As this outcome shows, experiential learning in inclusive education environments can stimulate policy development. That is why when teachers and child supervisors, principals and judges prefer working directly with autistic children, they, in turn, receive more meaningful information that can contribute to producing effective public policies regarding the child's autism condition. Despite this, it has not been shown how the fourth hypothesis about the likely influence of autistic children's inclusion on legal systems and models happened. The findings showed that blending these youngsters into educational contexts does not significantly alter legal systems' development in

the way it modifies government innovation. This evidence implies that although integration facilitates policy changes on a governmental scale, legal frameworks call for further mechanisms or pressures, separate from direct educational integration, to develop. The outcomes of the study reaffirmed the hypothesis that positive effects on government innovation initiatives come from legal systems. Legal frameworks built for efficiency promote government policies that consequently create an environment conducive to innovation. The evidence shared illustrates that strong legal frameworks are important in supporting government programs endorsing comprehensive strategies for inclusive education. Relating to the effect of school leaders and teachers' readiness on legal systems, both hypotheses were accepted. It has been found that unyielding or traditional leadership by school authorities can lead to major negative consequences on law models and legal systems. Alternatively, the preparedness of teachers had a positive and statistically important consequence on the legal frameworks. This reveals that teachers with knowledge and training can obtain support for inclusive education through the legal framework. Fundamentally, the research presents the core information about the contribution of legal frameworks in assisting government strategies on inclusive education for autistic children. The research shows that the critical factors in developing effective legal frameworks and government innovation are resources, integration experiences, and teacher preparedness. While it is resource availability that shapes legal adaptation, the direct integration of autistic students into our community has a greater influence on government

policy. Plus, the results show that school leadership should be attached to emerging legal and policy frameworks to hinder innovation, and that educator preparedness is necessary to drive legal and institutional change. This data is immensely important for policymakers, educators, and administrators in Zhejiang Province and other regions, resulting in a more direct understanding of the essential components needed for creating inclusive education environments.

This study identifies extremely significant impacts by

emphasizing the need for policy adjustments, improvements to the legal framework, and a strong push for comprehensive educational paradigms. The results inform policy decisions and support the continued development of legislative frameworks that actively support and encourage the integration of autistic children into Zhejiang province's educational system. Recommendations of research efforts for future teachers, policy makers and envision a collaborative educational environment through stakeholders that supports the overall integration of students with autism. This environment will overcome obstacles and promote a holistic educational ethic that supports the full potential of each learner.

## **7 Implications**

### **7.1 Policy implications**

The findings of this study present several practical implications for local governments, urban planners, and policy practitioners seeking to improve fair retail governance and effective policy implementation in decentralized settings. First, there is a clear need for increased institutional integration and coordination between key institutions such as DPMPTSP, DISPERINDAG, and spatial planning authorities. Establishing a unified task force or joint monitoring body will reduce bureaucratic fragmentation and promote a more consistent and efficient approach to licensing, oversight, and law enforcement. Second, digitization of licensing and zoning enforcement is very important. The use of geographic information systems (GIS), online permit tracking, and real-time monitoring dashboards can significantly improve transparency, reduce administrative errors, and improve compliance with spatial regulations. Third, community participation in retail spatial planning must be strengthened by creating an inclusive forum that brings together traditional market traders, community leaders, and local stakeholders. Such participation can increase the legitimacy of zoning decisions and foster greater public trust in government agencies. Fourth, promoting a transparent and publicly accessible licensing process—including publishing a list of licensed convenience stores and opening public complaint channels—will increase



accountability and help prevent unethical practices. Finally, the development of an equity-oriented policy framework is critical to prevent the concentration of convenience stores in vulnerable environments. Retail zoning policies should be guided by spatial equity assessments, and supporting programs such as subsidies, technical training, or simplified licensing processes should be geared toward strengthening the competitiveness of traditional vendors. Collectively, these strategies can foster a more balanced, inclusive, and sustainable urban retail environment.

## **8 Limitations and Future Direction**

While complete, Although this study provides a comprehensive evaluation of the implementation of minimarket regulation policies in Bandung Regency, some limitations must be acknowledged. First, the geographic scope of the study is limited to one district, which, while insightful, may limit the generalization of findings to other regions with different administrative structures, urban dynamics, and political-economic conditions. Second, the study used a cross-sectional design, with data collected at a single point in time, thus limiting the ability to capture evolving attitudes, behavior changes, or policy outcomes in the long term. Third, reliance on self-reported data from survey respondents and interview informants introduces potential biases, such as memory errors or social desirability—especially among government officials dealing with institutional constraints. Finally, the limited inclusion of private minimarket chains means that corporate practices, lobbying strategies, and internal compliance mechanisms remain underexplored, which may ignore important aspects of policy resistance or adaptation on the part of powerful retail actors.

To expand on the understanding established in this study, future studies should consider several avenues. Longitudinal research is recommended to examine how the implementation and effectiveness of convenience store regulations evolve over time and how those changes affect spatial equity and societal outcomes. Comparative research in multiple districts or provinces can uncover best practices and uncover systemic bottlenecks in

various local governance contexts. In addition, quantitative spatial analysis using GIS tools can help visualize and assess the geographical distribution of convenience stores, especially in relation to traditional markets, educational facilities, and economically vulnerable areas. Finally, the analysis of policy networks will offer a deeper look at how various actors—including politicians, investors, civil society organizations, and trade associations—interact and influence policy outcomes, providing a richer and more nuanced understanding of power relations and implementation dynamics in the modern retail sector.

### **Acknowledgement:**

The authors would like to express their sincere gratitude to all individuals and institutions who contributed to the success of this study. Special thanks are extended to the local government officials, community leaders, and waste management practitioners in Bandung Regency for their valuable time and insights during the survey and interview processes. We also acknowledge the support provided by the participating urban villages (*kelurahan*) and sub-districts (*kecamatan*), whose cooperation was essential for the completion of both the quantitative and qualitative phases of the research. We are deeply grateful to the academic advisors and colleagues who provided constructive feedback and guidance throughout the research process. Appreciation is also due to the research assistants and enumerators for their dedication in data collection and transcription.

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