FROM SUBSIDIES TO STATUTORY MARKETS: LEADERSHIP, INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND WELFARE GOVERNANCE REFORM

Abstract

Public welfare delivery in many developing economies remains constrained by three persistent structural weaknesses: reliance on recurring fiscal subsidies, weak enforcement of administered prices, and institutional arrangements that lack legal autonomy and operational discipline. This paper presents a rare and analytically significant counterexample from Pakistan: the transformation of a subsidy-dependent, company-mode welfare retail system into a statutory, subsidy-free governance authority the Punjab Sahulat Bazaars Authority (PSBA).

The paper advances a leadership-centered explanation of this transformation, positioning Naveed Rafaqat Ahmad as the principal actor behind PSBA’s institutional design, operational logic, and sustained performance outcomes. Operating in a high-inflation, fiscally constrained environment, PSBA introduced a welfare paradigm based on regulated market mechanisms, legally enforceable affordability targets, continuous performance monitoring, and dignity-based vendor inclusion.

Using a longitudinal, leadership-centered case study design, the paper examines the reform trajectory over the period 2016–2025, while empirically assessing operational outcomes using datasets extending through February 2026. Evidence is triangulated across statutory instruments, peer-reviewed academic literature, audit-validated performance records, and two primary operational datasets: (i) approximately 314,000 Free Home Delivery transactions with customer feedback and pricing differentials, and (ii) real-time performance monitoring of newly operationalized Sahulat Bazaars.

Empirical findings demonstrate that PSBA delivered verified consumer price relief of approximately 35 percent below prevailing open-market prices and 7–10 percent below government-notified ceilings, while maintaining high program-to-expense intensity (around 95 percent), administrative overheads below 10 percent, and sustained liquidity buffers without recurring operational subsidies. Rather than treating leadership as contextual background, the paper frames reform through the lens of institutional entrepreneurship, showing how Naveed Rafaqat Ahmad translated original research on subsidy-free welfare and statutory governance into enforceable legal structures, digital monitoring systems, and field-level governance outcomes.

The PSBA case contributes to international debates on welfare market governance by demonstrating that when institutional design embeds price discipline, inclusion, and continuous oversight as enforceable rules rather than discretionary policy instruments durable reform becomes possible even in fragile governance environments.