NECESSITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN DELIMITATION AND THE SHIFTING REGIME OF RESTRICTIONS: TO REVIEW OR NOT TO REVIEW

Abstract

Delimitation, the process of redrawing electoral boundaries, forms the cornerstone of representative democracy. In India, this exercise is constitutionally mandated to uphold the principle of “one person, one value, one vote.” Yet, the question of judicial review over delimitation orders remains deeply contested. Article 329(a) of the Constitution, read with Section 10 of the Delimitation Act, 2002, imposes an almost absolute bar on judicial scrutiny. This was firmly upheld in Meghraj Kothari v. Delimitation Commission, where the Supreme Court reasoned that judicial intervention could indefinitely stall elections. However, recent rulings mark a shift from this rigid “hands-off” approach. In cases such as Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. Secretary Governors Secretariat, State of Goa v. Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh, and Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod v. Union of India, the Court cautiously reopened avenues for judicial oversight, especially in instances of mala fide actions, arbitrariness, or illegality.

This article critically examines this evolving jurisprudence in three stages. First, it identifies challenges likely to emerge in the forthcoming nationwide delimitation post-2026, including unequal seat distribution across states with varying population growth rates and the looming risk of gerrymandering. These concerns strike at the legitimacy of electoral equality. Second, the article draws on comparative perspectives from jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and the United States. While both have historically refrained from interfering in boundary revisions, courts have intervened to prevent racial gerrymandering, abuse of power, or errors of law. Such experiences demonstrate that limited judicial review is essential to safeguard democratic fairness. Third, the article evaluates how the Indian judiciary has begun to soften the rigidity of Meghraj Kothari, with Kishorchandra Rathod offering the strongest justification for limited review where citizens lack alternative remedies.

The central argument advanced is that absolute judicial restraint risks legitimizing electoral manipulation and undermining democracy. Courts, as guardians of constitutional values, must retain narrow powers of review to address demonstrable illegality or mala fides. Accordingly, two recommendations are proposed: first, that a larger Constitution Bench clarify and consolidate the emerging jurisprudence, and second, that legislative amendments to Articles 81 and 82 of the Constitution, alongside reforms to the Delimitation Act, 2002, be undertaken to correct structural imbalances in representation.

In conclusion, the upcoming delimitation exercise post-2026 presents both opportunity and challenge. The debate should not hinge on whether to review or not to review, but rather on delineating the circumstances in which judicial intervention is both justified and necessary. Limited, principled judicial review remains indispensable to safeguarding electoral justice in India.